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2Executive Summary:
The development focus of the Doha Round emerged from a renewed spirit of
collective responsibility for the challenges faced by poor countries, and also as a
response to the perceived inequities generated by previous rounds of trade
negotiations. Unfortunately, in the years since it was launched, the Doha Round
has not delivered on its development mandate in several important respects.
First, there has been little progress on the issues of interest to developing
countries (especially agriculture, labor mobility, and labor-intensive
manufactures and services). Second, the new issues on the agenda, the so-called
‘Singapore Issues’, primarily reflect the interests of the advanced industrial
countries and have been strongly opposed by many developing countries. Third,
the domestic and bilateral actions of several OECD countries have led to
questions about their commitment to the multilateral development agenda.1
Finally, there has been only limited reform to the culture and procedures of the
WTO.
This report presents an alternative way forward for the Doha Round based on
social justice and economic analysis. The first part of the report proposes an
alternative agenda for the Round. It suggests principles that should motivate the
negotiations and identifies priority initiatives which would deliver significant
gains to developing countries and increase global efficiency. It also
recommends institutional reforms necessary to make global trade negotiations
more effective and inclusive.
The primary principle of the Doha Round must be to ensure that the agreements
promote development in poor countries. To make this principle operational, the
WTO needs to foster a culture of robust economic analysis to identify pro-
development proposals and promote them to the top of the agenda. In practice
this means establishing a source of impartial and publicly available analysis of
the effects of different initiatives on different countries and groups within
countries. This should be a core responsibility of an expanded WTO Secretariat.
Based on this analysis, any agreement that differentially hurts developing
countries or provides disproportionate benefits to developed countries should be
presumptively viewed as unfair and regarded as being against the spirit of the
Development Round.
                                                 
1 See the US Farm Bill of 2002 (Farm Security and Rural Investment Act 2002) which increases domestic
support to agricultural producers and the European Commission’s Luxembourg reform of the common
agricultural policy which did little to cut the total level of European agricultural support.
3The agreements must enshrine both de jure and de facto fairness. This means
ensuring that developing countries are not prevented from unlocking the
benefits of free trade because of a lack of institutional capacity. In this regard,
developing countries will require special assistance to enable them to participate
equally in the WTO.
The principle of fairness should also be sensitive to countries’ initial conditions.
Special and differential treatment is needed to recognize that adjustment to new
trading rules involves particularly high costs for developing countries whose
institutions are weakest and whose populations are most vulnerable. Prescriptive
multilateral agreements must not be allowed to run roughshod over national
strategies to deal with idiosyncratic development problems.
This report presents pro-development priorities that should form the core of the
Doha Round agreements. Primary attention should be given to market access for
goods produced by developing countries. There is an urgent need to reduce
protection on labor-intensive manufactures (textiles and food processing),
agricultural goods, and unskilled services (maritime and construction services).
Priority should also be given to the development of schemes to increase labor
mobility – particularly the facilitation of temporary migration for unskilled
workers. As tariff barriers have come down, developed countries have
increasingly resorted to non-tariff barriers; these need to be circumscribed.
Significant change in the outcomes of multilateral trade agreements must be
supported by institutional reforms. A fair agreement is unlikely to be produced
through an unfair process. In particular, greater transparency and openness is
required to create a more inclusive bargaining process and put an end to the
infamous ‘green room’ negotiations.
The Report makes clear that there is a huge discrepancy between the
Development Round trade agenda, both as it was formulated at Doha and as it
has evolved since, and a true Development Round agenda, that would reflect the
interests and concerns of the developing world. Such an agenda would promote
growth in developing countries and work to reduce the huge disparity that
separates them from the more advanced industrial countries.
Part 2 of this report considers some of the issues associated with the adjustment
process to a new trade regime. In one sense these adjustment costs can be
thought of as the price to be paid for the benefits of multilateral trade
liberalization. It is these adjustment costs together with the trade benefits that
determine the net effect of trade reform for each country. The Doha Round has
placed renewed emphasis on the importance of sharing the benefits of trade
reform fairly among developed and developing countries. However there has
been less attention to the distribution of adjustment costs among countries. The
fact that implementation and adjustment costs are likely to be larger in
4developing countries, unemployment rates are likely to be higher, safety nets
weaker, and risk markets poor are all facts that have to be taken into account in
trade negotiations. For the some of the smallest and poorest states, the
adjustment costs of trade liberalization may significantly outweigh the benefits
available.
If the Development Round is to bring widespread benefits to people living in
developing countries - and if there is to be widespread support for the
continuing agenda for trade reform and liberalization - the developed world
must make a stronger commitment than it has provided in the past to giving
assistance to the developing world. Assistance is required not only to help bear
the often large costs associated with trade reform, but also to enable developing
countries to avail themselves of the new opportunities provided by a more
integrated global economy.
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91 Introduction
In the aftermath of the failure of Cancun, there is a need to reassess the direction
of global trade negotiations.  In Doha, the nations of the world agreed to a new
round of trade negotiations, which would redress some of the imbalances of the
past, imbalances which it was widely felt had benefited the advanced industrial
countries at the expense of developing countries.  There was, in fact, some basis
for the complaints of the developing countries, both in terms of the manner in
which trade negotiations had been conducted in the past2 and in terms of the
outcomes.3  Many of the participants in the Cancun meeting felt that Europe and
the United States had reneged on the promises that had been made at Doha,
emblemized by the lack of progress in agriculture.
There were mutual recriminations about who was to blame for the failure.
There was even disagreement about who would suffer the most.  The United
States and Europe were quick to assert that it was the developing countries who
were the ultimate losers4.  But many developing countries had taken the view
that no agreement was better than a bad agreement, and that the Doha round was
rushing headlong (if any trade agreement can be described as “rushing”) into
                                                 
2 Of particular concern was the lack of transparency (including “green room negotiations, in which only a
few chosen countries from the developing world engaged in negotiations with the United States and
Europe) and the disadvantageous position the developing countries had in these negotiations, simply
because of the complexity of the negotiations and their limited staffs.  See for example the open letter,
dated 6 November 1999, sent by 11 developing countries to the WTO chairman Ambassador Ali Mchumo
of Tanzania, expressing their concern over the lack of transparency in the WTO Green room process.
3 A widely quoted World Bank study estimated that Sub-Saharan Africa was actually worse off as a result
of the terms of trade effects generated by the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations. The United Nations
Development Programme estimates that under the WTO regime, in the period 1995 to 2004, the 48 least
developed countries will actually be worse off by $600 million a year, with sub-Saharan Africa actually
worse off by $1.2 billion. The UN Development Programme also says that 70% of the gains of the Uruguay
Round will go to developed countries, with most of the rest going to a relatively few large export-oriented
developing countries. UNDP HDR [1997]. Similar concerns are raised about the “allowed” trade
restrictions.  Textiles remain the one major area of quotas, and those these are supposed to end in 2005,
there is concern that the developed countries will either not fulfill their commitments (a ten year transition
period was provided, to facilitate “adjustment,” but little adjustment occurred in the first eight years); or
they will replace the quotas with extremely high tariffs; or they will use safeguards or other non-tariff
barriers.  While it is often emphasized that average tariffs of developing countries remain higher than those
of developed countries, it is also true that developed countries average tariffs against developing countries
are higher than their average tariffs against developing countries, even taking into account existing
preferences.
4 See the op eds in the Financial Times and the New York Times.  Zoellick, Robert, B.  ‘America will not
wait for the won't-do countries’. Financial Times, September 22, 2003, Pg. 23.
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one which, rather than redressing the imbalances of the past, would actually
make them worse off.  Though some progress had been made in addressing the
concerns about the manner in which the negotiations were conducted, the failure
to address these concerns fully5 generated the further worry that the developing
countries would, somehow, be strong-armed in the end into an agreement that
was disadvantageous to them. There were also threats, especially by the United
States, that it would effectively abandon the multilateral approach, taking up a
bilateral approach.  It differentiated between the “can do” countries and others,
and suggested that the “can do” countries would benefit from a series of
bilateral agreements.6
This paper takes a step back from these disputes. It attempts to support progress
in the current round by asking, what should a Development Round of trade
negotiations look like?  What would an agreement that was based on principles
of economic analysis and social justice—not on economic power and special
interests—look like?  Our analysis concludes that the agenda would look
markedly different from that which has been at the center of discussions for the
past two years, and that the fears of the developing countries that the Doha
round of trade negotiations (were the demands of the developed countries
acceded to) would disadvantage them were in fact justified.
Section 2 of this paper addresses the need for a Development Round. It
examines some elements of the experience of developing countries in previous
trade negotiations and briefly reviews some of the potential gains available from
further liberalization. Section 3 is a brief review of the Doha round so far, and
the extent to which it has lived up to the expectations of developing countries.
Most of this paper is what is sometimes called “blue sky” analysis:  it
approaches the issues from a fresh start, relatively unencumbered by concerns
of politics and what has happened in the recent past. Section 4 outlines the
principles of a Development Round of trade negotiations.  Section 5 details the
priorities of a Development Round of trade negotiations in the context of
today’s international setting and section 6 considers several issues of particular
interest to developing countries.
Finally section 7 takes a brief look at some institutional reforms that might
facilitate a more transparent and democratic negotiating process, and one which
might more likely result in agreements that were both fair and in the general
interests of the world.
                                                 
5 Most notable in this regard was the request by a number of developing countries that the Cancun draft be
prepared on the basis of views and inputs at open-ended consultations, and where there was no consensus,
to clearly indicate the differing positions or views. The proposal was rejected by a coalition of developed
countries.
6 The smaller developing countries recognized that in these bilateral discussions their bargaining position
was even weaker than it was in the multilateral setting.  Several of the bilateral trade agreements made
since Cancun have shown that these worries were justified.  On the other hand, the United States has not
succeeded in a bilateral trade agreement with any major developing country.
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2 The Need for a Development Round
2.1 Redressing past imbalances
In June 1993 the Uruguay Round (UR) was finally brought to a close. Part of
the impetus for members to conclude the round was the promise of large welfare
gains that had been projected by many researchers. In 1992-1993, the World
Bank, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, and
various other institutions made projections of welfare gains in the order of $200
billion a year.7 A large share of the gains was predicted to accrue to developing
countries.8
In hindsight these estimates – particularly in relation to developing countries –
were over-optimistic. It has since been estimated that 70% of the gains from the
Uruguay Round will go to developed countries, with most of the rest going to a
relatively few large export-oriented developing countries. Indeed many of the
poorest countries in the world would actually be worse off as a result of the
round. In the first six years of the Uruguay round (1995-2001), the 48 least
developed countries will actually be worse off by some $600 million a year,
with sub-Saharan Africa worse off by $1.2 billion. (UNDP HDR [1997], p. 82).
One reason was that the modeled scenarios were not fully reflected in actual
events.9  Several reforms, which were significant sources of predicted gains, did
not proceed as had been hoped early in the negotiations. For example, the
Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC) was structured to significantly
                                                 
7 Indeed after Marrakech, the GATT secretariat put forward a larger estimate of the minimum gain of $500
billion per year. For a discussion of the projections see Safadi and Laird, 1996, "The Uruguay Round
Agreements: Impact on Developing Countries", World Development, Volume 24, No7, pp.1223-1242. For
a survey of the various estimates see Dani Rodrik, "Developing countries after the Uruguay Round", paper
prepared for the Group of 24, mimeo, August 1994. See also Will Martin and L. Alan Winters, editors, The
Uruguay Round and the Developing Countries, Cambridge University Press, 1996, and T. N. Srinivasan,
Developing Countries and Multilateral Trading System, Westview Press, 1998.
8 The gain to developing countries was estimated at up to 90 billion dollars, or roughly one third of the
$200bn total gain predicted at the time (OECD 1993).
9 The models themselves also make assumptions that may not be fully appropriate for less developed
countries.  See Charlton and Stiglitz [2004].
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backload liberalization;10 the ability of tariff-rate quotas (TRQs) to liberalize
agricultural market access was overestimated; and the costs of implementation
were almost completely ignored.
In addition the Uruguay Round agenda reflected, in large part, the priorities of
developed countries. Market access gains for example were concentrated in
areas of interest to developed countries and there was only marginal progress on
the priorities of developing countries (particularly in agriculture and textiles).
The result of this regressive asymmetry was that after the implementation of
Uruguay Round commitments, the average OECD tariff on imports from
developing countries is four times higher than on imports originating in the
OECD (Laird 2002). Domestic protection (particularly agricultural subsidies) is
also much higher in developed countries, amounting to more than US$300bn in
2002. The impact of this protection is particularly regressive since producers in
the poorest developing countries are the most affected by OECD policies. Only
4 per cent of the exports of developed countries are subsidized by another WTO
member, but 6.4 per cent of the exports of middle income countries are
subsidized. By contrast, a much larger share (29.4 per cent) of the exports of the
poorest countries (not including China and India) are subsidized by another
WTO member.11
As well as receiving a small share of the gains from the Uruguay Round,
developing countries accepted a remarkable range of obligations and
responsibilities. New trade rules and domestic disciplines were introduced, but
they too reflected the priorities and needs of developed countries more than
developing countries (e.g., subsidies were permitted for agriculture, but not
industrial products). Many of the rules acted to constrain the policy options
(such as industrial policies) of developing countries, in some cases prohibiting
the use of instruments that had been used by developed countries at comparable
stages of their development. Many of the new obligations imposed significant
burdens on developing countries. In return the least developed countries were
promised financial assistance with implementation costs and extensions of
preferential market access schemes. The common feature of these commitments
is that they were non-binding on developed countries. As a consequence
developing countries found themselves at the mercy of the goodwill of
developed countries. As Finger and Schuler (2000) aptly note: “the developing
countries took a bound commitments to implement in exchange for unbound
commitment of assistance”. Insufficient attention has subsequently been paid to
the enormous demands upon developing countries in implementing the outcome
from the Uruguay Round. Agreements related to intellectual property, customs
                                                 
10 The developed countries were given a decade to remove their textiles quota; many thought the extra time
would allow them a smoother adjustment process.  In practice, little if any adjustment has occurred.  Only
the day of reckoning was postponed.
11 These may underestimate the relative effects of subsidies if developing countries’ exports are more
concentrated in those agricultural products which attract subsidies.
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valuation, technical barriers to trade and agricultural food safety have been
particular targets of criticism in this regard.12
2.2 Unfinished business
The 1994 Agreement on Agriculture defined a framework in which agricultural
protection could be negotiated in the WTO, but it did not deliver significant
benefits to developing countries. Martin and Winters (1995) note that the
Agreement on Agriculture achieved “little in terms of immediate market
opening.” Indeed the level of OECD farm protection was not noticeably
reduced.  In 1986-88 transfers were equivalent to 51 percent of all OECD farm
production, and fourteen years later, after the implementation of Uruguay
commitments, they still account for 48 per cent of all farm production - roughly
US$320 billion (OECD, 2003).  Trade-distorting measures of industrialized
nations displace the agricultural exports of developing countries. By
suppressing world prices, these policies have a direct effect on farm incomes.13
Moreover, there may be dynamic effects when investment is suppressed in
countries whose trade is affected by OECD support.14
In non-agricultural goods, there is also scope for further liberalization. The
significant liberalization of manufacturing tariffs in developed countries over
the last two decades might suggest that there is little to gain from further
negotiations on industrial products. However if this is true to some extent for
developed countries, it is certainly not the case for developing countries. While
average developed country tariff rates are low, they maintain high barriers to
many of the goods exported most intensively by developing countries. When
weighted by import volumes, developing countries face average manufacturing
tariffs of 3.4 per cent on their exports to developed countries, more than four
times higher than the average rate faced by goods from developed countries, 0.8
per cent (Hertel and Martin, 2000).  Moreover aggregate data hides the
                                                 
12Many developing countries have been unable to meet their Uruguay Round obligations because of these
high costs. By January 2000, up to 90 of the WTOs 109 developing country members were in violation of
the SPS, customs valuation, and TRIPs agreements. Estimates of the cost of compliance to the Uruguay
agreements vary widely depending on the quality of the existing systems and the strength of institutions in
each country. Hungary spent more than $40 million to upgrade the level of sanitation of its slaughterhouses
alone. Mexico spent more than $30 million to upgrade intellectual property laws. Finger (2000) suggests
that for many of the least developed countries in the WTO compliance with these agreements is a less
attractive investment than expenditure on basic development goals such as education.
13 Estimates of the downward impact on world prices caused by OECD domestic support are between 3.5-
5% for many agricultural commodities including wheat & other coarse grains and oilseeds (Dimaranan et
al. (2003)).
14 Diao, Diaz-Bonilla, and Robinson (2003) report that protectionism and subsidies by industrialized
nations cost developing countries about US$24 billion annually in lost agricultural and agro-industrial
income. Latin America and the Caribbean lose about US$8.3 billion in annual income from agriculture,
Asia loses some US$6.6 billion, and sub-Saharan Africa, close to US$2 billion. Their estimates do not
include dynamic effects.
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existence of tariff peaks. In the United States, post-Uruguay-Round tariff rates
on more than half of textile and clothing imports are between 15 and 35 per
cent, while in Japan 22 per cent of textile imports face tariffs of 10-15 per cent
(UNCTAD 1996).  Similarly in the processed food sector, Canadian, Japanese
and EU tariffs on fully processed food are 42, 65 and 24 per cent respectively.
By contrast, the least processed products face tariffs of 3, 35, and 15 per cent in
these countries (World Bank 2002). Such tariff escalation serves to discourage
the development of food processing in LDC’s since the effective tariff rate on
“value added” in food processing is very high.  Tariff escalation and tariff peaks
are manifestly unfair and have a particularly pernicious effect on development
by restricting industrial diversification in the poorest countries.
After the Uruguay Round, there was also a widely held view that the TRIPS
agreement needed to be reviewed, particularly in its application to public health
and bio-piracy. Article 71.1 of TRIPS provided for a review of the
implementation of the TRIPS Agreement after year 2000, and for possible
reviews "in the light of any relevant new developments which might warrant
modification or amendment". Many developing countries felt that the
Agreement as it stood primarily reflected IPRs protection suitable for developed
countries, but which largely disregarded important factors in developing
countries.
International rules for intellectual property rights have potentially huge public
health effects and global distributional consequences. Unbalanced rules—and
there is a concern that present rules are unbalanced—can impede efforts to close
the north-south ‘knowledge gap’. Additionally the WTO also has the
responsibility to protect indigenous knowledge. While there have been a few
dramatic bio-piracy cases,15 the full impact of expanded patentability remains
uncertain.  Patent laws need to be changed so that the onus of proof reversed
and companies should give an undertaking that the patent they are seeking is not
based on traditional wisdom.
Finally, the Uruguay Round imposed strong restrictions on developing
countries’ use of  industrial policies—policies that had arguably played an
important role both in the development of Western economies in an earlier
century16 and more recently in the East Asian Miracle17.  But they allowed
developed countries to continue to use non-tariff barriers to exclude goods of
the developing countries.  Developing countries needed more freedom to use
industrial policies, and more protection from the abuses by developed countries
                                                 
15 In May, 1995 the US Patent Office granted to the University of Mississippi Medical Center a patent
[#5,401,504] for "Use of Turmeric in Wound Healing." The United States Patent and Trademark Office
(USPTO) revoked the patent after dozens of references to the procedure were found in Indian texts.
16 For a discussion see, eg. Chang (2002).
17 See, e.g. J. E. Stiglitz, “Some Lessons from the East Asian Miracle,” World Bank Research Observer,
11(2), August 1996, pp. 151-177
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of dumping duties, countervailing duties, safeguard measures, and phyto-
sanitary conditions.
2.3 New areas of importance
Services represent an increasingly large share of GDP and trade in both
developed and developing countries. With manufacturing dwindling to 14% of
U.S. GDP, it was natural for the U.S. to shift the focus of trade liberalization to
services.18  Indeed, the irony was that increasingly, it seemed as if the trade
agreements of the past, centered around manufacturing, would, in the future, be
of greater benefit to China than  to any other country.
But the Uruguay Round focused on the liberalization of those service industries
of primary interest to firms in OECD countries (like financial services). There
was significantly less attention given to low-skilled labor intensive services in
which developing countries have a comparative advantage.19 Developing
countries have increased their exports of services by more than four times since
1990, despite the large trade barriers facing many of their most promising
industries such as construction, shipping services, and health services (OECD
2002). In these industries developing countries have legitimate and substantial
interest in the outcome of a new round of liberalization.20
Some of the areas of service sector liberalization that were advanced in the
Uruguay Round may well have disadvantaged the developing countries.
Financial market liberalization, for instance, may have weakened domestic
financial firms, reducing the already scant supply of credit available to domestic
small and medium sized enterprises.
This agenda of “new issues” and “unfinished business” is markedly different
from the agenda of the Doha round.  The new “Singapore issues”21 all centered
                                                 
18 Additionally, given the apparent barriers to service trade, there might be large gains from liberalization.
(See Brown, Deardorff and Stern, 2002.  They estimate of the global gains from service liberalization are as
a high as $400bn.  However these estimates may overstate the benefits from liberalization if many of these
barriers are exogenous and not related to economic policy.)
19 More than one quarter of the world’s top 40 service exporters in 2002 were developing countries. Twelve
developing countries
20 As we discuss in the next section, these labor intensive services are not the ones that have been given
priority in the Doha Round so far.
21 These centered around (i) government procurement; (ii) trade facilitation; (iii) competition; and (iv)
investment.  The names, however, are somewhat misleading.  Competition did focus, for instance, on anti-
trust.  The developing countries had already expressed their hostility to the initiative by the OECD for a
multilateral investment agreement.  There was no reason to believe that the WTO provided a venue in
which an agreement acceptable to the developing countries could be worked out.  In any case, it was clear
that this was an initiative of the developed countries, not of the developing countries.  Similarly, while
developed countries hoped to have greater access to government procurement in developing countries,
16
around concerns of the developed countries.  There was one, competition
policy, which in principle could have been of benefit to the developing
countries—had dumping duties been brought into the discussion.  But the
developed countries were adamantly opposed.
                                                                                                                                                  
there was little hope that developing countries could make much inroad in procurement by developed
countries, especially in the central area of defense.  This too was a developed country agenda item.
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3 Doha’s Development Record So Far
Despite the expressions of goodwill at Doha, progress on the Development
Round has been slow.  Part of the problem is that, while the interests of different
developing countries differ, the evolving agenda itself was not really designed
to reflect the real concerns of developing countries. Throughout 2002 and 2003
it became apparent that many developing countries felt that the Doha Round
was moving in the wrong direction on many key issues. They felt that the new
round offers them few immediate benefits but carries the risk of additional
obligations. As a consequence developing countries walked away from the
Cancun Ministerial in September 2003.
Up to that point, Doha had achieved little progress on most of the critical
development issues. One of the key disappointments has been agricultural
reform, which many developing countries22 and NGOs23 viewed as the primary
objective of the round. The March 2003 deadline for agreement on agricultural
modalities was missed. When the US and EC finally presented a joint paper on
agriculture modalities in August, the framework was widely criticized by
developing countries, correctly in our judgment, for ignoring their interests.24
On the key issues of market access, domestic support, and export subsidies the
text was perceived to fall short of the level of ambition of the Doha mandate;
indeed, in some respects, what was offered was a step backward.25
At the same time, agricultural initiatives within OECD countries seemed to be
undermining multilateral efforts. The U.S. Farm Bill in 2002 increased the level
                                                 
22 Section 7 of 6th June 2003 Communication from Argentina, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Chile, China,
Colombia, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Gabon, Guatemala, Honduras, India,
Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Thailand, Uruguay, Venezuela and
Zimbabwe, (TN/C/W/13), makes it clear that “Reform of agricultural trade is of central importance for
many developing countries” and is “an essential ingredient of the negotiation and its outcome.” (original
emphasis.)
23 Oxfam (2000) argues that “agriculture is the key to unlocking the Doha development agenda, and
without constructive steps on this issue, the broader negotiations cannot really restart.”
24 See the statements by Indian Ambassador K.M. Chandrasekhar, Brazil’s Ambassador, Luis Felipe de
Seixas Correa, and China’s Ambassador Sun Zhenyu.
25 On domestic support, no specific figures were given for reducing most trade distorting support.  The text
potentially widened the scope for the use of blue box support – a step backwards in terms of liberalization.
Also the text did not focus on trade distorting elements of the Green Box measures. See the critical
response by Kenyan Ambassador Ms. Amina Chawahir Mohamed who said that “the EC-US text falls short
of our expectations and as such we find it difficult to accept it as a basis of our further work”. 
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of support to U.S. farmers26 and strengthened the link between subsidies and
production decisions.27 One year later, the EC’s 2003 Luxembourg reform of
the common agricultural policy (CAP) was also disappointing. The EC reform
shifts support from the ‘Blue Box’ (production limiting) to the ‘Green Box’
(deemed to be less trade-distorting). However the level of producer support will
remain virtually constant – projected to fall from 57 per cent to 56 per cent
(OECD 2004). Moreover the reform has little impact on export subsidies or
import barriers. Both of these initiatives fell far short of expectations and
signaled the limited commitment of the US and EC to agricultural reform.
Consequently both plans had a depressing effect on the mood of multilateral
agricultural negotiations.
After the Uruguay round, there was a clear understanding that there would be
further liberalization of agriculture.  There is now a strong sense that the United
States has reneged on that commitment; whether the huge increase in
agricultural subsidies is an explicit violation of earlier agreements is of less
importance than that it represents a violation of the spirit of the agreement (or at
least was taken as the spirit of the agreement by the developing countries.)28
Just as the agreement has to be viewed as a whole, so too, a Development
Round agreement has to be viewed in the context of the unbalanced agreements
that preceded it.
In addition to their disappointment on agriculture, developing countries are
skeptical about the effects of the new items on the agenda. There is significant
opposition from developing countries to the Singapore Issues. In the space of a
month from early June 2003, 77 developing countries, including over half the
WTO membership, made public statements urging that the Singapore Issues not
be included as part of the Doha Round.29 Since these issues are not priorities for
developing countries, their emerging centrality in the agenda is an incongruous
feature of the ‘development’ round.
Several developing countries see the Singapore issues as incursions into their
national sovereignty that are not justified by the benefits they bring. Multilateral
                                                 
26 The U.S. Farm Security and Rural Investment Act (FSRIA) of May 2002 has a value of about $190
billion over the next 10 years, about $83 billion more than under previous programs. It sets target prices
which are lower than the pre 1996 levels, but the total effective support is larger because average world
commodity prices have declined and the range of commodities included in FSIRA is larger than in the 1996
FAIR Act.  That act was intended to phase out farm subsidies, but even before the passage of FSRIA had
achieved additional support through emergency measures.
27 It provides counter cyclical payments (CCPs) to U.S. farmers which respond negatively to the world
prices. This type of measures has allowed the U.S. to dump its farm surplus on world markets. For
example, the U.S. exports corn at prices 20 percent below the cost of production, and wheat at 46 percent
below cost. See Cassel (2002).
28 The recent preliminary WTO ruling against American cotton subsidies (based on a complaint from
Brazil) has lent support to the critics.  America claimed, remarkably, that their subsidies did not adversely
affect other cotton exporting countries.  Such claims clearly undermine the credibility of the position of the
developed countries.
29 CAFOD (2003) ‘Singapore Issues in the WTO: What do developing countries say?’
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regulatory disciplines hold the specter of repeating the worst elements of
Uruguay by restricting the options for individual governments to pursue
development policies based on their own national priorities and problems.
In addition there are concerns that the initiatives based on the Singapore issues
may impose a large burden on the administrative capacity of developing
countries. There are significant costs associated with both the creation and
enforcement of new regimes in competition policy, investment regulations, and
trade and customs procedures.30 Many developing countries have been unable to
meet their Uruguay Round obligations because of these high costs.31
Another area where achievements have lagged behind rhetoric is in the delivery
of non-reciprocal trade preferences. Recently there have been a number of
initiatives in OECD countries to further discriminate in favour of LDCs. Most
notable among these are the EU’s Everything But Arms (EBA) initiative and the
US’s African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). The EU has argued that
the EBA will “significantly enhance export opportunities and hence potential
income and growth” for LDCs (CEC 2002). However analysis of preferential
schemes on LDC exports shows only limited impact. Brenton (2003) concludes
that trade in goods given preferences for the first time under the EBA in 2001,
amounted to just two hundredths of one per cent of LDC exports to the EU in
2001.32 Even earlier preferences were not focused on goods exported by LDC’s:
up to 50 per cent of the exports of non-ACP countries to the EC did not receive
preferential access and paid the MFN tariff [Brenton, 2003]. Overall, the impact
of these schemes has not yet been very significant, with the exception of
African apparel exports to the U.S. under AGOA [World Bank, 2003].33
                                                 
30 Finger (2000) estimated the implementation of three of the Uruguay Round’s six agreements that
required regulatory change (customs reform, intellectual property rights, and sanitary and phytosanitary
(SPS) measures). His analysis suggests that the average cost of restructuring domestic regulations in the 12
developing countries considered could be as much as $150 million. In eight of these countries this figure is
larger than the entire annual development budget.
31 By January 2000, up to 90 of the WTOs 109 developing country members were in violation of the SPS,
customs valuation, and TRIPs agreements.
32 Part of the reason the EBA has had such a limited effect is that almost all EC imports from LDCs (more
than 99 percent in 2001) were already eligible for preferences under other schemes (Brenton 2003). In 2001
the EBA initiative granted duty-free access to imports of all products from the least developed countries
(except arms and munitions). Total exports from these LDCs to the EU increased by 9.6 per cent in 2001.
However in practice, the EBA was only relevant to the remaining 919 products (of the EUs 10,200 tariff
lines) which had not previously been granted duty free status under either the GSP or Cononou Agreement.
Of these 919 products, imports from LDCs were recorded in just 80 products in 2001. Brenton (2003) notes
that total exports of these products actually fell from 3.5 million euros in 2000 to 2.9 million euros in 2001.
Moreover trade in these goods in 2001 amounted to just two-hundredths of one per cent of the total value of
LDC exports to the EU. Thus it appears that the direct impact of the EBA initiative has not been significant
in the short term and given the small size of trade in affected products, is not likely to be large in the
medium term.
33 Moreover, beginning in 2008, cotton textile producers will have to use American cotton, further limiting
the benefits of AGOA.
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There was also little or no progress on other items that are of concern to
developing countries, from non-tariff barriers like dumping duties to bio-piracy.
In summary the agenda for the ‘Development Round’ has evolved
disappointingly for developing countries. It has done little to address their
concerns in agriculture and it has done little to address problems posed by non-
tariff barriers. It has not prioritized a developing country service sector agenda
and there were no reforms in basic procedures.
In addition, the proposed agenda’s new issues could have made life worse for
developing countries. The U.S. wanted capital market liberalization as part of
investment agreement, even though weight of evidence was that capital market
liberalization did not promote growth but did lead to more instability. Under
competition policy, rather than creating a true competitive
environment—hindering use of dumping duties as protectionist devices—there
was fear of restricting development and socially oriented preferences
In the South, of course, there is a tendency to see the actions as coordinated,
driven by economic interests in the North.  While they may see more
coordination than actually occurs, the impacts are often closely akin to what
they would be if they were coordinated.  The high interest rates, tax policies,
and trade liberalization policies demanded by the IMF do exacerbate the adverse
effects on developing countries of whatever trade liberalization measures they
agree to within the WTO.  The two cannot be seen in isolation.
21
4 Principles of a Development Round
We begin with an analysis of the principles that should underlay a development
round of trade negotiations.  It seems self-evident that:
1. Any agreement should be assessed in terms of its impact on development;
items with a negative effect on development should not be on the agenda.
2. Any agreement should be fair.
3. Any agreement should be fairly arrived at.
4. The agenda should limited to trade-related and development-friendly
issues.
While these principles may be widely agreed to, there may be important
differences both about the meaning of terms and about how to respond to
conflicts among the principles.
4.1  Any agreement should be assessed in terms of its
impact on development
Any agreement should be carefully designed to promote, not hinder,
development.  There is surprisingly little economic analysis of the precise
consequences of various potential trade agreements on participant countries.
Where analytical studies have been done, they have not penetrated into the core
of negotiations and do not seem to play a central role in setting the agenda. The
absence of this type of analysis raises the question of what is driving the
prioritization of trade issues on the WTO agenda, other than a mélange of
prevailing orthodoxies and the momentum of special interest groups?
The WTO Secretariat should be responsible for producing a general equilibrium
incidence analysis, analogous to what is conducted when taxes are imposed,
attempting to assess how different countries are affected by different proposals.
Publicly available analysis would benefit developing countries, many of who
are at an information disadvantage relative to developed countries. Publicly
available information would also be an important source for consumers who are
less equipped to lobby for favorable outcomes than producer groups.
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Analysis based on general equilibrium models must be sensitive to the fact that
different developing countries are likely to be affected differently, and different
groups within developing countries are likely to be affected in different ways.
Thus, eliminating developed country agricultural subsidies is likely to benefit
grain exporters, but hurt grain importers.  It is likely to benefit grain producers,
and hurt grain consumers.  What is particularly problematic is that within
developing countries, the grain producers are among the poorest, so they are the
ones most likely to benefit, even if the country as a whole is a grain importer, so
the country as a whole loses.  Moreover, within most developing countries,
there are limited mechanisms of redistribution, so that it does not suffice to
assess what happens on average.
The results of general equilibrium models are sensitive to their assumptions.
Much of the analysis of the impacts (including, for instance judgments about
whether particular types of agricultural subsidies are trade distorting) relies on a
particular model of the economy, the neo-classical model, which assumes full
employment of resources, perfect competition, perfect information, and well
functioning markets, assumptions which are of questionable validity for any
country, but which are particularly problematic for developing countries.
Most of the tools used to analyze general equilibrium effects of trade
liberalization are static models. They describe the movement from one ‘steady
state’ to another but do not incorporate the costs associated with transition or the
consequences for economies which are initially out of steady state. For example
the models typically assume that there is full employment.  Trade liberalization
measures are good for a country because it enables resources to be redirected
from low productivity protected sectors to more productive sectors as the
economy specializes in its areas of comparative advantage.  Under full
employment, developing countries would unambiguously benefit from trade
liberalization measures, were it not for terms of trade effects (changes in relative
prices.)  Most of the studies that assess the impact on developing countries cited
in the Appendix thus focus principally on these terms of trade effects.
But with unemployment, trade liberalization may simply move workers from
low productivity protected sectors into unemployment.  This lowers the
country’s national income and increases poverty.  There can be multiplier
effects, so that the total impact is far greater than the direct effect.  Much of the
opposition to trade liberalization arises because of the perceived effects on
unemployment.  In more developed countries, monetary and fiscal policy
should, in principal, enable the country to maintain close to full employment.
As the advocates of trade liberalization repeatedly emphasize, the objective of
trade liberalization is not to create jobs, but to increase standards of living by
allowing countries to specialize in areas of comparative advantage.  But in many
developing countries, with persistent unemployment—with unemployment rates
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sometimes in excess of 20%34--it is evident that monetary and fiscal polices are
unable to maintain the economy at full employment.  While the standard
neoclassical models typically employed to assess trade impacts do not identify
the impact of trade liberalization on the equilibrium level of
unemployment35—by assumption there is none—even if trade liberalization had
no impact on the equilibrium level of unemployment, it may take the economy
considerable time to adjust, and the costs of adjustments—lost income and
increased poverty—may be considerable.
Another important assumption made in most of the analyses is that there is no
uncertainty, no risk.  But changes in trade regimes affect countries’ exposure to
risk.  In the absence of good insurance markets, there can be first order welfare
effects arising from this increased exposure to risk.36  For instance, with a quota,
those who compete with imports know precisely how much will be imported,
and therefore, if there is relatively little domestic volatility, they will face
relative little price uncertainty.  But with the tarrification of quotas, countries
are exposed to considerably greater volatility.37
It is important that any incidence analysis take into account other pre-existing
distortions.  For instance, tax policies (often advocated by international
institutions), which effectively tax the informal sector less than the formal
sector, already distort production in favor of the informal sector.  In this context,
trade regimes which lower the international price of agricultural goods, typically
produced by the informal sector, have a larger adverse effect than would be the
case if tax policy were more neutral.
It is also important that any incidence analysis be based on an assessment of the
global general equilibrium impacts, which takes into account the effects of a
change in a trade regime on global relative prices.  For instance, if a single small
country were to subsidize cotton, it would have a relatively small effect on the
global price of cotton.  But if a large producer—the United States—subsidizes
cotton, it has an effect on the international price of cotton.
The fact that implementation and adjustment costs are likely to be larger in
developing countries, unemployment rates are likely to be higher, safety nets
weaker, and risk markets poor are all features of developing countries that have
to be taken into account in conducting a relative incidence analysis. If trade
                                                 
34 In 2001average unemployment rates reached 14.4 per cent in Africa; 12.6 per cent in transition
economies; and 10 per cent in Latin America. Such statistics, however, often under represent the true level
of unemployment, for instance, the prevalent high levels of disguised unemployment.
35 See for instance the papers cited in the appendix, especially contributions by Hertel (1997), Anderson et
al. (2000)
36 For instance, Dasgupta and Stiglitz [1977] show that the change from quotas to tariffs may expose
countries to much greater risk.  Newbery and Stiglitz [1984] show that the adverse effects from increased
exposure to risk may be so greater that everyone in both countries may be worse off.
37 The incidence, in this case, depends on the extent to which there are disturbances in the domestic
markets, and the extent to which the external disturbances are correlated with the domestic disturbance.
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liberalization has a large effect on inequality, then governments may be required
to strengthen their redistributive welfare system. Larger taxes generate
increased deadweight loss, which reduces the efficiency gains from
liberalization.
Large adjustment costs imply not only that the process of liberalization should
be conducted gradually, but also that there should not be oscillations.  Bilateral
agreements on the way to a multilateral agreement may be particularly
offensive, when there are important elements of trade diversion.  The greater
adjustment costs in developing countries may mean either that the net benefit
(net of the adjustment costs into and out of the sector having temporary
preferential treatment) may be small and/or that there will, in fact, be relatively
little benefit, as expansion into that sector may be limited, as investors
recognize its short term nature.
Finally, it is of first order importance to distinguish between provisions which
should, in principle, make a country better off on its own, almost regardless of
the circumstances, provisions which might or might not make a country better
off, on its own, and provisions which essentially are redistributive in nature,
with the gains to one side being largely offset by losses to the other.  We have
argued that many of the trade liberalization measures would, in a world of full
employment, make a country better off, on its own.  In this world, the question
is often posed:  why is there any need for a trade agreement? Trade agreements
are used only as a bargaining weapon; the threat of not opening up one’s own
market (which has a cost) is used to force the opening up of the foreigner’s
markets.
Note that many of the arguments that are currently used in favor of certain
provisions of proposed trade agreements contend that they are good for the
developing countries.38  To the extent that such arguments are correct, of course,
it implies that there is no need for a trade agreement, other than the political
economy argument, that it is only by bringing the pressure from the gainers
from trade liberalization that one can overcome the resistance of the losers in a
world in which compensations are typically not made.  Moreover, to the extent
that such arguments are correct, it implies that (apart from global terms of trade
effects) the issue of fairness only pertains to the distribution of relative gains
(relative costs and benefits) since every country benefits.  It also means that any
country could unilaterally increase its gains simply by lowering its trade barriers
further, thereby expanding trade.  To be sure, some of the opposition against
trade liberalization comes from those who would be hurt by it, especially special
interests who benefit from protection; but some opposition may arise because
particular countries may be adversely affected as a whole.
                                                 
38 This includes not only trade liberalization, but also investor protections.  Investor protections will attract
more investment.  But if that is the case, then countries would have an incentive to undertake such actions
on their own.  There are some legitimate worries, spelled out below:  excessive investor protection may
compromise general welfare concerns, e.g. about safety or the environment.
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These cases need to be distinguished from intellectual property rights, where
stronger IPO protections may increase the incomes of those in the more
advanced industrial countries at the expense of those in the less advanced
industrial countries. Here, the issue is primarily redistributive, and is
accordingly fundamentally different from those that arise in connection with
trade liberalization.39  Again, the developed countries make a self-serving
argument that stronger IPO protections will (a) induce more research; or (b)
induce more investment in intellectual property intensive industries. There is
relatively little evidence that the incremental profits generated in developing
countries, for most goods, has much impact on research.  This is certainly the
case for most drugs, where the overwhelming bulk of the profits are generated
by sales in the North; the drug companies do little research related to illnesses
the primary incidence of which is in the South.  In many areas, such as soft
drinks, trade secrets, not patents, have been the basis of expansion into the
South.  In any case, again, if it were true that stronger intellectual property
protections led to faster growth, countries interested in enhancing growth would
on their own provide such stronger protection.40
4.2 Any agreement should be fair.
This is perhaps the principle which is most difficult, but also one that is perhaps
the most important.  Underlying conflicts about perceptions of fairness is the
fact that because the circumstances of the different countries are different, any
agreement that applies “fairly” or “uniformly” to all countries may still have
large differential effects.  This is why we have emphasized (under point 1) the
importance of an incidence analysis, an assessment of the differential effects on
different countries.  Any agreement that differentially hurts developing
countries more or benefits the developed countries more (say, as measured by
the net gains as a percentage of GDP) should be presumptively viewed as unfair.
Indeed, it should be essential that any reform be progressive, i.e. that a larger
share of the benefits accrues to the poorer countries.  This was almost surely not
true of the Uruguay round.
There is one key difficulty in interpreting this requirement.  Many of the costs
of, say, agricultural subsidies are borne by the developed countries.  Not only
are there huge budgetary costs associated with the subsidies, but the subsidies
distort production, and thus there is a deadweight loss associated with these
                                                 
39 See, e.g. Bhagwati [2002] who argues, accordingly, that intellectual property should never have been part
of trade negotiations.
40 In the case of intellectual property, there is a concern about free rider problems, given the public good
nature of research.  There is, accordingly, a need for collective action—including possibly collection action
related to the protection of intellectual property.  On the other hand, because of the public good nature of
knowledge, providing free access to such knowledge to the developing countries is one of the efficient, low
cost ways by which developed countries can provide assistance to developing countries.
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subsidies.  Thus, were developed countries to eliminate their subsidies, the
developed countries (as a whole) would be among the main beneficiaries.  Thus,
a refinement of the above criterion would look at the benefits granted others; in
competitive markets, it would be reflected in the general equilibrium terms of
trade effects received by producers or paid by consumers; in non-competitive
markets (or markets with quota restrictions) it would be the value of access
granted.
One particular aspect of this should be emphasized:  in trade disputes, both de
jure and de facto the more developed countries are in a better position to
prevail.  Thus, the costs to a developing country to attacking a claim of
intellectual property by a Western company in a case involving bio-piracy41
may be very high; in practice the developing country is at a disadvantageous
position in any process entailing resort to complicated and expensive legal
proceedings.
More generally, the WTO dispute system favors rich countries with the
resources to use it effectively for their own interests. The EC, Japan and the US
were complainants in almost half (143 of 305) of all bilateral disputes in the
WTO Dispute Settlement system between 1995 and 2002. By contrast the 49
members classified by the UN as Less Developed Countries did not bring a
single challenge in that period.42
There is a long history within developed countries of those in positions of power
using the legal system to maintain their privileges.  More recently, many
developed countries have tried to come to terms with the resulting inequities by
providing public legal assistance.  Typically, because of the relatively low pay
of those employed to provide such assistance, this can go only a little way in
redressing the imbalance.  But at a minimum, the developed countries should
provide assistance to the less developed countries in helping create a more level
playing field.  This is one of the proposals taken up in Part 2.
By the same token, even were a developing country to prevail in a WTO
tribunal against the United States or Europe, the enforcement system is
asymmetric, and consequently unfair.  The sanction for violating a WTO
agreement is the imposition of duties.  If Ecuador, say, were to impose duties on
goods that it imports from the United States, it would have a negligible effect on
the American producer; while if the United States were to impose a duty on
goods produced by Ecuador, the economic impact is more likely to be
devastating.  In practice, the WTO system has no effective way of enforcing an
unfair trade action, the main impact of which is on small developing countries.
                                                 
41 Bio-piracy is the attempt by a Northern firm to patent a traditional food or medicine from a developing
country, in order to capture the intellectual property rents.  The developing countries may be forced to pay
for what they view as rightfully theirs.  See below for a more extensive discussion.
42 Horn, H. and Mavroidis, P. (2003) ‘Which WTO Provisions are Invoked by and Against Developing
Countries’ CEPR.
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When, of course, a major industrial country takes a global action—such as the
U.S. imposition of tariffs on steel—then there can be a global response, and this
can induce a response (as we have seen.)
But the other side of “fairness” is the initial condition.  Currently, developing
countries have higher tariffs than do developed countries43 The United States
might claim that it is only fair that developing countries cut their tariffs
proportionately; this would entail a greater amount of tariff reduction by the
developing countries—and accordingly the costs to the developing countries
might be greater. But the developing countries also point out that at the very
least the principle of progressivity should rule out adverse discrimination
against developing countries.  Yet, currently, the developed countries impose
higher tariffs against the developing countries than they do against the
developed countries, even taking into account the so-called ‘preferences’.
Balancing these concerns are those dealing with historical inequities.  If a
country’s relative weakness in part is due to a colonial heritage, or more
pertinently, to earlier unfair trade agreements (e.g. that resulting from the
Opium War in the nineteenth century in China), to what extent does fairness and
equity demand that current agreements reflect these past injustices?  Trade
negotiators from the North would like to pretend that such inequities never
occurred.  Those from the South might argue that one cannot separate events
today from the historical context.
The nature of trade agreements is, of course, that not every provision in the
agreement is viewed to be “fair.”  Some are intended to give more to one party,
the other to another; it is the package as a whole which should be viewed as fair.
But each trade agreement is forward looking; there are implicit and explicit
understandings about the direction of future agreements.  After the Uruguay
round, there was a clear understanding that there would be further liberalization
of agriculture, and there was a presumption that the textile quotas would not
simply be replaced by high tariffs, but that this market too would open.  In the
case of agriculture, there is a strong sense that the United States has reneged on
that commitment; whether the huge increase in agricultural subsidies is an
explicit violation of earlier agreements is of less importance than that it
represents a violation of the spirit of the agreement (or what should have been
the spirit of the agreement, or at least was taken as the spirit of the agreement by
the developing countries.)  Just as the agreement has to be viewed as a whole,
so too, a Development Round agreement has to be viewed in the context of the
unbalanced agreements that preceded it.
                                                 
43 For manufactured goodsaverage tariff rates are 1.5 per cent for developed countries and 11.5 per cent for
developing countries. For agriculture, average tariff rates are 15.6 per cent for developed countries and 20.1
for developing countries (Hertel and Martin 2000).
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4.2.1 Fairness between foreign and domestic producers
While most of the discussion of this paper concerns the “fairness” among
countries, there is a related issue:  fairness between domestic and foreign
producers.  One of the purposes of trade liberalization is to ensure that foreign
producers are treated “fairly.”  But again, there are questions: what does that
mean?  Foreign producers and domestic producers are often inherently in
different situations.  The foreign producer (in the case of a developing country)
may have greater access to capital.  He almost surely has greater access to
international technology.  Much of the debate about protection concerns
“leveling the playing field,” correcting these initial inequities.
Most of the economics literature eschews the “fairness” vocabulary in favor of
the efficiency language.  Protecting domestic firms is inefficient; the country
would be better off if it did not.  But for reasons hinted at in the previous
subsection, these arguments are contentious.  There may be important learning
benefits from protection.  And while economists have typically argued in favor
of open subsidies, and/or government loan programs, rather than the hidden
subsidies protection provides, direct subsidies may, for a variety of reasons, be
difficult or impossible to implement.  In a second best world, some protection
may be efficient.44
Thus, there is contentiousness in both the efficiency and the fairness arguments.
But what cannot be justified in either terms are developed country non-tariff
barriers, such as dumping, which treat developing country producers
disadvantageously relative to their own, subjecting them, for instance, to a far
higher standard for what amounts to predatory behavior than they subject their
own firms.45
By the same token, it is hard to justify demanding developing countries to
provide foreign firms with greater protections than provided domestic firms.
While there is some debate about the validity, or abuse, of the infant industry
argument, there is no argument for protection of the “grown up industry.”
So too, America has found it desirable to impose lending requiring on its banks,
to ensure that they provide capital to underserved communities through the
Community Reinvestment Act. Such measures recognize that there is role for
government in encouraging particular sectors of the economy.  It seems unfair
(and inefficient) to preclude developing countries undertaking analogous
measures.
                                                 
44 For a historical argument, see Chang, Ha-Joon (2002).  More recent theoretical analysis includes that of
Dasgupta and Stiglitz [1985].
45 For instance, the U.S. anti-trust laws impose a very high standard for predatory pricing, much higher than
is employed in the U.S. fair trade laws which pertain to the actions of foreign firms.  Indeed, it has been
argued that using the US domestic standard, few foreign firms would ever be found guilty of dumping, but
using the dumping standard, most American firms could be found guilty.
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4.2.2 Other problems in the interpretation of fairness
One of the most difficult issues is how to treat policy failures within each of the
countries.  Suppose that it is true (as asserted earlier) that the Uruguay round in
fact differentially benefited the United States.  But suppose the imbalance could
have been reduced if only the developing countries reformed their economies.
They might, for instance, have been able to benefit more from the reduction in
tariffs on manufacturing, if only they had invested more in infrastructure, so that
they could have attracted more manufacturing.
By the same token, to what extent should the international trading regime be
blamed for inequities which arise, in part, because of how other parts of the
international system operate?  Suppose, for instance, that a “fair” trade
negotiation occurs within the WTO, but that after the trade negotiations are
over, the developing country has to turn to the IMF for assistance; and that the
IMF imposes as a condition for assistance further trade liberalization.  Viewing
the two negotiations together, as a package, clearly the developing country may
have given far more than it got within the trade package, but of course, it got, in
addition, some foreign assistance.  (Admittedly, in the case of many of the bail-
outs, the primary beneficiary of the bail-outs may be banks in the more
advanced industrial countries.)  But even apart from these demands that are put
on developing countries, the United States makes demands on other countries
(section 301 and super 301 actions46), to which they often feel compelled to
accede.  Thus, even if the trade agreements that were reached were fair, what
happens afterwards upsets the balance; the inequities are all the greater when
the initial trade agreement is unfair.
Similarly, when international institutions encourage tax policies which have the
effect of distorting production towards the informal sector, it implies, as noted
above, that the West’s subsidies of agriculture have a greater adverse effect on
the developing countries than they otherwise would have had.  In talking about
the inequities of the trade regime, should we assess its fairness, coming on top
of distortions imposed or encouraged by the North, or in terms of what the
incidence would have been, had a more neutral tax system been imposed?
Should we view the two actions together, assessing the incidence of the two
policies in conjunction, or should we only assess the fairness of the trading
regime itself?
By the same token, when countervailing duties are imposed against a
developing country which has “subsidized” interest payments, by bringing them
down from the usurious levels insisted upon by the IMF, to levels still slightly
higher than in international capital markets, is this unfair?  Should the
                                                 
46 Super 301authority - which expired in 1997 but was reinstituted in January 1999 - enables the USTR to
identify the most significant unfair trade practices facing U.S. exports and to focus U.S. resources on
eliminating those practices.
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government only be viewed as undoing a distortion?  The problems are
exacerbated by demands (included in the recent bilateral trade agreements
between the United States and Chile and the United States and Singapore) for
capital market liberalization.  Capital market liberalization increases economic
volatility47, and the increased economic volatility increases the risk premium
that investors demand,48 effectively increasing the interest rate charged.  It
seems unfair to force upon the developing countries provisions which
effectively increase the interest rate they have to pay, and then when the
government tries to undo the consequences, to have a countervailing duty
slapped upon them.
In the South, of course, there is a tendency to see the actions as coordinated,
driven by economic interests in the North.  While they may see more
coordination than actually occurs, the impacts are often closely akin to what
they would be if they were coordinated.  The high interest rates, tax policies,
and trade liberalization policies demanded by the IMF do exacerbate the adverse
effects on developing countries of whatever trade liberalization measures they
agree to within the WTO.  The two cannot be seen in isolation.  This provides
the basis of one of the important recommendations that we make below.
With such disparate views of fairness, it is no wonder that the South may feel
that a trade agreement proposal is grossly unfair, and yet the North might feel
no pangs of conscience.  Some might conclude that, as a result, we should
simply drop the criterion of equity among the desiderata of a Development
Round agreement.  That would be a mistake.  In a democracy, any trade
agreement must be freely entered into, and the citizens of the country must be
persuaded that the agreement is essentially fair.  Moreover, there are several
widely accepted philosophical frameworks—in particular that of
Rawls49—which are widely accepted, and that at least provide some guidance
for thinking about whether any agreement is fair.
4.3 Any agreement should be fairly arrived at
This is often referred to as procedural justice.  It becomes an important
complement to the kind of fairness discussed in the preceding section when
there is some ambiguity about what should be meant by “outcome fairness.”
                                                 
47 See, for instance, Prassad et al, the report of the IPD task force on capital market liberalization {2004),
and Stiglitz [1999, 2001, 2004]
48 See Stiglitz [2003]
49 John Rawls [1971], A Theory of Justice.  He emphasizes that we should assess whether (in the current
context) a particular change in the trade regime would be generally agreed to, behind a veil of ignorance, in
which the participants in the discussion did  not know whether they were to be born in a less developed or a
more developed country.  For alternative frameworks (which in the current context would arrive at quite
similar views) see A. K Sen [1999] Development as Freedom.
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Procedural fairness focuses on the openness and transparency of the negotiation
process, and the manner in which the discussions are conducted.  There is now a
large literature which establishes that setting the agenda may have a large effect
on the outcome; hence having voice in the setting of the agenda is essential.
The agenda in previous trade negotiations has been unbalanced; issues of
benefit to the developed countries have been at the center of the discussion;
issues like liberalization of unskilled labor intensive services have been off the
agenda, while liberalization of skilled labor intensive services have been on the
agenda.
Transparency is essential because it enables more voices to be heard in the
negotiating process and limits abuses by the powerful.  This is particularly
important for developing countries, because of the limited size of their
negotiating teams. Of particular concern is the lack of transparency of the ‘green
room’ negotiations, in which only a few chosen countries from the developing
world engaged in negotiations with the United States and Europe.  The ‘green
room’ process limits outside scrutiny and places the developing countries in a
disadvantageous position because of the complexity of the negotiations and
their limited staffs.50  Procedural fairness needs to deal with the asymmetry of
power and the asymmetry of information among WTO members. While the
effect of power disparities are difficult to reduce, informational disadvantage
can be remedied.51
The processes for adjudicating disputes too often lack the protections that we
have come to expect in modern democracy.  Under NAFTA, for instance, there
is not an appellate process that affords the same guarantees for the public
interest that arises is issues concerning investor protection domestically.
Indeed, the very distinction between the manner in which international rules are
arrived at and the manner in which domestic rules are determined reflects the
lack of democratic guarantees.  Within a country, we have parliamentary
processes. These processes involve negotiations, but they are not just a
negotiation between interested parties.  We do not have business and labor
negotiating labor legislation, for instance, though in the deliberation, the views
of both are listened to carefully.   At the international level, we have no
analogous parliamentary body.  We have a “negotiation.”  In the past, the terms
of the negotiation have largely been set by the United States and Europe.  The
negotiators mandate is to get the best deal for their country, using whatever
tactics they can employ, whether it be threats, promises, secret meetings, etc.
This contrasts markedly with at least the language used in parliamentary
                                                 
50 See for example the open letter, dated 6 November 1999, sent by 11 developing countries to the WTO
chairman Ambassador Ali Mchumo of Tanzania, expressing their concern over the lack of transparency in
the WTO Green room process.
51 Both increased transparency and the provision of (impact assessment) information discussed in section
4.1 reduce information asymmetries.
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processes, in which the objective is to find a set of rules and regulations which
are fair and efficient. The participants in the discussions, while mindful of the
interests of those they represent, defend their positions in terms of principle, and
look for principled solutions, reflecting social justice and solidarity.
4.4 The policy space should be interpreted
conservatively
Defining the policy space appropriate for attention within the WTO is a difficult
task. There has been a tendency to expand the WTO’s agenda to include all
manner of international problems from intellectual property rights to protection
for foreign investors. The international community has found that bringing
formerly intractable international issues within the ambit of trade provides both
a convenient negotiating forum and a ready mechanism for enforcement of
agreements. If the only test of inclusion in the agenda is that a policy must
affect trade flows, then the boundaries of WTO activity are very hard to define
because almost all international problems can be linked to trade flows in some
way. In this regard, policymakers have liberally employed the prefix “trade
related aspects of” to pragmatically expand the WTO’s mandate into a growing
number of issues.
However the growth of the WTO’s policy space comes at a price. First
developing countries have limited capacity to analyze and negotiate over a large
range of issues. Second the experience of the Singapore issues suggests that
larger agendas burden the negotiations. Third, the expansion creates room for
developed countries to use their superior bargaining power in trade negotiations
to exploit developing countries over a larger range of issues. For instance when
the agenda was extended to competition policy, the issues relevant to the foreign
business interests of developed countries became the main focus of negotiations
while insufficient attention was given to key areas of concern for developing
countries, such as rules against predation and the development of global anti-
trust enforcement. Similarly the focus of intellectual property negotiations has
been determined by the pharmaceutical industry in the industrialized world.
Almost inevitably, they determination of these issues will reflect the
consequences of the exercise of power.
For these reasons a ‘principle of conservatism’ needs to be introduced to guide
the growth of the WTO’s mandate. Further issues should only be included in the
agenda of a development round if they score highly on three criteria: (i) the
relevance of the issue to trade flows, (ii) its development friendliness, and (iii)
the existence of a rationale for collective action.
This third element reflects a general presumption in favor of national
sovereignty.  There is no reason to force nations to undertake certain actions
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unless their actions have effects on the trade of others, which require collective
action to resolve. There are areas in which a trade agreement is absolutely
essential.  These include an international rule of law (procedures) for dealing
with trade disputes and/or agreements to prevent beggar-thy-neighbor trade
policies. There are areas in which international agreements would be beneficial
to manage cross-border externalities or global public goods.52 But modern trade
agreements have been extended into areas which intrude into national
sovereignty with no justification based on the need for collective action and
without clearly identified and fairly distributed global benefits.53  The
presumption of consumer sovereignty is based on the premise that society
should only interfere with individual choices when those choices have
consequences for others, when there is a need for collective action, and the same
is true in trade.
4.5 Some Implications
The above principles have some immediate implications for the structure and
design of any development round agreement and process, several of which we
have already touched upon.  Among the more important are the following
1. The scope of the agreements should be relatively limited, with first
priority going to areas where collective action is absolutely required.
 i. There is a need to revisit TRIPS
 ii. Few, if any, of the Singapore issues meet this criterion
 iii. There should be restrictions on investment competition; this is
more important than negotiating over investment protections
2. The priorities for trade liberalization should reflect the development
concerns of the poorer countries.
 i. There is a need to revisit the sectoral priorities (agricultural
versus services; labor versus capital)
 ii. There is a need to revisit the priorities within sectors (unskilled
service intensive sectors versus skilled service intensive
sectors)
 iii. There is a need to revisit the use of non-tariff barriers
(dumping, safeguards, and countervailing duties)
 iv. There is a need to revisit the issue of subsidies
(i) Are some of the so-called non distorting agricultural
subsidies really distorting
                                                 
52 For a discussion of the concept of global public goods, see Kaul et al. [2003].  See also Stiglitz [1994,
1995]
53 Trade agreements might also be useful as a mechanism for governments to overcome domestic political
opposition to trade reform.
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(ii) Are there some prohibited subsidies which should
be allowed for developing countries
 v. There is a need to revisit the issue of how countries respond to
crises
 vi. There is a need to analyze trade policy within the context of the
broader international context.
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5 Priorities for a Development Round
5.1 The Context
As developing countries enter the trade negotiations, the natural question to ask
is what agreement would make the most difference for them.  What should they
be trying to get?  There is a corresponding question: what is it that they could
give, which is of most benefit to the developed countries, and which is of the
least cost (or perhaps even of benefit) to themselves at the same time.  The
developed countries natural response may to demand a quid pro quo.  But such
a demand would be to look at the current negotiation outside of its historical
context.  The developed countries got the lion’s share of the benefits out of
previous trade negotiations.  Accordingly, they ought to be willing to accept a
smaller share of the benefits out of the current trade negotiations.54 Ironically,
the demands of the advanced industrial countries at Cancun, had they been
accepted by the developing countries, arguably would have resulted in a new
trade agreement where once again the lion’s share of the benefits would have
gone to the developed world.
With little progress on the issues of concern to developing countries—non-tariff
barriers, intellectual property, migration, unskilled intensive services, and
agriculture—and new demands in areas of dubious benefit to the developing
countries, it was hard to see how the developing countries would benefit
significantly.55 Actually, even within manufacturing, there is scope for gains to
the developing countries.  What matters is not just the average tariff rate56, but
the structure of tariffs.  Escalating tariffs, where there are higher tariffs on more
processed goods than on less processed goods, inhibit the ability of developing
                                                 
54 The problem, of course, is that political globalization has not kept pace with economic globalization:
issues of international trade agreements are seldom looked at through the same kind of lens that we look at
domestic legislation.  We do not demand that the poor give up an amount commensurate with what they
get.  Rather, we talk about social justice and equity.
55 Anderson (2001) compares the benefits of developed country liberalization on developing countries with
the benefits of developing country liberalization on developed countries. As a proportion of GDP in each
group the benefits to developing countries of the former exceed the benefits to developed countries from
the latter by a factor of 6. Given this imbalance in payoffs it is not surprising that developed countries are in
such a strong bargaining position.
56 Average tariff rates—when weighted by the amount of trade—may be particularly misleading, since high
tariffs lead to little trade, and accordingly such high tariffs may be given little weight in the computation of
the average, even though they have a very distortive effect.
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countries developing manufacturing capacities, especially in areas which might
represent a natural comparative advantage, such as food processing or textiles.
The salient fact is that average developed country tariffs (notwithstanding
important tariff peaks on agriculture and key labor intensive goods and services)
are already very low, so that developing countries have relatively little to benefit
even were these to be completely eliminated.57 The large reductions in tariffs by
developing countries would have put large strains on these countries.  Were they
at full employment, a strong argument could be made that they would,
nonetheless, benefit, if they were given enough time and resources to adjust.
But that the speed of adjustment that was likely to be demanded, and the
absence of adequate resources to facilitate the adjustment, meant that
developing countries might be significantly worse off.
There is an important asymmetry of power in the negotiations: what developing
countries do in opening up their markets to developed countries has a much
smaller impact on the developed countries than the converse, what the
developed countries do in opening up their markets to the developing world. In
short, the developed countries themselves gain from liberalizing their own
markets, because they are able to adjust, and the disturbances posed to them by
the developing countries are small; the developing countries are in a far more
disadvantageous position; they will need assistance in making the required
adjustments, and they should be given a longer time within which to adjust.
Accordingly, at the center of a development round of trade should be an
expansion of Europe’s Everything but Arms initiative.  The developed countries
should
(i) All agree to follow Europe’s lead
(ii) Should extend the initiative to middle income countries; and
(iii) Should extent the initiative to eliminate agricultural subsidies.
(iv) Make sure that technical provisions—like rules of origin—do not
undermine the promise of market opening.58
In short, reciprocity should not be the central feature of these negotiations, as
they have been in the past. 59
                                                 
57 Average tariff rates on industrial goods imported into the OECD countries fell from around 40 per cent in
1950 to 1.5 per cent in 1998 (Hertel (2000). In spite of these low average rates, there are tariff peaks, many
of which adversely hurt developing countries, so that, provided these are addressed, developing countries
do have something to gain.
58 In the discussion below we note the initially extremely small impact of the Everything But Arms
initiative—with the rules of origin providing one of the explanations.  Countries can only receive the
preferential treatment of exports if a large fraction of the value added originates in the country.
59 There are two arguments sometimes put forward by those that advocate reciprocity, even after
recognizing the asymmetric position of developed and less developed countries.  The first is a political
economy argument.  It is argued that without some reciprocity, the North is unlikely to make any
concessions to developing countries.  We do not address that issue here.  The question posed to us was
what would be on the agenda of a true development round?  What would a global trade regime that
promoted developed look like?  Still, we note that developed countries voluntarily provide assistance
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There is one other aspect of the context in which trade negotiations are currently
occurring.  What distinguishes developed from less developed countries is not
only the extent and nature of market imperfections, but also factor endowments.
Developing countries are intensive in unskilled labor; their greatest shortage is
probably in the ownership of physical capital.  Developing countries are
disproportionately in the tropics60 and, currently, are more engage in the export
of commodities, including natural resources.61  Thus, they differ in the products
that they export and import, which is why decisions about which goods and
services to liberalize, which for which there should be restrictions on subsidies,
can make a great deal of difference for the general equilibrium incidence.
Finally, we should note the dramatic transformation of the global economy.  In
the nineteenth century, what are the advanced industrial economies transformed
themselves from agriculture into manufacturing.  Today, only 14% of
employment and output in the United States is in manufacturing, and the
fraction in Europe is not much higher.62 Now, they are transforming themselves
from manufacturing economies into service and knowledge economies.
Meanwhile, the developing world itself is divided into several groups:
subsistence agriculture (much of Africa); export agriculture (Brazil and
Argentina); and those breaking out of agriculture and becoming increasing
centered on manufacturing.  For the agricultural exporters, of course, the failure
to liberalize trade in agriculture and to remove subsidies has been particularly
costly.63
There is, as a result, a fundamental tension in current trade negotiations.  The
developed countries want to protect their declining industries and to gain market
                                                                                                                                                  
(unilaterally) to developing countries, partly because they believe it is the morally right thing to do, partly
because they believe political stability may be enhanced by strengthening developing countries.  It seems
strange to argue for unilateral assistance, which in many cases only partially compensates for the damage
done by unfair trade agreements.  The second is a paternalistic argument: developing countries need
economic reforms, like trade liberalization; but special interests within developing countries make such
reforms difficult.  Only by insisting on them through multilateral trade agreements (or through
conditionality on assistance) can such reforms occur.  There is a large literature explaining why such
conditionality undermines democratic processes and, in any case, is not likely to produce genuine reform.
60 See Gallup, John, Jeffrey Sachs, and Andrew Mellinger, “Geography and Economic Development”
Presented at the Annual Bank Conference on Development Economics, World Bank. April 1998.
61 FAO (2003)
62 Developed countries share of world trade in manufactures has fallen from 90 per cent in 1970 to 72
percent in 2000 (World Bank 2002).
63 But note that most of the progress in trade negotiations during the past half century have focused
around liberalization of manufacturing (other than textiles)—the goods that are of diminishing
importance to the advanced industrial countries but of increasing importance to middle income
developing countries.  There is a certain irony:  while the United States and Europe may have thought
that they were negotiating trade agreements that were of most benefit to themselves, in fact they
negotiation a global trading regime that, if it is fairly implemented (and setting the non-tariff barriers
aside) is likely in the future to be of most benefit to China and other middle income developing
countries.
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access for their expanding industries.  But their declining industries are
declining largely because of competitive pressures from the developing
countries.  Hence, the sectors that they are most interested in protecting are
precisely the sectors that are of the greatest concern to the developing world.  It
is not as if America is mostly concerned with protecting itself against Europe, or
vice versa (though there is some element of that.)  And the sectors that are
declining are, by the same token, those in which there are the lowest wage
workers.  Hence protection elicits concerns about equity and social justice
within the developed countries—a particularly narrow vision which is out of
sync with economic globalization.
At the same time, by demanding market access for the sectors which are
growing, the developed countries hope to catapult the advantage that they
already have—the first mover advantage—into a longer term advantage.  For
that very reason, were such a strategy accepted, it would inhibit the
development transformation of the poorer countries, making it all the more
difficult for them to move from traditional products into becoming effective
competitors with the more developed countries.
It is also because the advanced industrial countries are intuitively aware of these
difficulties that non-tariff barriers have assumed increasing importance.  Having
negotiated away tariffs, this is their one remaining protectionist instrument.
5.2 Market access priorities
The general argument in favor of trade liberalization is that it allows the
expansion of the size of markets, allowing the global economy to take further
advantage of the economies of scale (the argument Adam Smith put forward
more than 200 years ago), and it enhances global efficiency in production and
exchange.  The factor price equalization theorem stipulates conditions under
which trade in goods and services leads to full global efficiency, substituting for
the free mobility of factors.  Those conditions are highly restrictive, and over
the past several decades, discussions have moved from liberalization of trade to
allowing for the mobility of capital, though not of labor.  As noted earlier, the
standard argument that trade liberalization necessarily makes all countries better
off (though not necessarily all individuals within each country) is predicated on
a set of assumptions that is not satisfied in most developing countries:  full
employment, perfect competition, and perfect capital and risk markets.
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5.2.1 Labor mobility and unskilled labor intensive services
The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) recognizes four modes of
service delivery. The temporary movement of natural persons (Mode 4) has
received by far the smallest attention in terms of the volume of scheduled
concessions. Yet differences in factor payments across countries provide
evidence that factor movements would substantially increase global
productivity. If factor payments equal marginal products64, then the largest
discrepancies are associated with the payments to unskilled labor, then to skilled
labor, and lastly to capital. Accordingly, agreements that provide for the
mobility of unskilled labor would do most to increase global efficiency.
Nor has there been enough attention given to proposals to facilitate remittances.
Governments have a role to play in maximizing both the value of remittances
and their impact on development. Efforts to formalize the structure of
remittance flow (much of which currently moves through informal channels)
could make it easier, safer, and cheaper to transfer funds. For example,
governments could ensure migrants have access to secure and low cost financial
services and regulate remittance-handling intermediaries to prevent
malpractices. As well as increasing the flow of remittances, remittance policies
can improve the development impact of remittances at the receiving end.  For
example, micro-finance and micro-enterprise support initiatives have
encouraged remittance-receiving clients (especially small businesses) to access
credit and savings accounts.65 Finally, the further development of remittance-
backed bonds could help liquidity constrained developing countries to use
future flows of remittances to raise external finance relatively cheaply.66
Yet despite the tremendous development potential of this reform, the limited
progress that has been made in this area has been largely associated with the
intra-corporate movement of skilled personnel – an issue of interest to
developed countries. Thus far Mode 4 has not progressed in a way that allows
developing countries to use their comparative advantage in low and medium
skill labor-intensive services. Nor has there been enough attention given to
                                                 
64 They may not, and the disparity between factor payments and the value of marginal products may differ
across countries, if the degree of market imperfections differs.
65 For an example initiative in this area see the case of the financial institution PRODEM in Bolivia which
focuses on the promotion of savings and the offer of new financial services to remittance receivers. See
UNDP (2003) Worker Remittance as an Instrument for Development, Comparative Research – UNDP El
Salvador. A number of best practice scenarios from Latin America and Asia were presented and
documented in the November 2000 ILO conference in Geneva on “Making the best of Globalization:
Migrant Worker Remittances and Micro-Finance.”
66 In 2001, Banco do Brasil issued $300 million worth of bonds through Merrill Lynch using the future yen
remittances from Brazilian workers in Japan as collateral.  The terms of these bonds were more favourable
than those available on sovereign issues (with a BBB+ Standard and Poors rating compared to BB- on
Brazil’s sovereign foreign currency rating). For a review of securitization of remittance flows see Ketkar,
Suhas and Dilip Ratha (2000) Development Financing During a Crisis: Securitization of Future
Receivables, mimeo, Economic Policy and Prospects Group, The World Bank, Washington DC.
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proposals to facilitate remittances. Governments have a role to play in
maximizing both the value of remittances and their impact on development. For
example, governments could ensure migrants have access to secure and low cost
financial services and regulate remittance-handling intermediaries to prevent
malpractices. The development of new financial instruments like remittance-
backed bonds and the facilitation of transfers from migrants using employer's
payroll deduction schemes would also increase the ease with which remittances
flow to developing countries.
As well as facilitating the movement of natural persons (mode 4), there is scope
for liberalization of other service industries of importance to developing
countries. Services account for, on average, 50 per cent of developing countries
GDP, but developing countries account for only 25 per cent of the world’s
services exports. While the last decade has seen considerable liberalization of
high skill services, there has been less progress in those unskilled-labor-
intensive services of interest to developing countries.
A large portion of benefits from services liberalization derive, not from seeking
better market access abroad, but from the increased competitiveness and
efficiency of the domestic market. However in addition to these ‘efficiency
gains’ developing countries have important export interests in further services
liberalization (OECD 2004). Many developing countries have capitalized on
their comparative advantage in low-skill services to develop competent and
highly specialized industries. Examples are maritime services including port
services and the shipping industry; construction services; back office services
including data processing and call centers.
5.2.2 Agriculture
Section 2.2 highlighted the persistently high levels of agricultural protection in
the OECD.67 Yet agriculture is crucial to developing countries. It represents
almost 40 per cent of their GDP, 35 per cent of exports, and 70 per cent of
employment.
Because agriculture is such an important part of both national economic
development and daily livelihoods in developing countries, agricultural reform
must proceed carefully. Agricultural liberalization presents developing countries
with the benefits of increased market access, but also the (potential) costs of
higher prices for domestic consumers. The fundamental point is that consumers
benefit from lower prices that result from large agricultural subsidies, and
producers lose.  The net effect of wide-ranging agricultural reform varies across
developing countries depending on the composition of their exports and imports
                                                 
67 Total OECD spending on agricultural subsidies is more than US$300 bn per year. This is almost six
times the total aid from OECD countries to all developing countries (US$50-60 bn per year).
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of different commodities, and the price sensitivity of those commodities to
liberalization. The potential for losses highlights the need for a more fine
grained approach, which would differentiate among crops and countries.
The WTO should focus on liberalizing those commodities which have the
largest positive effect on producers and the smallest adverse consumption
effects. One important determinant of the net effect of this kind of reform is the
level of protection for each commodity and the consequent impact of
liberalization on prices. Tariffs are particularly high in the feed grains, dairy,
and food grains sectors, while dairy products, meat, and livestock are the worlds
most subsidized exports. Producer payments are highest for grains and oilseed
sectors and lowest for meat, livestock and dairy (Hertel et al. 2000).
Another important determinant of the welfare effects of liberalization is the
agricultural trade balance across countries. There is a division between
temperate products (program crops and livestock) where developing countries
are largely net importers and developed countries are largely net exporters, and
tropical products for which developing countries are largely net exporters. Most
developing countries are net importers of program crops,68 which are precisely
the commodities that have the highest domestic support and stand to experience
the largest price increases. It is therefore not surprising that most studies predict
that most developing countries are worse off as a result of the terms of trade
effects following this kind of reform. Indeed Dimaranan, Hertel and Keeney
(2003) find that gains accrue primarily to developed countries in the Cairns
group as well as the two largest developing country exporters, Argentina and
Brazil. These countries are the strongest advocates for the existing agricultural
reform agenda. Still, it is possible that, as producer prices increase, some
developing countries will switch from being net importers to net exporters.
Moreover, western production subsidies may have large adverse distributional
effects in developing countries. Producers lose, as consumers gain; the
producers are typically poor farmers, often far worse off than the urban net
consumers. Given the limited capacity of developing countries to effect
redistributions, there can be a significant welfare loss from such adverse
distributional impacts.
The existence of net losses for developing countries in some areas of reform
should not imply that no reform is required – rather it suggests that a selective
approach is needed. The most important subsidies to eliminate would be those
where the consumption benefits are small relative to the production costs.
Developing countries should focus their attention of the elimination of tariffs
                                                 
68 This includes Mexico, ‘Rest of South America’ (a regional average which excludes Argentina and
Brazil), China, Indonesia, Korea, ‘Rest of South Asia’ (a regional average which excludes India), Tanzania,
Zambia, ‘Rest of Sub Saharan Africa’ (a regional average which excludes Tanzania and Zambia), and the
average of the Middle East and North African Countries. Brazil, India, Argentina and Vietnam are net
exporters (Dimaranan, Hertel and Keeney, 2003).
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and quotas on tropical products, processed foods, and other commodities which
they export or for which they have high export elasticities with respect to price.
Elimination of cotton subsidies would raise producer prices for cotton, but have
a small effect on standards of living in developing countries as a result of the
small increase in the price of cloth. Similarly, subsidies for crops which are
disproportionately consumed by the wealthy will have the least adverse
distributional effects.  Soy beans, for instance, may largely go into the
production of animals (beef and chicken).
Furthermore, the potential adverse effects of agricultural liberalization on large
segments of society suggest the importance of a gradual approach, allowing
urban workers time to adjust.  It would also be desirable for developed countries
to give some of the money they previously expended on subsidies to assist the
developing countries in the transition.
The WTO makes a clear distinction between explicit export subsidies and other
forms of domestic subsidies, yet both types of payment can increase production
and exports and depress world prices.69 Since, domestic subsidies are treated
more permissively in the WTO several OECD countries have reduced their
export subsidies and increased their direct domestic support payments to
comply with their WTO commitments. In the US and EU, the annual values of
export subsidies for cereals and beef declined by US$4.1 billion between the
base period and 1998 and 1999. In the same period, domestic support in the
form of exempt direct payments for those commodities rose by an estimated
US$18.9 billion a year in the European Union alone (ABARE 2001). However
the trade effects of various types of domestic subsidies are often understated.
While the impact of export support on developing countries per dollar of
subsidy is greater than production-based support, the difference is small if the
elasticity of demand is small, which is the case for many agricultural
commodities. Even non-production based support (‘decoupled’ payments
primarily in the ‘green box’), have an impact on output and prices. These
payments advantage OECD producers by providing them with cheap (or free)
credit to potentially use for investment and expansion of production. The
distinction between trade distorting subsidies and non-trade distorting subsidies
is based on a particular economic model, in which capital markets are perfect.
Then, trade-distorting subsidies are subsidies which change the marginal return
to production or which reduce the marginal cost of production.  Thus,
generalized income supports, in this view, are not production distorting, nor are
payments to keep land fallow.  But both of these may, in fact, be production
distorting, if, for instance, farmers face credit constraints.  Then, in effect, the
subsidies provide additional finance, which allows farmers to expand
production.
                                                 
69 The WTO classifies domestic subsidies according to their distortionary effect on trade: amber (directly
trade-distorting); blue (indirectly trade-distorting production payments); green (non-trade distorting).
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5.2.3 Liberalization of industrial goods
While average developed country tariff rates are low, developed countries
maintain high barriers to many of the goods exported most intensively by
developing countries. When weighted by import volumes, developing countries
face average manufacturing tariffs of 3.4 per cent on their exports to developed
countries, more than four times higher than the average rate faced by goods
from developed countries, 0.8 per cent (Hertel and Martin, 2000).70
Moreover aggregate data hides the existence of tariff peaks (discussed in section
2.2). OECD tariffs are particularly high for goods of importance to poor
countries such as low skill manufactures (especially textiles) and processed
foods. Such tariff peaks have a particularly harmful effect on development by
restricting industrial diversification in the poorest countries.
A second reason that developing countries should be pushing to have industrial
tariffs prioritized in the Doha Agenda is that barriers to south-south trade are
quite high. The average import-weighted tariff on the exports of manufactured
goods from developing countries to developing countries is 12.8 per cent
(Hertel and Martin, 2000). Anderson et. al (2000) estimate that the welfare gains
to developing countries derived from the liberalisation of trade in manufactures
by other developing countries is $US31bn.
5.2.4 Non-tariff barriers
Developing countries have repeatedly found that as they make inroads into a
market in the United States or Europe, they are slapped with dumping duties or
face some other form of non-tariff barrier.  Though ostensibly the Uruguay
Round marked the end of the so-called voluntary export restraint, the United
States has talked about reinstating such restraints against China.  The effect of
these non-tariff barriers is far greater than indicated by the actual duties
imposed.  The fear that they will be imposed has a chilling effect on
development:  it increases the risk associated with investing in an export
oriented industry, which is particularly important in economies already facing
high interest rates.  Often, initially high duties are imposed, only to be revised
down substantially; but the initially high duties suffice to drive the exporting
firm out of business.  Some solution to the problems posed by non-tariff barriers
should be high on the agenda of any development round.
                                                 
70 The distortion is even larger if one recognizes that the quantities imported are reduced as a result of the
high tariff barriers.  (In the measure cited, a prohibitive tariff would have no weight in the measure, since
there would be no imports.)
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There are four important categories of non-tariff barriers.  Dumping duties,
which are imposed when a country (allegedly) sells products below costs,
countervailing duties, which can be imposed when a country subsidizes a
commodity, safeguards, which can be imposed temporarily when a county faces
a surge of imports, and restrictions to maintain food safety or avoid, say, an
infestation of fruit flies.  The advanced industrial countries have used all of
these at times to restrict imports from developing countries, when they have
achieved a degree of competitiveness which allows them to enter the markets of
the developed countries.  Many of these measures are described as ensuring
“fair trade,” but from the perspective of developing countries, they ensure
“unfair trade.”  They are evidence of the hypocrisy of the North.  Increasingly,
however, developing countries are using such measures against each other and
against the advanced industrial countries, and in that sense they represent a
hidden threat to a trade liberalization regime.
There has been a large increase in the number of antidumping claims.71 Part of
the problem with the schemes is how they have been implemented. Consider,
for example, America’s use of dumping duties. The accused must respond in a
short period of time to a long demand for information (in English), and when
the accused is unable to do so, the U.S. government acts on the “best
information available,” usually the information which has been provided by the
American company trying to keep out its rivals.  High initial duties are imposed,
which regularly get revised downward, when better information becomes
available.  But meanwhile, long term damage has been done, as American
buyers will not purchase the commodity, given the uncertainty about the level of
tariffs they may have to pay.72  America’s provisions for dumping duties (and in
some cases countervailing duties) for China and some of the former Communist
countries have been particularly egregious.  In the “surrogate country
methodology” which is used to assess the cost of production (the benchmark
against which charges of dumping are assessed) costs of production are
compared with those of a “similar” country.  In one instance, the United States
used Canada as the country most similar to Poland; not surprisingly, it was
found that the costs of production were high, justifying a high dumping duty.73
President Bush’s action in imposing steel tariffs exemplifies the inequities
associated with safeguards, a particular form of non-tariff barrier.  With
safeguard measures, one does not have to even show that the developing
country has done anything wrong; in some cases, one does not even have to
show that the developing country’s exports are at the center of the industry’s
problems.  All that one has to show is that the industry faces a problem—sales
or profitability are declining, and that the “surge” of imports contributed to the
                                                 
71 There were 2,063 dumping cases initiated between 1995 and 2002. The three most common initiators
were the U.S. (279), India (273), and the EC (255). See Finger and Zlate (2003).
72 For a more complete description of these abuses, see, for instance, J.E. Stiglitz, “Dumping on Free Trade:
The U.S. Import Trade Laws,” Southern Economic Journal, 64(2), 1997, pp. 402-424.
73 See Economic Report of the President
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problems.74  But if the United States, the richest country in the world, a country
with low unemployment and a relatively good safety net, says that it needs to
resort to safeguards to protect an industry which has long been in decline, then
how much more convincing is the need for most developing countries—with
high unemployment and often no safety net—to impose safeguards.
There are three reforms that would make a great deal of difference.  The first is
to recognize the principle of national treatment:  in addressing problems of
unfair trade, the legal framework should be the same for domestic firms as it is
foreign firms.  In the case of dumping, for instance, firms are charged with
selling below cost.  To an economist, the natural question is, why would a firm
ever sell below marginal cost (and what is the relevant economic concept)? The
answer is to try to drive out rivals, to establish a monopoly or dominant position
in a market, that would enable it later on to sell at a high price, well above costs.
Thus, American anti-trust law, in assessing whether predatory pricing (the
equivalent in a domestic context of dumping) has occurred attempts to assess
whether price is below the relevant cost, and whether there is evidence of the
likelihood that the accused will recoup his loses.  As a result of this high
standard, few cases of predatory pricing have been successfully prosecuted.
Subjecting foreign firms to the same standard would ensure that dumping
charges were being used to preserve competition, not to reduce the threat of
foreign competition. (The double standard is highlighted by the fact that if
American firms were subject to the standard used in dumping case, a large
fraction of American firms would be found guilty of dumping.)
The second is to create a new international tribunal as the first “court.”  Today,
when, for instance, the United States accuses firms of a foreign country of
dumping, it acts as prosecutor, judge, and jury.  Though the process is governed
by a “rule of law,” in the sense that there were well defined procedures, the
process often works in a highly unfair way.  There is a costly and lengthy WTO
process, which can, and has, been used to rectify gross abuses, as in the case of
the U.S. imposed steel tariffs.  But it would be far better if the original decision
was taken out of the hands of the country and put into a specialized international
tribunal.
The third is that the implementation legislation and practices of the countries
should be reviewed to ascertain whether it is fair and non-discriminatory, both
de jure and de facto, and is in conformity with widely accepted economic
principles.  An example already referred to is the use of BIA (best information
available).  Almost all economists agree that the relevant cost concept for
                                                 
74 This is governed by Article XIX of GATT 1994 which deals with "Emergency Actions on Imports of
Particular Products", and also by the Agreement on Safeguards. To quote the appellate body in the US Steel
case: "Together, Article XIX and the Agreement on Safeguards confirm the right of WTO members to
apply safeguard measures when, as a result of unforeseen developments and of the effect of obligations
incurred, including tariff concessions, a product is being imported in such increased quantities and under
such conditions as to cause or threaten to cause serious injury to the domestic industry that produces like or
directly competitive products.
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judging dumping is marginal not average costs, yet the legislation in many
countries uses average costs; this means that dumping charges are often
sustained in cyclical industries, in downturns, where marginal costs are
considerably below average costs.75
The determination of whether subsidies have been provided is another example
which has been subject to considerable contention.  A development round
should clarify this, in ways which ensure that governments may undertake
industrial policies to promote nascent industries.  This is particularly important
because the form of subsidy in the United States—research in the defense
industry, the benefits of which spill over to civilian uses—is markedly different
form that in the developing world.  Allowing one, but not the other, creates an
uneven playing field.  Similarly, the IMF often forces developing countries to
have high interest rates, well above the “market rate”; lending money at more
reasonable rates should not be viewed as a subsidy.
A third example concerns the sale of privatized assets, particularly in the former
socialist economies.  Assume that the original investment was subsidized, but
the government privatizes the industry through a competitive auction.  Such an
auction should extinguish the subsidy:  the new investor pays, in effect, fair
market value for the asset.  In a way, one can look at the privatization as a
bankruptcy/restructuring proceeding.  When a firm goes bankrupt, its assets are
sold in an auction.  The acquiring firm is not viewed as having received a
subsidy.  The socialist economies can be viewed as a large bankrupt enterprise,
the assets of which are now being disposed.    On the other hand, when the
government effectively gives away the asset, then the subsidy is clearly not
extinguished.  (A side-benefit of a rule that distinguishes between the two kinds
of privatizations is that it would encourage more honest privatizations.)
While the argument for safeguard measures is persuasive, they have been
widely abused, especially by the developed countries.  If the richest country of
the world, the United States, with a strong safety net, relatively high
employment level, etc. has to resort to safeguard measures to protect itself
against a surge of imports, how much more justified are developing countries in
imposing such measures.  Indeed, it is hard to conceive of many important
liberalization measures, against which safeguard protections could not
justifiably be invoked by developing countries.  This highlights again the need
to set clearer standards at the international level.  For instance, for a safeguard
measure to be imposed, not only should the country show that there is “injury,”
but that it is substantial, entailing a loss, say, of at least 1% of the jobs in the
country, and that the burden on the country’s social safety net is such that it
would be hard pressed to absorb it.  The threshold standard should be lower in
developing countries.  Such a reform would ensure that the safeguard measures
                                                 
75 Moreover, dumping is sometime found in competitive industries, in which no rational firm would ever
engage in predatory pricing, since there is no way it could establish the monopoly power required for it to
recoup the losses it makes when it sells below marginal cost.
47
only be used in cases where trade disturbances imposed significant adjustment
burdens.
5.3 Priorities in non-market access issues
5.3.1 Restrictions on tax and incentive competition to
attract investors
One arena in which an international agreement might be of immense benefit to
developing countries concerns their competition for investment through
concessionary tax rates and financial subsidies.  The main beneficiary of that
competition is international business and often countries suffer large fiscal
losses without commensurate gains to either their domestic economy or to the
efficiency of the location of international production.76 If authorities were to
embark on cross-country (or cross-jurisdiction) policy action, there are
essentially three options, representing three levels of ambition with regards to
the objectives being pursued. In ascending order these are: i) transparency-
enhancing obligations on firms and countries;77 ii) co-operation between
jurisdictions;78 and iii) the putting in place of enforceable international rules.79
Just as international agreements circumscribe subsidies in general, there should
be a strong proscription on firm specific competition. The spirit of the WTO’s
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM) could be
extended to new rules limiting investment competition. Under the SCM,
subsidies are actionable if they can be shown to cause adverse trade effects. One
of the adverse effects triggering actionability under Part III is: “serious
prejudice to the interests of another member” – a principle which could be
analogously applied to the incentive instruments used in investment
competition.
                                                 
76 For a discussion of harmful tax practices see OECD (1998). For welfare losses from international tax
competition see Charlton (2003).
77 Oman, Charles (2000) Policy Competition for Foreign Direct Investment: A Study of Competition
among Governments to Attract FDI, Development Centre Studies, OECD, Paris.
78 OECD countries adopted a similar approach in their efforts to identify and reduce “harmful tax
competition” (OECD 1998). While the OECD’s mandate here covers mainly general tax rates rather than
specific incentives, the criteria used to determine “harmful” tax policies is instructive for investment
incentives. Two of the criteria cover transparency and discrimination between foreign and domestic firms.
The European Commission’s 1999 “Code of Conduct (Business Taxation)” has taken a similar approach.
79 Three alternative frameworks could regulate incentives with reference to either their i) size (capping the
total financial benefit available); ii) use (e.g. specifying geographical areas or sectors in which they are
allowed/prohibited); and iii) instrument (proscribing instruments perceived to be particularly harmful).
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The European Union (which has been operating state aid guidelines now for
several decades) provides an example of how rules might be developed.
Although grants & subsidies to foreign direct investors are not explicitly
targeted by Commission policy, in practice they are one of the main forms of
state aid regulated by it. The definition of state aid clearly encompasses
traditional instruments of investment attraction. Indeed the European
Commission classifies state aid as including i) grants to firms; ii) loans and
guarantees; iii) tax exemptions; and iv) infrastructure projects benefiting
identifiable end-users. These payments are regulated by the European
Commission, which claims some success in reducing subsidies in the EU.80
5.3.2 Anti-corruption policies
One particularly insidious interaction between foreign firms and developing
countries is the rampant corruption:  it is often less expensive to bribe
government officials to obtain, say, a concession, than to pay the full market
price.  International non-bribery agreements (such as America’s Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act) should be made part of an international agreement.
There should be full disclosure of all payments made to foreign companies
(publish where you pay).  There should be an agreement that only disclosed
payments will be tax deductible; but even stronger enforcement measures
should be undertaken.
Secret bank accounts facilitate corruption, by providing a safe haven for funds
stolen from a country.  This greatly adversely affects developing countries.
There should be an international agreement proscribing bank secrecy (the
importance of which has recently been recognized in the case of terrorism.)
This too can easily be enforced.  No bank should be allowed to deal with any
bank in a country which does not conform to the agreed upon transparency
standards.  Any country that does not enforce such a sanction can be sued (e.g.
under provisions similar to those discussed above under fair competition.)
5.3.3 Anti civil strife policies and pro-environment policies
Trade agreements have largely been designed to expand the scope of trade, on
the premise that trade is beneficial.  Trade policy has become controversial
because there are some notable instances where that does not seem to be the
                                                 
80 See Charlton (2003) for a discussion of the EU’s state aid regulations as applied to foreign investment
incentives.
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case.  The most obvious are the trading in arms, especially small arms, the
trafficking in diamonds and other minerals which help finance the purchase of
arms, and the narcotics trade.  It has become well accepted that countries that
export drugs have a responsibility for containing the sale of those drugs.  This
perspective has been pushed by the advanced industrial countries; as they have
come to the view of their inability to control consumption and the demand side,
they have put increasing responsibility on the supply side.  The same principle
should hold for arms trade—it may be far easier to control the sale of arms than
the purchase.
In its appellate decision in the shrimp-turtle case, the WTO recognized the
importance of global environmental concerns.  This decision needs to be
strengthened and its scope extended, most importantly to recognize that
allowing the firms within a country to take advantage of a global economic
resource, to deplete that resource unduly, to excessively harm that resource, is
an unfair trade practice and should be subject to sanctions.  The failure to
impose charges for the use of global environmental resources (including the
atmosphere) of course encourages such abusive practices.  Some developing
counties risk being very adversely affected by global warming, even if some
temperate advanced industrial countries will not be so adversely affected.
5.3.4 Responding to crises: from beggar-thy-neighbor to
help-thy-neighbor
One of the original motivations for international trade agreements was the fear
of the kinds of beggar-thy-neighbor policies which marked the Great
Depression.  Nonetheless, even within the WTO, there are provisions (almost
never invoked) that allow countries to take emergency measures. The issue is
important because given the unstable global financial and economic system,
country after country has faced a crisis in recent years; by one reckoning there
have been a hundred crises in the last three decades.   Rather than resorting to
beggar-thy-neighbor policies, it would be far better than encouraging countries
to return to protectionist measures in the event of a crisis to encourage other
countries to take special measures to open up their markets.  For instance, in the
Argentine crisis, if countries provided special access to Argentinean beef or
wine, it might have modulated the downturn and facilitated a quicker restoration
of the economy.  An international panel within the WTO should assess whether
there is a crisis exists which might benefit from special trade opening measures,
and how those “help thy neighbor” policies might be implemented.
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5.3.5 Trade implementation and environment facility
The developing countries are at a marked disadvantage, not only in negotiating
fair trade agreements, but also in implementation.  We noted one aspect of this
earlier:  there difficulty in mounting challenges to bio-piracy actions under
TRIPS.
Some developed and many less developed countries have marked subsidies to
the use of energy, which has adverse effects on the global environment.  The
costs of global warming are likely to be particularly severe to some developing
countries, such as Bangladesh.81  The international community has recognized
the need to assist developing countries face the incremental costs associated
with implementing environmentally sound technologies, and that should include
adjustment assistance to help developing countries bear the costs of eliminating
subsidies to (fossil fuel) energy.
5.4 What should not be on the agenda?
The preceding is a partial list of some of the items that should have a high
priority in any round of trade negotiations that pretends to call itself a
development round.  Many of the items listed have received little or no
attention.  Equally remarkable are the several items (especially within the so-
called Singapore issues) that are on the table.  Some of these would almost
surely impede development.  The fact that the United States and Europe put
such items on the agenda and continued to push them so long within the so-
called Development Round is worrisome:  Were they merely bargaining chips?
Was there no real comprehension about what should be meant by a
Development Round?
5.4.1 Investor Agreement
Developed countries have put considerable efforts in expanding investor rights.
As we noted earlier, facilitating the free mobility of capital is far less important
for global economic efficiency or for the developing countries themselves than
facilitating the movement of labor, particularly that of unskilled workers.
                                                 
81 United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) estimates that the costs of global warming may exceed
$300 billion annually. These costs stem from more frequent natural disasters, loss of land as a result of
rising sea levels and damage to fishing stocks, agriculture and water supplies. In some low lying states such
as the Maldives, the Marshall Islands and the Federated States of Micronesia, losses linked to climate
change could, by 2050, exceed 10 per cent of Gross Domestic Product (UNEP 2001)
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Indeed, there is a strong case the capital market liberalization may actually
lower global economic efficiency.82
Moreover, as we have also noted, to the extent that there is validity to the
argument that improved investor protections will attract more capital, each
country can do that on its own.  Each developing country does not have to rely
on an international agreement.  But is it only through international negotiations
that free labor mobility can be achieved.83  There is, accordingly, a far stronger
argument for focusing on the “rights of labor” than on the “rights of capital.”
Equally troublesome is that arguably, some of the items that were on the agenda
would actually have an adverse effect on the well-being of developing
countries.  The United States put the issue of capital market liberalization on the
table, and has in fact insisted on such provisions in bilateral agreements (e.g.
with Chile and Singapore.)  There is mounting evidence that full mobility of
short term speculative capital (hot money) would actually increase economic
instability, increasing in turn poverty.  There is little evidence that it enhances
economic growth.  Indeed, the instability which it generates may well impede
investment and growth.  The problems of Latin America in recent years, and of
East Asia at the end of the last decade, can be directly traced to capital market
liberalization.
The problem with many investor protections is that other rights have been
compromised in the attempt to enhance the rights of investors.  Such investor
rights are not costless.  But those whose rights are being compromised do not
have a seat at the table (see the discussion of Institutional reforms in Section V).
For instance, Chapter 11 of NAFTA granted investor rights which compromised
the rights of government to provide for the general welfare, through health,
safety, and environmental regulations.  Recent decisions suggest that the right of
a community to protect itself against toxic wastes may be compromised.
There are already mechanisms for the protection of investors against
expropriation, both internationally (MIGA, the Multilateral Investment
Guarantee Agency) and on the part of many of the investing countries (Overseas
Private Investment Corporation, OPIC, in the United States.)  There has not
been a convincing case made that these are inadequate, or, if they are, that they
cannot be strengthened.  The new investor protections go beyond the concern
for expropriation, to the granting of additional rights to investors.
                                                 
82 See, e.g. J. E. Stiglitz [2000, 2004] and the forthcoming IPD task force report on Capital Market
Liberalization (Oxford University Press, forthcoming.)
83 The distinction is perhaps not quite as strong as it has sometimes been put.  Allowing immigration of
labor will benefit both the recipient and sending country; but there are likely to be groups that are directly
adversely affected in the recipient country, who will be vocal, and often politically effective, in their
opposition.  On the other hand, investors seldom oppose capital market liberalization, as they focus on the
consequences of the lowering of the cost of capital.  Of course, entrenched industry may resist the entry of
competitors in their line of business.
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5.4.2 Intellectual property rights
Had such a provision been part of the Uruguay Round, it is doubtful whether the
TRIPS agreement would have passed muster.  Clearly, the provisions relating to
compulsory licensing of drugs had an enormously adverse effect on many of the
poorest in the developing countries.
While there have been a few dramatic bio-piracy cases,84 the full impact
remains uncertain.  Yet, because of the huge inequities which it suggests, it has
taken on symbolic value, and accordingly, it is difficult to conceive of a fair
trade agreement that does not address the issues.
The argument of Bhagwati and others that intellectual property should not be
included in a trade agreement are sufficiently compelling that in fact there
should be a complete roll back of TRIPS.  The issues should be switched to
another international forum (WIPO).
Whether within the WTO or this alternative forum, a new intellectual property
regime needs to be created which balances more carefully the interests, e.g. of
users in both developed and less developed countries (including researchers, for
whom knowledge is one of the most important inputs) and producers of
knowledge.  This should be reflected in all the provisions, including the tests of
novelty85, as well as the breadth and scope of the patent.  There should be a
stronger presumption for narrowly defined patents, and the issue of patents for
business practices as well as other recent extensions of patent coverage should
be examined and agreed to within an international process that is centered in the
scientific community, not the trade ministers.  There should also be sensitivity
to the disadvantageous positions of developing countries in pursuing legal
recourse.86  (The issue of intellectual property rights is discussed further in
section 6 below.)
                                                 
84 One famous case involved a Texas company attempting to patent Basmati rice.  In that case, India
challenged the patent and prevailed.
85 Patents could not, for instance, be granted for traditional medicines or goods, or slight variants of those
traditional medicines, when the usefulness of those commodities has already been recognized within the
developing country.
86 There is already in motion a backlash among the more technologically advanced of the less developed
countries.  Brazil is pushing for open source software, and China may adopt its own telecommunications
standards, which will enable it to avoid paying high royalties for the use of technology based on other
standards.  An unbalanced intellectual property regime can contribute to overall global inefficiency in the
use and production of knowledge.
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5.4.3 Other services
In the list of priorities, we emphasized earlier the opening up of markets to
unskilled labor intensive services and the movement of unskilled labor
(sometimes in support of such services.)  Earlier rounds of trade liberalization
focused on, for instance, financial services, the benefits of which are arguable.
The standard argument is that more efficient financial service intermediation
lowers the cost of doing business and thus promotes economic growth.  It is pro-
development.  But a closer look at the record reveals a more mixed picture.  In
at least some developing countries there are concerns that the purchase of local
banks by foreign banks has reduced the flow of credit to domestic small and
medium sized enterprises, and thus impeded economic growth.  (There is a long
history of such concerns, evidenced in the United States, for instance, by
restrictions on interstate banking, intended to prevent New York and other
money center banks from buying up other banks, thereby impeding regional,
and especially rural, development.)  The agreements on financial services
should be reexamined, to ascertain whether there is sufficient protection for
developing countries.  In particular, the right of developing countries to impose
lending requirements (analogous to those in the United States in the Community
Reinvestment Act) to force more lending to underserved populations should be
explicitly recognized.
5.4.4 Other regulatory interventions
Developing countries worry that new trade agreements will create new barriers
to the entry of their goods into developed country markets (impeding their
development). They worry about blue-tariffs (impediments based on labor
standards) and green tariffs (impediments based on environmental standards.)
Standard economic theory suggests that, with a couple of exceptions noted
below, weak standards do not necessarily improve a country’s competitiveness,
and therefore the issue of standards should not, in general, be embraced within a
trade agreement.  In standard theory, in a competitive market, any costly
provision (such as improved working conditions) simply gets reflected in the
wage paid.  Such restrictions affect the form of compensation, but not the
overall level of compensation.  In general, there is no reason that the
international community should intrude into the forms of compensation.
There are three basic exceptions to these principals.  The first is when the global
community is affected (a principle which has already been recognized in the
appellate decision in the shrimp/turtle case, in the area of environment and
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endangered species.87)  The international community has a right to take actions
to address global public goods and externalities, and among the most important
of these is the global environment.  Trade policy should recognize, as we have
noted earlier, that not forcing firms to pay the true social costs of their
environmental damage is a form of subsidy, which countries should have the
right to take action against. Since developing countries as a whole are more
likely to be adversely affected by global warming than, say, the United States,88
using trade policy to force compliance by the advanced industrial countries with
the Kyoto Protocol could well be considered an important part of a pro-
development trade agenda.
The second is related—matters of human rights.  Clearly, when individuals are
forced to provide labor services (e.g. when they are prisoners) or allowed to use
child labor, costs of production may be lowered.   As a global community, we
do not want to provide economic incentives for such behaviors; on the contrary,
we want to discourage it.  By the same token, when governments have seized
land of indigenous peoples, and provides the fruits of that land to others at
discounted prices (even if those prices are above its cost of acquisition), then
that should be viewed as an unfair subsidy.  Countervailing duties against
minerals and lumber produced in many countries would be justified by such a
provision.
The third, which too may be related, concerns circumstances in which countries
can take actions which affect unfairly costs of production.  The most notable
example of this is restrictions on collective bargaining and the right to take
collective action.  The bargaining relationship between workers and firms is one
sided, and firms can use their economic power to drive down wages and labor
costs, making their products more competitive than they otherwise would be.
In all of these cases, some argue that since these are not matters of trade (though
the first clearly constitutes a trade-distorting subsidy) it is preferable to address
these problems through other channels.  Without prejudging the validity of this
argument, the fact of the matter is that there are few other channels.  Today, in
the absence of alternatives, trade sanctions are one of the few ways that the
international community can enforce its will, and though resort to such
measures should be carefully circumscribed, the instances enumerated are
among those in which sanctions may arguably be justified.89
                                                 
87 The United States requires domestic shrimpers to use protective technology called Turtle Excluder
Devices, which are a kind of trap door by which turtles can escape from shrimp nets. In 1989, Congress
essentially banned importation of shrimp caught by foreign shrimpers who don't use Turtle Excluder
Devices.
88 This is because the developing countries, on average, are already in warmer climates.
89 It is important that the decision about whether a trade sanction is to be imposed be taken by the
international community; otherwise special interests within a country may well try to disguise
protectionism behind a cloak of environmentalism or labor rights.
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On the other hand, there are a host of other regulatory interventions which may
adversely affect foreign businesses, sometimes differentially so, but whose
primary motivation is to enhance economic development.  We referred to one
earlier—restrictions on banks that require that they lend certain minimal
amounts to small and medium sized domestic enterprises and to other
underserved communities.  It is a legitimate role for government to undertake
such actions.  The United States, Japan, and many other countries did so in their
earlier stages of development—and continue to do so.  Because foreign banks
may not be in a position to screen among such loan applicants as well as
domestic banks, such regulations may have a differentially adverse effect on
foreign banks.
By the same token, governments may decide that affirmative action programs
are desirable for social purposes, and require that all employers hire workers
from certain disadvantaged groups.  These restrictions might, conceivably,
impose greater costs on foreign firms, who are used to hiring Western educated
individuals, but they reflect a legitimate aspiration of governments to create a
more equal society.
5.4.5 Exchange rate manipulation
The United States has recently leveled charges of exchange rate manipulation
against China.  Global financial markets have exhibited enormous instability.
Volatility of exchange rates presents a particular problem for developing
country.  Markets are thin, and thus subject to both more volatility and
manipulability.  Government intervention is, accordingly, often viewed to be
desirable.  There are a variety of mechanisms by which the government can
affect the exchange rate, and there are a variety of policies which the
government undertakes which affect the exchange rate indirectly.  Bad
economic policies (large deficits) for instance may lead to a devaluation of the
currency, whether that is the intent of the policy or not.  Given the large adverse
consequences of trade deficits, there should be a presumption that countries that
have only a moderate trade surplus are not engaged in exchange rate
manipulation.    The complexities involved suggest that there should be a high
threshold test for taking action in the event of an accusation of exchange rate
manipulation, and that, at the very least, only multilateral trade surpluses, not
bilateral trade deficits, should be presented as evidence of such manipulation.
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6 Special Issues
6.1 Special and Differential Treatment and the
Development Box
There is now general agreement that the different circumstances that developing
countries are in warrants special and differential treatment.  This is necessary if
there is to be any trade agreement that goes much beyond current arrangements,
and yet promotes the development of the poorest countries in the world.
There are at least two approaches to special and differential treatment.  The first
lifts the “single undertaking”, allowing countries to decide which of the
provisions they wish to sign up to.  Many developing countries fear, however,
that eliminating the single undertaking will lead to a divide and conquer
strategy, in which a few countries sign up to the “higher standards,” putting
pressure on the others to do so.
That is why the alternative approach of generalized rules embodying differential
treatment is preferred.  Thus, for instance, developing countries should be given
a longer adjustment period. They should be given greater latitude in providing
subsidies, especially for new technology.  If non-tariff barriers are retained, the
developing countries should receive differential treatment.
A variant of this proposal would divide the WTOs agenda into two or more
schedules. The core market access agenda and those elements which would not
function in the presence of a free-rider problem would remain subject to the
‘single undertaking’. This agenda would embody generalized SDT for
developing countries. A second schedule would include peripheral trade issues
for which the free-rider is less significant and where most of the gains from
liberalization are captured domestically. Countries could choose to opt-out of
any or all of the elements of this schedule depending on whether the proposals
are consistent with their other national development policies.
Such differential treatment would facilitate the design of trade agreements
which are more likely to promote economic development.  A blanket
proscription against government subsidies to technology (industrial policies) is
likely to have an adverse effect on developing countries, and indeed, it is likely
in practice to be unfair; the United States conducts its industrial policy largely
through the military, which supports a wide variety of technological
developments that eventually have important civilian applications.  And it is
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hard to conceive of a trade agreement that would prohibit the transfer of such
technologies.
Thus, each provision of a trade agreement should be assessed for its impact on
development, and designed, employing where necessary, provisions for special
and differential treatment, to ensure that development is enhanced.  Moreover,
the totality of the trade agreement should be assessed, to ensure that a fair share
of the benefits (the net incidence) accrues to developing countries.
6.2 Intellectual property issues
Recent debates about intellectual property need to be put into context.
Intellectual property provides innovators with a temporary monopoly power.
Monopoly power always results in an economic inefficiency.  There is
accordingly a high cost of granting even a temporary monopoly power.  But the
benefit is that by doing so, greater motivation is provided for inventive activity.
The dynamic gains, it is hoped, exceed the static losses.
Much of the most important innovative activity is outside the realm of
intellectual property.  Behind the inventions associated with atomic energy or
lasers were basic discoveries in physics.  Behind the computer were basic
discoveries in mathematics.  The basic research which underlies practical
innovation in almost all arenas occurs in universities and government research
laboratories, and few of the discoveries are protected by intellectual property.
In many cases, it is neither desirable nor practical for this to happen.  Often the
applications which give market value to the discovery occur years after the
original discovery (beyond the normal patent life.) Ideas give rise to other ideas,
and there is no way to ascertain which ideas proved instrumental in the creation
of follow-on ideas.
Most important, it should be recognized that material reward provides little of
the motivation for much of this intellectual activity.  To be sure, it could not
occur without financial support.  The salaries of the researchers have to be paid,
and if the financial support is woefully inadequate, many would-be researchers
will divert their attentions to other areas.  Yet there is little evidence that
stronger intellectual property protection would generate a greater flow of basic
ideas.
Knowledge is a public good, and this is especially true for the fruits of basic
research, which is why governments have an important responsibility for its
support.  Intellectual property protection thus constitutes only a part—and not
the most important part—of what may be called our knowledge and research
system.  Providing greater support to this one part of the system may actually
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harm other parts of the system, and impede the progress of science.  Note that
the system under which basic research is conducted is a very open one, in which
ideas freely move around, and in which in fact scientists put considerable effort
into disseminating their ideas and encouraging others to use them.  In many
ways, this is the opposite of the premises underlying intellectual property, which
seeks to circumscribe the use of knowledge, limiting it only to those who are
willing and able to pay.
Thus, the intellectual property regime must balance concerns about incentives
for research with the costs of the inefficiencies associated with monopoly
power; it must balance the interests of some producers of knowledge, with the
interests of other producers of knowledge, of consumers, and of society more
generally.
Since knowledge is the most important input into research, better intellectual
property protection may actually impede the research process.   Much of the
effort in patenting is directed at trying to maintain monopoly power, ensuring
that others will not invent around the patent.  Some of the value of each patent
entails “enclosing” what was previously public knowledge.
The intellectual property provisions of the Uruguay Round (TRIPs) were
unbalanced. No where was the lack of balance more in evidence that in TRIPS
treatment of medicines, and there remain concerns even about the agreement
that was reached in the run up to Cancun.  Compulsory licensing should be
extended to any drug that is lifesaving or which controls diseases with serious
effects on health.  Even if malaria or dysentery were not life saving to some
people, they enervate millions of people in the developing world, impeding their
productivity and lowering their living standards.  There may not be an
“emergency” or crisis, as there is in the case of AIDs, but it is still of critical
importance to the developing world.
The revenues lost to the pharmaceuticals as a result of such compulsory
licensing are likely to be miniscule, relative to the revenues generated by the
exercise of monopoly power in the more advanced industrial countries, and
therefore are likely to have a negligible effect on the development of drugs.  The
cost to the developing countries of failure to provide drugs at affordable prices
is enormous.90
The disparity between price and marginal cost of production can be viewed as a
tax, used to finance research.  Basic principles of equity question the levying of
this tax on some of the poorest people in the world.  If the international
                                                 
90 The right of a government to demand compulsory licensing has been recognized even by the United
States, the staunchest defender of intellectual property rights; when it was worried about anthrax, it forced
the compulsory licensing of Ciprio.  The only issue is, under what conditions should such compulsory
licensing be allowed.   A development round would have provided answers that more directly addressed the
concerns of the developing countries.
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community believes that there is a need to provide greater incentives for
research for the development of medicines, then they should do so directly,
through funding of research either within the public or private sector, not by
levying a tax on the poor.  One proposal has it that each country should make a
contribution to research, the magnitude of which would be based on their
income, and the form of which would be of their own choosing.  The
contribution, for instance, could be in the form of direct expenditures on
research, licensing fees, or the implicit taxes paid to holders of patents.
There are other issues which affect developing countries access to life saving
medicines at affordable prices.  One concern is the ease with which generic
drugs are able to get established, and how quickly they can enter a market at the
expiration of a patent.  In some of its bilateral trade agreements, the United
States has been working to make it more difficult.  If there is to be an
intellectual property agreement within a development round, it should enshrine
principles facilitating the rapid entry of generics.
The problems posed by bio-piracy are equally serious.  While as noted earlier,
when contested in court, some of the claims of Western firms may not be
sustained, it is costly for developing countries to mount the legal challenge.
One proposal is that there be a change in the presumptions associated with
patenting, say, traditional medicines, with the party applying having to show
that there was not recognition of its medicinal properties, with the adjudication
occurring in an international tribunal, and with the legal expenses of the
developing country being divided between the applicant and the developing
country in proportion to the ratio of the income per capita.
6.3 Competition Issues
Competition was supposed to be one of the Singapore issues, but the discussions
on competition have devolved more into ensuring fair competitive access of
developed countries into developing country markets, than into ensuring that
markets are really competitive, and that developing countries have fair access to
developed country markets.
Ensuring Competition.  Today, many companies operate across boundaries.
Competition policy in one country can affect others.  The United States and
Europe have increasingly come to recognize this.   The United States instituted
an action against Japan, claiming anti-competitive practices in Japan, which the
Japanese government had not stopped, had unfairly discriminated against
Kodak.  Europe took actions against Honeywell on anti-trust grounds, and the
American government complained that its standards were too high.  The EU is
considering taking actions against Microsoft; even though American courts have
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found Microsoft guilty of violations of anti-trust laws, there is widespread
concern that the remedies were insufficient.
The concerns are two sided:  there is a worry that the anti-trust laws will be
applied in a discriminatory way, to hurt foreign companies; and that anti-trust
actions will fail to take account of anti-competitive effects in developing
country.  Ideally, there should be harmonization of anti-trust laws at the highest
standard.  Strong competition advocates worry, however, that harmonization
will occur at the standard of the least common denominator, and an international
agreement will legitimate such lower standards.
Given these difficulties, initial steps would include insisting on national (non-
discriminatory treatment); this would entail either eliminating dumping duties,
or revising anti-trust legislation, to apply the same standards to foreign and
domestic firms.
A second reform would require that national authorities look carefully at anti-
competitive effects outside their own jurisdiction.91  Not only should domestic
anti-trust regulators look at competitive effects abroad, but foreign consumers
should have the right to take actions in foreign courts against corporations that
abuse their market power.  Cross border class action suits should be sanctioned,
allowing consumers in multiple jurisdictions to band together to impose, for
instance, treble damages, with judgments enforceable in the jurisdiction of the
home country.
Thirdly, consumers and governments in all countries should be able to take
actions (including class action suits) against international cartels, including
those cartels in which governments are a party or have sanctioned the cartel.
(While some developing countries may lose from such an action, the benefits
received by others would almost surely outweigh the losses.  For instance, oil
producers may be worse off, but oil consumers would be better off.)
Ensuring fair access.  Here, the concern of developed countries is that
restrictions imposed by developing countries (such as affirmative action or
preferences for small and medium sized enterprises) have a differential effect on
multinationals.  But a development round should recognize the legitimate role
of such restrictions as social and developmental policy tools, and there should
be a high burden of proof imposed on any challenge to such restrictions, to
establish that there is no legitimate social or developmental objective of the
restriction or that those objectives could not be practicably92 achieved in a
significantly less trade-distorting way.  At the same time, developed country
regulations and practices which have an adverse effect on firms from
                                                 
91 Fink, Matoo and Rathindran (2001) suggest that the GATS should require domestic competition law to
consider the effect of collusive agreements on foreign markets. (The relevance of this point goes, of course,
well beyond the service sector.)
92 E.g. without significant adverse effects on other groups.  The alternative should be “Pareto Superior” .
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developing countries (e.g. high licensing fees) should be held to a much higher
standard.
6.4 Regional and Bi-lateral Trade Agreements and
South-South Trade
With the collapse of the Doha Round, the United States threatened to pursue a
set of bilateral and regional trade agreements.  Such agreements are against the
spirit of the multilateral trading system, which has been based on most-favored
nation principles.  Moreover, developing countries may be even more
disadvantaged in one on one bargaining with the United States; a series of such
agreements may leave many developing countries worse off than they would be,
even with another unfair multilateral agreement.  While in principal, such
agreements are only WTO consistent if there is limited trade diversion, in
practice, little attention has been paid to this requirement.  The argument that
these regional agreements are useful as a step towards improved multilateral
agreements is also suspect.  The kind of multilateral agreement to which they
may lead may be more unbalanced than one which would be directly entered
into, without the more circuitous route.  More to the point, there is a high cost to
the round-about approach.  For to the extent that there is temporary trade
diversion, some industries are being temporarily encouraged, only to be later
discouraged.  Adjustment costs are typically high in developed countries; there
may be significant costs of entry and exit, and with a scarcity of capital, the
burden on developing countries may be particularly large.
In the next section, we proposed institutional reforms that address these issues.
But there is another arena in which trade agreements which fall short of full
multinational agreements may be desirable, and those entail reducing the
restrictions on South-South trade.  South-South trade makes up some 40% of
developing country trade.  Developing countries have much higher tariff levels
than developed countries.  This suggests there are considerable gains available
from liberalization of south-south trade.
How then should WTO agreements manage the trade-off between the need to
protect domestic markets from competition from developed countries, while not
hindering trade between developing countries? One solution might be to allow
developing countries to offer preferential market access deals to each other in
the same way that the EU’s EBA initiative offers free access to developing
countries only. Such a provision would have one further advantage:  preferential
treatment by some developed countries (most notably the U.S.) is based on
political conditionality; it is a “gift” that is constantly in threat of being taken
risk, and this induced risk limits the value of the gift.  Moreover, the granting of
such preferences becomes a lever with which developed countries can extract
other concessions from developing countries.  A South-South agreement would
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There is widespread dissatisfaction with the way that trade agreements are
made, partly stemming from a belief that current procedures put developing
countries at a disadvantage.  This is particularly important, given the increasing
role that such trade agreements have in our societies.  They define a wide set of
rights and obligations.  Yet they are arrived at in a manner that is distinctly
different from the way that other kinds of legislation are adopted.  The terms are
often negotiated behind closed doors, with little public debate about specific
provisions.  The legislative process is often truncated.  The result is agreements,
like Chapter 11 of the NAFTA agreement or the TRIPS agreement, which
contain provisions which would never have been accepted by a democratic
parliament with open discussion in a deliberative process.
The hallmark of earlier trade agreements is that they were conducted in secret,
with many of the terms not fully disclosed until the end of the negotiations, and
then governments faced an “all or nothing” choice.  Because they could have no
effect on the outcome, parliamentarians had little incentive to understand the
intricacies.  Given the extent to which trade issues overlap with other issues,
including those touching on the environment, it is important that the procedural
reforms move deliberations about trade issues to make them more like other
deliberative processes—including more open deliberation.
Trade has become too important to be left to trade ministers alone.  Part of the
deliberative process must entail the active involvement of others (meeting
together, not just through the trade ministers.) Thus when intellectual property
matters are being discussed (if they are to be discussed at all), the Science
Ministers must be involved. When trade policy affects the environment, there
must be some mechanisms for the environmental ministers’ voice to be heard.
They would insist, for instance, that provisions be inserted that prevent a race to
the bottom, that low environmental standards (e.g. associated with allowing the
pollution of the world’s atmosphere) be viewed as a form of subsidy to be
prohibited.
We emphasized in Section 3 that the fairness of the international regime is to be
judged not only in terms of the outcomes, but also in terms of the processes.
There is now a large literature documenting the deficiencies in the procedures,93
                                                 
93 On participation see Blackhurst, Lyakurwa, and Oyejide [2000]; on transparency see Francois [2001]; on
representation see Winters [2001]
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and for reasons already noted, these procedural deficiencies disadvantage
developing countries.  That is why procedural reforms – particularly relating to
transparency and representation – should have a high priority.
The developed countries should continue the kind of support they have provided
to help the developing countries participate more effectively in these
deliberations.   Trade negotiations involve complex issues, including economic
issues in which even the experts are not in agreement.  Meaningful participation
in these discussions requires understanding these complexities, knowing the full
import of each of the provisions, how it might affect countries differently in
quite different situations.
7.2 Structures and representation
As the number of WTO members has grown, and the demands for a more
inclusive bargaining process have increased, the current system appears to many
as increasingly unwieldy.  It is not the intent of this paper to provide a detailed
analysis of alternative proposals for institutional reform, but rather to highlight
its importance, and to emphasize why such reforms should in fact be viewed as
a priority in current discussions.
It is apparent that the opening up of the WTO to so many members makes
negotiations cumbersome and difficult. This has been used as an excuse for the
secretive processes in which, somehow, a selected group of countries are chosen
to negotiate with the United States, EU, and Japan in the “Green Room.” The
arbitrary and capriciousness nature of the Green Room procedures needs to be
replaced.  In other areas of democratic decision making, especially those based
on consensual processes (as in principle) trade negotiations are supposed to be,
the principle of representativeness is well accepted:  a small group of countries
is chosen to reflect the various interests and constituencies—say the largest
trading countries, United States, EU, Japan, China; a representative or two of
the middle income countries, say Brazil and one other country; a couple if
representatives of the least developed countries; a representative of the Cairns
group, etc.  Each would then consult with those that they are representing on a
regular basis.  An open and transparent process would ensure that the views and
voices of all are heard.
Another requirement is a new body within the WTO responsible for assessing
the impacts of proposed trade provisions on development and developing
countries and also assess ‘trade diversion’ vs. ‘trade creation’ affects of bilateral
and regional agreements. Its objective would be to look objectively at the
consequences of alternative proposals for all the countries of the world,
recognizing that economic science is not at a stage where there is agreement
about the “right” model.  Thus, the body might attempt to assess the impact of
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the allegedly non-trade distorting agricultural subsidies in a world in which
there are capital constraints.
Other functions of an expanded WTO secretariat might include an independent
body to assess countries in crisis ant to adjudicate and approve the imposition of
trade restrictions (‘safeguard measures’) and to investigate dumping charges,
countervailing duties, and phyto-sanitary conditions.
There is a need to address the scope of technical assistance and the capacity of
the WTO to adequately provide it within existing structures. Helping low
income countries strengthen their institutional capacity to permit them to meet
WTO agreements will require not only technical assistance but also significant
financial assistance. The costs of implementation of WTO commitments are
very substantial. 94
While a limited assistance program may assist developing countries to
implement reform, technical assistance is not sufficient to deal with the
economy-wide adjustment costs associated with structural change. These costs,
which generate domestic opposition to trade liberalization, are no less important
barriers to progress than the lack of institutional capacity.
In addition, lack of institutional capacity has the effect of limiting the access of
developing countries to justice within the dispute system. Developing countries
are disadvantaged in complex and expensive legal proceedings. An expansion of
existing legal assistance schemes will be an important prerequisite for
institutional fairness.
The bulk of technical assistance has fallen on international organizations. Both
the World Bank and the WTO have increased their technical co-operation
activities. However as much as 90 per cent of financing for these activities is
provided by trust funds provided by two or three bilateral donors, while the
WTO itself has typically allocated for technical co-operation activities less than
one per cent of its total annual budget – less than half a million US dollars,
Michalopoulos (2000). 95
                                                 
94 Finger and Schuler (1999) “The implementation of Uruguay Round Commitments: The development
challenge”, Policy Research Working Paper no. 2000, World Bank, Washington D.C.
95 Michalopoulos, C. (2000) ‘The role of special and differential treatment for developing countries in
GATT and the World Trade Organization’ World Bank mimeo.
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8 A “practical” agenda
The agenda set forth may not be readily accepted by the developed countries, if
they maintain the frame of mind that has prevailed in the past, where each
country attempts to extract the most out of the trade negotiations, given its
bargaining power.  Given the weak bargaining power of the developing
countries, they have, not surprisingly, not fared well.
But the world is fast changing.  There is widespread recognition of the
inequities associated with past agreements, and that makes it increasingly
impossible for at least those countries with democratic governments to sign onto
another unfair agreement.  Even in the developed countries, there is widespread
recognition of these inequities, and an almost embarrassment at the extent to
which trade agreements are shaped by special interests.  The protests in Seattle
and at the other international meetings around the world are evidence of the
dissatisfaction with globalization as it has been practice.
The developing countries have also recognized that if they stand together, there
can be no new agreement that does not address their concerns.  As we argued in
the introduction, the kind of agreement that the developed countries were asking
for—at least as part of their bargaining position—would arguably have put new
demands on the developing countries, without offering them much in return.
There is increasing sentiment that no agreement is better than a bad agreement.
The concern about terrorism combined with the resolve of the international
community to reduce poverty—the Millennium Development Goals-- has put on
new spotlight on the plight of the developing countries.  While poverty may not
cause terrorism, poverty and despair provide fertile feeding grounds.  As aid
levels have declined (in real terms, especially relative to the needs) many of the
developed countries talk about the importance of trade.  But what is needed for
the developing countries is access to the markets of the developed countries;
this is what they cannot do on their own; this is where an international
agreement—to pursue a common international concern—would be of value.
A practical agenda for a development round would focus on what measures
would improve the plight of the developing countries.  It would postpone any
discussion of new demands until after the problems and imbalances of previous
rounds have been addressed.  From the list of suggestions in the previous two
sections, the following constitutes a “minimal” list, which should be the basis of
a development round of negotiations:
1. Special and differential treatment
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Trade negotiations must begin from the premise that the less developed
countries are deserving of special and differential treatment, both because they
have been disadvantaged in the past, and because of the differences in their
current circumstances. This will entail a movement away from the principles of
reciprocity and bargaining which have underlay most trade negotiations thus
far.  It will entail unilateral concessions by the developed countries, both to
redress the imbalances of the past and to further the development of the poorest
countries of the world.  The costs to the developed countries of such
concessions is likely to be low, the benefits to the developing countries
enormous.
2. Institutional reforms
a. Greater transparency and openness in process; no green room
negotiations
b. The creation of a representative “trade council” with partially
rotation membership for negotiation of key issues
c. The establishment of international tribunals to adjudicate in the first
instance accusations of dumping and other unfair trade practices
d. The establishment of international tribunals to adjudicate in the first
instance claims of intellectual property involving indigenous products
e. The creation of a permanent advisory body to help the developing
countries bargain more effectively for their own interests
f. The creation of an independent evaluation unit, which would assess
the incidence and development impact of alternative proposals as well
as evaluate the extent to which any bilateral or regional trade
agreement diverts trade.
g. The right of the WTO secretariat on its own to initiate cases.
(Developing countries may feel uneasy about initiating cases against
large powerful countries, partly out of fear, for instance, that foreign
assistance be reduced.)
3. Regional and bilateral trade agreements
       These trade agreements undermine the multilateral trade system.  The
argument that they are an important stepping stone towards a multilateral
system is unpersuasive.  Indeed they impose costs on the developing countries,
as they continually adjust to ever changing artificially created advantages.
Moreover, the process of “divide and conquer” may lead to an outcome which is
more to the disadvantage of the developing countries.
a. There should be strict enforcement of restrictions already in place on
regional and bilateral trade agreements, intended to ensure that the
benefits of such agreements arise mainly from trade creation rather
than trade diversion
b. The independent body described in 1. should evaluate each proposed
trade agreement in these terms
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c. The use of political conditionality in trade agreements, other than a
commitment to democratic processes, should be prohibited
4.  Investor issues
a. An agreement among all countries that they would not compete for
companies by providing tax concessions or special infrastructure
benefits, enforced both by private rights to action and by trade
sanctions
b. An agreement by all countries concerning transparency for all
payments to governments (especially for mineral, oil, and other
resource royalties), and an agreement by the capital exporting
countries that they would not allow deductibility of any payments not
so published.
c. A universal foreign corrupt practices act
d. An elimination of bank secrecy, not only for terrorism, but also for tax
evasion and corruption
e. A recognition of the right of countries to impose regulations on
companies for health, safety, or the environment, or for the
advancement of disadvantageous groups.
f. A recognition of the right of countries to subsidize domestic firms, on a
temporary basis, to promote the development of new industries
5. Agriculture
a. The recognition of the right of countries to impose countervailing
duties against agricultural subsidies, regardless of the form those
subsidies take
b. A reexamination of the distinction between trade distorting and non-
trade distorting subsidies, with a heavier burden placed on those
claiming that particular forms of subsidy are not trade distorting.
(Explicit attention should be paid to the consequences in the more
realistic situations, e.g. when there are capital constraints.)
c. A commitment to the phasing out of preferential treatments granted
exporters from one set of countries to another; while special and
differential treatment for developing countries as a whole is beneficial,
when directed at particular countries, it gives rise to trade diversion
rather than trade creation.
d.  A commitment by developed countries to the elimination of all
production and export subsidies on commodities the consumption of
which is primarily in the developed world over the next five years.
Other agricultural subsidies would be eliminated over the next ten
years.   Included in production subsidies are subsidies to fertilizer,
capital, water, and energy.  The developed countries should divert
some of the money saved in subsidies to helping consumers in the
developing countries who are adversely affected by the increased
prices.
6. Manufactured goods
a. The rapid elimination of all tariffs on all  manufactured goods from
low income countries
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b. The reduction of tariffs and other trade barriers on textiles to a level
not exceeding the current average level of tariffs on all other
commodities, followed by a phase out of all tariffs on textiles.
7. Services
a. The recognition of the right of developing countries to restrict foreign
banking, and in particular to impose lending requirements,
particularly for small and medium sized enterprises
b. The recognition of the right of developing countries to impose
domestic reinvestment restrictions on funds raised within the
developing country
c. The reduction in restrictions by developed countries on unskilled-labor
intensive services (like construction and transportation services).  As
part of the liberalization of these services, temporary migration of
individuals will be allowed.
d. The rights of temporary migrants are to be fully recognized.  This
includes rights of their children to education, rights to health care
services, and civil rights.
e. An agreement that there should be no restrictions on off-shore
contracting of internet services
f. An agreement that further negotiations for liberalization of services in
skilled intensive areas will be put on hold until the imbalance of
previous rounds of negotiations have been fully redressed
8. Non-tariff barriers
a.  There should be an agreement that there should be a single standard
governing unfair trade practices for developed and less developed
countries; the standards should reflect those employed in anti-trust
laws.  There are two approaches that could be taken:
 i. National treatment:  each country could be allowed to set its
own standard, but the standard would have to be non-
discriminatory
 ii. A single standard for the world would be negotiated.
b. Procedural reforms outlined in 2c would ensure fairer treatment of
developing countries
c. Dumping:  Whatever approach is taken, it would entail using
economically relevant cost concepts (marginal not average costs);
eschewing discriminatory procedures (like best information
available); and eliminating the use of the surrogate country method
for allegedly non-market economies96
d. Countervailing duties:  Privatization in competitive auctions will have
deemed to have extinguished a subsidy; the provision of credit at
LIBOR plus rates will not be deemed a subsidy, even if such rates are
substantially below interest rates prevailing in the country.  Providing
                                                 
96 In the surrogate country method, dumping duties are imposed, not by comparing price with actual costs,
but with the costs in a “similar” market economy.  The methodology has often been implemented in a
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energy and water (or other commodities) at prices that do not reflect
environmental impacts will be deemed a subsidy.
e. Safeguards:  Developed countries should face higher threshold
impacts before safeguard measures can be resorted to.
9. Intellectual Property
a.    The provisions of TRIPS will be re-examined, with a view to
b. Ensuring access not only to life saving medicines, but also to
medicines that have impacts on the many debilitating diseases in
developing countries
c. Advancing the interests of developing countries in acquiring new
technology, to close the “knowledge gap,” that separates them from
the more developed countries
d. Preventing bio-piracy
10. Competition issues
a. National treatment of domestic and foreign producers in competition
law (effectively, the elimination of dumping duties)
b. The recognition of the right of governments to enact special provisions
for disadvantaged groups and small and medium sized enterprises
c. Anti-trust action against international cartels (including those in
which governments are a party, and including provisions for class
actions)
d. Anti-trust authorities to recognize the impacts of mergers and anti-
competitive actions outside the country
e. Those adversely affect by a merger or other anti-competitive action
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APPENDIX 1:
A survey of estimates of the potential costs and gains




The “Doha Development Agenda” of November 2001 puts
poverty-reducing economic growth at the centre of the
WTO’s considerations.
If the development focus of the Doha Round is to be a
meaningful operating principle, then the overriding task of
the Round must be to ensure that the liberalisation
agreements promote development in poor countries.
In practise this means prioritising reforms which yield the
largest benefits to developing countries; helping
governments move towards good trade policies; and dealing
effectively with the implementation constraints faced by
poor members.
This report attempts to support that task by reviewing the
potential benefits and costs of liberalisation across various
trade and factor flows.
This analysis is a crucial first step to ensure that priority is
given to those elements of the agenda that deliver the
largest gains to developing countries.
A thorough survey of the empirical literature on the gains
from various WTO proposals has not been done. Time does
not permit this to be a thorough analysis, but it is a brief
survey of the effects of different liberalisation programs on
global welfare. The bulk of useful regional-level empirical
studies use computable general equilibrium (CGE) models.
Such studies are based on a simple model of the entire
economy that, as the name suggests, are developed in a
computable form.  These models enable us to observe the
effects of various liberalisation experiments on trade
volumes, prices, and incomes. Simulations can separately
determine the effects of reform on different sectors and on
different countries and regions. CGE models have several
limitations. They require a large amount of data (to estimate
accurately all the demand and supply functions which
underlie them) and rely on a few crude assumptions. Most
importantly, they do not incorporate key features of
developing countries, such as the high level of
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unemployment.  Most assume away the problems posed by
uncertainty; but the absence of risk markets makes risk of
central concern in developing countries.  Most assume
perfect competition, while markets in developing countries
may be highly non-competitive.  We present these models
not because we believe that they provide accurate
assessments of the costs and benefits of trade liberalization,
but because they call attention to some of the key
issues—and because they have become a point of
reference.
Where possible, the specific effects of reform on
Commonwealth developing countries has been included.
However the empirical evidence in this regard is thin and
most global CGE studies do not disaggregate the effects on
small countries beyond the regional level.
This appendix analyses the potential gains and costs from
liberalisation in four areas: agricultural trade; services; the
temporary movement of natural persons; and manufactured
goods trade.
To some extent the results of the survey give cause for a re-
evaluation of the current focus of negotiations. The
estimated welfare gains from those negotiating areas which
consume considerable attention are estimated to yield
smaller benefits than other reforms on which there has been
less focus, and less progress.
Three conclusions which we believe are relatively robust
emerge from the empirical survey below.
- Liberalisation of labor markets – in particular allowing an
increased quota of workers from developing countries to
work temporarily in developed countries –  offers large
welfare gains.
- There are significant gains to be realised from the
reductions in tariff barriers to south-south trade. In both
agriculture and manufacturing the gains to developing
countries from liberalisation of trade between themselves
are estimated to be greater than those from liberalisation
of trade with the OECD. (This may both because tariff
barriers between developing countries are
higher—implying greater benefits from reductions—and
because of the extensive use of non-tariff barriers by
developed countries.)
- There is considerable evidence that poorly implemented
liberalisation especially in the service sector, can have
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negative effects for the poor. Carefully managed
implementation, effective regulation, and substantial
assistance will be necessary part of any reform agenda.
The literature surveyed identifies ambiguous effects of
agricultural and investment liberalization on developing






In the Doha Ministerial Declaration, WTO members
committed themselves to reform of the main instruments of
agricultural protection including “substantial improvements
in market access; reductions of, with a view to phasing out,
all forms of export subsidies; and substantial reductions in
trade-distorting domestic support.” They also agreed that
“special and differential treatment of developing countries
shall be an integral part of all elements of the negotiations.”
This vision combines wide-ranging reform of the distorted
agricultural trade policies of developed countries, and
gradual liberalisation in developing countries.
This background note surveys the (at times thin) empirical
evidence on the potential costs and benefits associated with
the kind of reform envisioned by the Doha declaration. It
focuses specifically on the welfare effects of liberalisation
for developing countries.
Developing countries face the benefits of increased market
access and the (potential) costs of higher prices for
domestic consumers. The fundamental point is that
consumers benefit from lower prices that result from large
agricultural subsidies, and producers lose.  The net effect of
wide-ranging agricultural reform varies across developing
countries depending on the composition of their exports
and imports of different commodities, and the price
sensitivity of those commodities to liberalisation. As a result,
the conclusions of the empirical evidence give cause for
caution.
A reform agenda which maximises the welfare of
developing countries must also recognise the specific effects
of different protection instruments on different commodities.
Furthermore, developed countries have a large number of
instruments by which they can redistribute income and
alleviate poverty.  In less developed countries, by contrast,
the set of instruments is far more circumscribed.  Since
Agriculture
6
agriculture producers are among the poorest people in
developing countries, increasing the prices they receive may
be one of the few instruments for alleviating rural poverty.
But such policies are, at the same time, likely to increase
urban poverty.  Tariffs on imports (especially when they
countervail subsidies by more advanced industrial
countries), with some of the proceeds use to provide
targeted food subsidies may accordingly increase welfare.
Reform should focus on maximising market access benefits
and identifying ways of offsetting the terms of trade impact
on consumers. This requires (i) a rapid elimination of the
most damaging protection instruments: export and
production subsidies on commodities that compete with
developing countries and which are not consumed
extensively by developing countries, or in which the effect
of liberalization on prices paid by consumers in developing
countries is likely to be small; (ii) increased market access,
particularly for the goods exported by developing countries;
(iii) a gradual reduction of production subsidies on sensitive
commodities (those imported by developing countries with,
say, substantial negative price effects on poverty); (iv)
assistance for the poorest countries.1
2.2 Patterns of protection and trade
While average manufacturing tariffs fell have fallen
significantly in recent decades, agricultural protection has
remained stubbornly high. The average level of agricultural
producer support in OECD countries ranges from less than
5 per cent of gross farm receipts in Australia to 20 per cent
in the US and 35 per cent in the EU (figure 2.1). Developing
countries face high tariff barriers on many of their
agricultural exports – the average tariff on agricultural goods
exported to developed countries  was 15.1 per cent in 2000
(Hertel et al 2000).2
Table 2.1 shows the (projected) levels of farm support in
2005 after the Uruguay Round agreements are fully
implemented (Hertel et al. 2000).  Tariffs are particularly
high in the feed grains, dairy, and food grains sectors.
                                                      
1 The nature of the assistance is discussed more fully in Part II




Column 2 shows that dairy products are the worlds most
subsidised exports followed by meat and livestock.
Producer payments are highest for grains and oilseed
sectors and lowest for meat, livestock and dairy (column 3).
Average  levels of subsidies (or protection) do not
necessarily provide a good indicator of how distorted the
market is.  For instance, most cotton production may be
totally unsubsidized, but America provides large subsidies,
which has a substantial marginal effect.  The price effect of
large subsidies to even a limited group can be quite large,
given the inelasticity of demand for agricultural goods.
Table 2.1: Average Protection
This table shows the average protection (per cent ad valorem) for food and
agriculture by sector. The figures are worldwide averages in 2005. Subsidy
equivalents are aggregated across all regions and divided by exports at domestic
market prices.
Import Tariff Export Subsidy Production Subsidy
Food grains 23 1 6
Feed grains 97 4 11
Oil seeds 4 0 9
Meat & livestock 17 8 2
Dairy 23 27 2
Source: Anderson (2003)
Figure 2.1 Agricultural producer support
(% of value of gross farm receipts)
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Other Agriculture 11 0 0




Source: Hertel et al. (2000) page 26
Table 2.2 shows the average tariffs on agricultural goods by
importing and exporting region. Developing countries face
even higher tariffs on exports to other developing countries
(18.3 per cent) than on exports to developed countries (15.1
per cent).
Table 2.2 Average agricultural tariff rates
This table reports the average tariff rates faced by high
and low income countries on their own and each other’s
goods.








Source: Hertel and Martin, 2000
A second important determinant of the welfare effects of
liberalisation is the agricultural trade balance across
countries. Table 2.3 (from Dimaranan, Hertel and Keeney,
2003) reports the average trade specialization indices for
several countries and regions over the course of three
decades. These indices give a measure of the trend of
agricultural trade balances through time. The value of the
index ranges from -1 for a country that imports and does
not export a particular commodity, to +1 for a country
which only exports.
Table 2.3 shows a division between temperate products
(program crops and livestock) where developing countries
are largely net importers and developed countries are
largely net exporters, and tropical products for which
developing countries are largely net exporters. Many of the
most developed countries – including the EU, US, Australia
and New Zealand – have increased their food trade balance
over the last 30 years. Most of the developing countries –
Sub Saharan Africa, Latin America (excluding Argentina and
Brazil), Indonesia, Mexico, Middle East and North Africa –
have actually become more dependent on imports in
program crops and meat/livestock.
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Table 2.3 Trade Specialization Indices
This table reports trade specialization indices. The index is calculated as (X-M)/(X+M) where X is
exports and M is imports for each country. A country that only exports has an index value 1. A
country that only imports has an index value –1. The program commodities referred to in this
section are composed of paddy rice, wheat, cereal grains, oilseeds, raw sugar, processed rice, and
refined sugar. Livestock and meat includes livestock, wool, animal products, meat, dairy. Other
includes vegetables and fruits, plant-based fibers, other crops, vegetable oils and fats, other
processed food.
Program Commodities Livestock & Meat Products Other Agr and Food
Year 1965-75 76-85 86-98 1965-75 76-85 86-98 1965-75 76-85 86-98
Aus/NZ 0.95 0.97 0.94 0.99 0.98 0.98 0.13 0.10 0.32
Japan -0.94 -0.96 -1.00 -0.96 -0.96 -0.96 -0.60 -0.67 -0.82
Korea -0.90 -0.82 -0.90 -0.14 -0.73 -0.85 -0.23 -0.23 -0.21
USA 0.59 0.78 0.81 -0.04 0.16 0.24 -0.08 -0.04 0.00
Canada 0.55 0.72 0.76 0.13 0.32 0.40 -0.18 -0.18 -0.09
Mexico 0.19 -0.87 -0.83 0.03 -0.41 -0.54 0.66 0.56 0.36
EU15 -0.74 -0.56 -0.27 -0.49 -0.05 0.13 -0.48 -0.37 -0.17
EFTA -0.91 -0.89 -0.76 -0.08 -0.02 -0.04 -0.27 -0.27 -0.08
CEU -0.51 -0.71 0.03 0.57 0.44 0.50 -0.20 -0.28 -0.15
Turkey -0.54 0.25 -0.51 0.04 0.55 -0.32 0.86 0.79 0.43
China -0.17 -0.55 -0.18 0.87 0.69 0.38 0.22 0.36 0.28
Indonesia -0.57 -0.88 -0.88 0.13 -0.11 -0.30 0.74 0.71 0.52
Vietnam n.a. -0.37 0.85 n.a. -0.65 -0.01 n.a. -0.10 0.48
ASEAN4 0.58 0.49 0.20 -0.74 -0.30 -0.34 0.48 0.55 0.38
India -0.58 -0.15 0.43 -0.40 -0.24 -0.10 0.43 0.24 0.44
RSoAsia -0.59 -0.16 -0.40 -0.43 -0.70 -0.67 0.45 0.13 -0.02
Argentina 0.97 0.99 0.96 0.99 0.92 0.75 0.64 0.71 0.78
Brazil 0.58 0.15 0.29 0.51 0.47 0.35 0.79 0.85 0.66
RLatAm 0.36 0.07 -0.08 -0.17 -0.23 -0.23 0.56 0.56 0.57
FSU n.a. n.a. -0.63 n.a. n.a. -0.59 n.a. n.a. -0.31
MENA -0.91 -0.97 -0.94 -0.80 -0.94 -0.87 -0.01 -0.54 -0.45
Tanzania n.a. n.a. -0.40 n.a. n.a. 0.18 n.a. n.a. 0.69
Zambia -0.35 -0.40 -0.40 -0.88 -0.78 -0.59 -0.38 -0.15 0.34
R_SSA 0.39 -0.13 -0.17 0.37 -0.05 -0.25 0.68 0.54 0.53
ROW -0.10 -0.43 -0.66 -0.27 -0.50 -0.45 -0.16 -0.25 -0.43
Source: Dimaranan et al. (2003)
Table 2.4 gives an indication of developing countries trading
relationship with the developed world. It shows developing
countries exports to, and imports from, OECD countries as a
share of each countries total. As a group, the OECD
countries are big exporters of commodities to countries like
China, India and the rest of South Asia (RsoAsia) and the
Middle East and North Africa (MENA). These countries are
likely to be affected by liberalisation which alters the price
of OECD exports. Indonesia, Sub Saharan Africa and China




For countries like these which are heavily integrated into
OECD markets, liberalisation brings risks and rewards.
Producers gain from greater market access, while consumers
may lose through higher prices. These effects are discussed
in more detail in the next section. However, table 2.3 gives
us some indication of their relative importance across
countries: many developing countries are net importers of
most commodities.
Table 2.4. Share of Developing Country Trade with OECD, 1997
This table reports the percentage of several developing countries’ exports and
imports which are traded with the OECD. The program are composed of paddy
rice, wheat, cereal grains, oilseeds, raw sugar, processed rice, and refined sugar.
Livestock and meat includes livestock, wool, animal products, meat, dairy.
Other includes vegetables and fruits, plant-based fibers, other crops, vegetable
oils and fats, other processed food.
Program Commodities Livestock and Meat Other Agr and Food
Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports
China 52 76 60 85 55 44
Indonesia 78 58 69 95 27 44
Vietnam 13 56 74 82 24 40
ASEAN4 40 48 54 71 47 44
India 27 75 52 85 31 24
RsoAsia 23 66 61 81 62 18
Argentina 23 58 38 35 57 36
Brazil 48 21 71 33 50 36
RlatAm 47 63 77 69 47 51
FSU 37 23 50 80 48 63
MENA 43 66 73 80 66 60
Tanzania 89 31 54 60 54 25
Zambia 86 7 69 93 65 43
R_SSA 63 49 77 82 69 62
ROW 62 73 59 66 62 61
Source: Source: Dimaranan et al. (2003) table 4.
These results, however, have to be taken with some
caution.  They reflect the pattern of trade flows that result
given the highly distorted trade regime.  Many developing
countries simply cannot compete against the huge subsidies,
say, to dairy; if these subsidies were not there, they would
become exporters rather than importers.
Moreover, agricultural markets are global markets, and so
even if developing country A imports wheat from
developing country B, the price it pays is greatly affected by
the subsidies provided by the developed world or by trade




2.3 Effects of liberalisation
The (national) real income effects of liberalisation are
dominated by two factors: (i) the change in allocative
efficiency, and (ii) the change in terms of trade (TOT).
Gains from allocative efficiency are realised when market
distortions are removed, permitting the economy to
reallocate its resources to the most productive use. These
benefits accrue largely to the liberalising region itself.  They
are partially reflected in the huge budgetary savings that
accrue to the government of the liberalizing country.
The terms of trade effect comes from changes in a country’s
export prices relative to its import prices. The impact of
global liberalisation on national terms of trade is usefully
decomposed by McDougall (1993) into three separate
effects – the world price effect, the export price effect and
the import price effect.
Export and import restrictions mean that there is a wedge
between the international price and the price that may be
received by producers or paid by consumers in each
country.  A country with an export subsidy faces a higher
producer and consumer price than the world price.  A
country with a production subsidy faces a higher producer
price (inclusive of the subsidy) but the consumer price is
the world price.  A country with an import quota or tariff
faces both a higher consumer and producer price.  Full
liberalization entails eliminating all of these restrictions.
Since there are huge subsidies to the production of
temperate agriculture products, the world price of these
crops would go up.  The consumer price would go up less
in the EU3, which has an export subsidy, than in the United
States.  Developing countries that protect agriculture would
see consumer and producer prices go down relative to the
                                                      
3 Consumer prices could even fall.
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world price, but since the world price has gone up, the net
effect is ambiguous.
Making matters more complicated are cross commodity
movements. Not all agricultural crops are equally
subsidized.  The elimination of subsidies would lead to a
reallocation of resources within the agricultural sector.  It is
possible, for instance, that with the elimination of the dairy
subsidy, the output of beef cattle could rise, and thus that
the price of beef might fall, even though the consumer price
of milk products might rise.  In general, vegetables are less
subsidized than grains, and hence there would be a shift
away from grains towards vegetables.  Shipping costs are,
however, less for grains than for vegetables, and vegetable
markets tend to be localized.  Thus, even if vegetable prices
in developed countries fall, it will have little impact on
developing countries.
For a few crops, like sugar, there are quotas.  The
elimination of the quota would lower producer and
consumer prices in the developed countries imposing
quotas, and raise international producer and consumer
prices.  The overall impact on developing countries
depends on who receives the quota rents.  Even when the
rent goes to those in developing countries, it does not seep
down to producers.
Differences between production and export subsidies are
often exaggerated.  A production subsidy of tp percent in an
economy producing xp raises output by approximately tp _s,
where _s is the elasticity of supply.  The output impact per
dollar of subsidy is tp _s/tppx= _s/ px, and the impact on
exports is _s/ px_, where _ is the ratio of exports to total
production. On the other hand, an export subsidy raises
both the production price and the consumption price, so
that output is increased and consumption reduced.  The
impact on exports is thus _s/ px_ + (1/_ -1) _d/pc, where c
is consumption.  While the impact on developing countries
per dollar of subsidy is greater, the difference is small, if the
elasticity of demand is small, which is the case for many
agricultural commodities.
It is important to recognize that among the “consumers” of
agriculture goods is agro-business.  While the higher price
discourages direct consumption, it also discourages agro-
business, shifting it to other countries, including developing
countries.  Thus, while there remains a presumption that
export subsidies are worse than production subsidies for
developing countries, there is some question not only about
the magnitude, but even about the sign.
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2.4 Other impacts of reform on developing
countries
There are several concerns about the effects of agricultural
liberalisation on developing countries. The effects of
Uruguay round liberalisation were expressed at the
Marrakech Meeting, where the Ministerial Decision on
“Measures Concerning the Possible Negative effects of the
Reform Program on Least Developed and Net Food-
Importing Developing Countries” addressed the need to
provide adversely affected countries with assistance.
 (i) Poverty and income distribution
The effect of liberalisation on poverty is difficult to
determine, largely for the same reasons that we noted that
there was an ambiguity in the impact on developing
countries as a whole:  consumers lose while producers gain.
One problem is that the limited resources of small farmers
could prevent them from taking advantage of liberalised
markets unless credit facilities are improved.
One of the most significant effects of liberalisation on the
poor is felt through changes in the price of food. Andersson
et al. (2000) model a general equilibrium framework and
find that full liberalisation of OECD farm policies would
have a large effect on the volume of international food trade
(a 50 per cent increase) but only a small effect on prices (a
5 per cent increase on average). Beghin et al. (2003) find
that the price rise is larger for some commodities. However
it does not include the effects of reform to non-farm trade
and so may misstate the effect in a multisector agreement.
But even in this study, the expected price increases are not
large – the smallest increases (about 4-6 per cent) are in the
wheat, rice, and coarse grains sectors. The effect price
increases on poverty is hard to generalise across developing
countries and within countries. This is because the
relationship between liberalisation and poverty depends on
the shares of household income from different factors (land,
labor, capital) – the prices of which will change. The size of
these changes depends on factor substitutability, factor
intensities and factor mobility. The impact of price changes
on welfare depends on the relative shares of different goods
in the production bundle. Additionally liberalisation could
have effects on net transfers including increased welfare,
Agriculture
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remittances from distant relatives or changed taxation levels
(Anderson 2003).
Despite these difficulties, Anderson (2003) argues that since
most of the poorest people are net sellers of food (or at least
sellers of agricultural labor) liberalisation would reduce
poverty. Increases in the price of food would stimulate
production and increase the demand for unskilled farm
labor.  Because unemployment (both open and disguised) is
chronic in developing countries, this in itself would have
enormous benefits.
 (ii) Food self-sufficiency
Some fear that cuts to protection by OECD countries will
lead to unaffordably high international food import bills
(Sharma, Konondreas, and Greenfield, 1996).
Table 2.5 shows the proportion of the population that is
undernourished in several developing countries (Anderson
2003).  The last two columns show the value of food
imports as a percentage of total exports and total
agricultural exports. Interestingly however, net food
importer status (greater than 100 per cent in the last
column) is not highly correlated with the FAO’s category
‘Low income food deficit country’ (LIFDC). Botswana,
Jamaica and Peru are all net importers but are not classified
as food deficient. Also the Cote d’Ivoire, Malawi and Kenya
all import less than 20 per cent of their export volume, but
are classified as food deficient.
An additional concern is that the liberalisation of agricultural
trade would prevent countries from managing external price
shocks. However, Zwart and Blandford (1989) argue that
liberalisation could lead to less volatile food prices since
trade can even out surpluses and deficits across countries
with heterogenous production shocks.
But governments may want to intervene to stabilize either
producer or consumer prices, especially in developing
countries where means for risk absorption are limited.
Thus, initiatives at agriculture liberalization should leave





A final concern is that many of the least developed
countries already receive preferential access to OECD
country markets. Some of the beneficiaries of these
agreements are concerned that their advantages might be
eroded under a broader multilateral agreement.
However there are several reasons why multilateralism
should be preferred. First preferential agreements harm
those countries that are not in the agreement, including
many who are very poor. Borrell (1999) discusses this point
in the context of the banana dispute of the 1990s in which
Table 2.5: Income category and food trade status
LI, LMI and UMI refer to the World Bank classifications of low-income, lower middle-income
and upper middle-income countries; LDCs are least-developed countries, as recognized by the
UN; LIFDCs are low-income food-deficit countries, defined by FAO as those countries with a
GNP per capita less than $1,445 in 2000 and which are net importers of food defined on a calorie












Bangladesh 35 LDC LIFDC 21 829
Botswana 25 UMI NFIDC 14 256
Brazil 10 UMI 7 30
Costa Rica 5 UMI 6 19
Côte d’Ivoire 15 LI NFIDC LIFDC 9 17
Egypt 4 LMI NFIDC LIFDC 20 542
Fiji Na LMI 9 52
Guyana Na LMI 7 23
Honduras 21 LMI NFIDC LIFDC 13 48
India 24 LI LIFDC 5 42
Indonesia 6 LI LIFDC 6 56
Jamaica 9 LMI NFIDC 12 111
Kenya 44 LI NFIDC LIFDC 13 32
Malawi 33 LDC LIFDC 13 16
Morocco 7 LMI NFIDC LIFDC 12 146
Pakistan 19 LI NFIDC LIFDC 15 134
Peru 11 LMI NFIDC 14 152
Philippines 23 LMI LIFDC 6 123
Senegal 25 LDC LIFDC 26 357
Sri Lanka 23 LMI NFIDC LIFDC 12 68
Thailand 18 LMI 2 14
Uganda 21 LDC LIFDC 20 41
Zimbabwe 38 LI 5 13
Source: Anderson (2003), table 4, page 41
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one study showed that for every dollar of benefit to
producers of bananas in ACP countries, the regime harmed
non-ACP developing country producers by a similar amount
and reduced the welfare of EU consumers by 13 dollars.
This type of scheme does not seem to be a very efficient
means of assisting banana producers in ACP countries, who
could be directly compensated by gains from removing the
preference.
Second, if developing countries only sell part of their
production in preferential markets, then they are selling the
rest of their output at lower than normal prices because of
the depressing effect of OECD protection on prices in the
rest of the international market.
2.5 Empirical review
The empirical results below come largely from CGE
(computable general equilibrium models).
(i) Total benefits
Hertel et al. (2000) reports simulation results from a
reduction from a 40 per cent liberalisation of all types of
protection (including production and export subsidies). The
real income impacts of these changes are dominated by
efficiency and terms of trade effects.
There are significant gains from increases in allocative
efficiency. The first column in table 2.6 reports the
efficiency gains  as a share of food and agricultural value
added. Large gains accrue to countries with the most
distorted policies, such as Europe, US and Japan. In Western
Europe the efficiency gains from liberalisation amount to
more than 8 per cent of the entire sector’s value added.
Hertel et al. (2000) add these efficiency gains to the terms of
trade effects to calculate a measure of welfare gains, the
‘equivalent variation’ (EV) – which represents the amount of
money that would make consumers equally well off had
there been no liberalisation. The second column in table 2.6
shows the ratio of efficiency gains to total gain (EV). Where
this is greater (less) than 100 per cent the terms of trade
effects are negative (positive). For example, India
experiences a terms of trade loss. Sub Saharan Africa, Brazil
and Latin America experience a terms of trade gain because
they are net exporters of food.
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The total global welfare increase from a 40 per cent
liberalisation of agricultural protection is $70 bn in this
study. The distribution of these gains across countries is
regressive. By far the largest absolute gains (column 4, table
2.6) accrue to developed countries. Western Europe and
Japan who benefit from the reduction in their own
subsidies. However, column 3 shows a measure of relative
welfare which accounts for the importance of food in GDP
in each region. Although the benefits of liberalisation to
Western Europe are large, the food sector only represents 5
per cent of GDP. The third column in table 2.6 shows the
total gain (EV) as a proportion of expenditure on food in
that region. This is one way of representing the benefits of
liberalisation relative to the importance of agriculture in the
economy. On this category, the largest gains are realised in
Other South Asia (non-India), Rest of the World (ROW), and
Other Southeast Asia (non-Indonesia), the Other NICs and
then Western Europe (Hertel et al. 2000).
For comparison, Table 2.7 shows the results of a second
CGE study by Anderson et al. (2000). They estimate that the
total welfare gain from the liberalisation of all (i.e. 100 per
cent) of agricultural protection is $164 bn.4 The Anderson
study reports the impact of liberalisation by different regions
on other regions. It concludes that the farm policies of the
OECD countries – after the Uruguay reforms have been
accounted for – reduce welfare in developing countries by
$11.6 bn. This is a small number in comparison to the gains
realised by developing countries as a result of liberalisation
in other developing countries ($31.4 bn), and the gains
realised by developed countries as a result of their own
liberalisation ($110.5 bn). It is also a small number in
comparison to the gains predicted from liberalisation in the
temporary movement of natural persons. The reason many
developing countries do not gain more is not difficult to
understand given the structure of these models. Their gains
from more efficient resource allocation are offset by an
adverse change in the region’s terms of trade.
Moreover, these models simply add up the gains and losses;
no note is made of the fact that rural producers may be far
poorer than the average person in society; or that those
who buy imported food (say wheat) are far richer than
                                                      
4 This study is roughly consistent with Hertel et al. (2000) whose
predicted $70bn gain was based on a 40 per cent reduction of barriers.
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those who live off locally grown crops, like millet.   Nor
does it take into account any multiplier effects, e.g. the
losses in income to producers may have a larger effect on
GDP than corresponding gains in income to consumers (e.g.
because of differences in marginal propensities to
consume.)  With unemployment rampant in most
developing countries, aggregate demand is often a
constraining variable.  Nor do these models take into
account the impacts of credit constraints:  higher prices
allow poor rural farmers to buy more fertilizer and higher
quality seed, thus providing a further boost to their income.
The higher incomes, in turn,  may allow other forms of high
return investment—including temporary migration into
higher paying urban areas.  Finally, there is considerable
evidence that at very low incomes, productivity depends on
nutrition, and the higher incomes accordingly will have a
direct impact on agricultural productivity, another effect not
incorporated into these models.
 (ii) Effect of different instruments
For further comparison, we look at studies which focus on
the effects of specific protection mechanisms.
Dimaranan et al. (2003) examine the effect of domestic
support (not including market access restrictions) in
industrialised countries on developing countries. The terms
of trade effect dominates welfare outcomes in their
simulations, leading them to conclude that a cut in OECD
production subsidies would lead to welfare losses in most
developing regions. The first column in table 2.9 reports the
average world price impacts of cutting domestic support in
all industrialised countries for all agricultural commodities
by 50 per cent. The table shows that domestic support has
the largest effect on price for program crops (wheat, corn,
barley, rice) and ruminant livestock (beef). Sugar and dairy,
which are mainly protected by tariffs, show small price
declines and land and labor shifts out of program crops.
The remaining columns in table 2.9 decompose the world
price effects by type of domestic instrument: output
subsidies, intermediate input subsidies, land based
payments, and capital subsidies (including livestock based
payments).
The welfare impacts of domestic support reduction arise
from allocative efficiency, output stimulus, and terms of
trade effects (table 2.10). The two largest agricultural
exporters, Argentina and Brazil, gain considerably in each of
these categories. For these countries the terms of trade
effects are large and positive. However for most developing
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countries the terms of trade effects are negative and exceed
the allocative efficiency gains. A 50 per cent reduction in
OECD domestic support results in a decline in aggregate
developing country welfare of $357.3 mn.
Turning our attention to another experiment in partial
liberalisation, Hertel et al. (2000) analyse the effect of
reductions in border protection (leaving production
subsidies unchanged). They report that, not surprisingly, the
global gains from this partial liberalisation are smaller than
when liberalisation also includes production subsidies: $59
bn rather than $70bn (table 2.7). However, the additional
benefit from including production subsidies accrues entirely
to developed countries which reap allocative efficiency
gains. Western Europe alone gains an additional $9bn when
production subsidies are included. By contrast, many
developing countries are worse off when production
subsidies are liberalised because of the terms of trade effect.
The Middle East and North Africa and Sub Saharan African
countries outside the customs union are significantly worse
off as a result of the reduction in production subsidies (table
2.10).
2.6 Conclusion - Analysis of empirical
results
The quantitative studies above indicate that the effect of
agricultural liberalisation on developing countries is
complex. Competing efficiency and price effects have
different effects across heterogenous countries.
For the reasons explained earlier, these results should not
be taken too seriously.  The underlying assumptions of the
computable general models do not provide a good
description of the economies of developing countries.  The
results are highly sensitive to assumptions about elasticities
and cross elasticities of supply and demand.
Still, there are three lessons that emerge from these admitted
highly restrictive studies.  The first is that in the process of
liberalization, many developing countries will find
themselves worse off, and this will be especially so for
urban workers.  But these adverse effects can be mitigated
by adjustment assistance from the more developed countries
which at the same time leaves the more advanced industrial
countires better off.  This is because of the large allocative
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inefficiencies associated with the distorted patterns of
production.
The second is that a true development round has to go well
beyond agriculture.  It must include agriculture:  it is too
important to some of the developing countries; there can be
no principled trade agreement without including agriculture;
and, not surprisingly, as a consequence, it has taken on
enormous symbolic value.
 Thirdly the potential for losses does not suggest that
multilateral reform should be abandoned. Instead it suggests
that to share benefits among all countries, reform must
accommodate differences across countries.  The case for
liberalization is particularly strong for those commodities,
like cotton, the elimination of the subsidies for which would
have little direct bearing on the standard of living of those
in developing countries.
The empirical results surveyed above indicate that uniform
elimination of all agricultural protection. would result in
negative terms of trade shocks for developing countries and
sharp declines in farm incomes in Europe and North
America.  The latter are in a position to bear the costs; the
former may not be. A reform agenda must carefully
discriminate between liberalisation instruments. Such an
agenda would have three key components.
First, a significant reduction in border protection in
developed countries (particularly the EU), including tariff
cuts and the elimination of export subsidies. Tariffs on the
goods produced primarily by developing countries as well
as those consumed primarily in developed countries should
be reduced most rapidly. For example the elimination of US
and EU quotas and tariffs on sugar and tropical products
would increase the price received by developing world
producers but only have a small effect on consumer prices
in developing countries.
Second, domestic production support for price-sensitive
necessities that are widely consumed in developing
countries should  be reduced gradually, with some of the
savings in developed country subsidy budgets being
directed at ameliorating the adjustment costs of those in the
developing world.. Many developing countries in North
Africa, Sub Saharan Africa and Latin America (not Brazil,
Argentina or Mexico) rely on imports of subsidised grains
and oilseeds from OECD producers. The empirical evidence
reviewed above suggests that these countries are particularly
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exposed to agricultural reforms which might increase the
price of some commodities.
Third, domestic support should be shifted from market price
support to alternative payment systems. Reinstrumentation
of protection in OECD countries towards the least trade-
distorting instruments (such as land based payments) is one
possible means of compensating OECD farmers while
minimising the impact on developing world consumers. But
for reasons stated in the main body of this report, many of
the so-called non-trade distorting subsidies do in fact lead to
increased production, and too much has been made of the
distinction between export subsidies and production
subsidies.
This type of program is similar to the thrust of the OECD in
its “Positive Reform Agenda” for agriculture (OECD 2002)
and supported by a series of recent research contributions.5
A more complete agenda is described in Section V of the
main report.
                                                      
5 Rae and Strutt (2002) compare the welfare gains of liberalisation in
border measures and domestic support in a CGE framework. They find
that improved market access generates far greater trade and welfare
gains than reductions in domestic support. They conclude that the WTO
should focus primarily on achieving reductions in border restrictions
and deprioritise the elimination of domestic support. Hoeckman, Ng and
Olarreaga (2002) focus on the effect of OECD agricultural reform on
developing countries. They reach the same conclusion that developing
countries interests are better suited through tariff cuts rather than
domestic support..  It is still the case, however, that the elimination of
domestic subsidies for certain commodities (like cotton) is likely to have
a small effect on consumers in developing country, and a large benefit
to producers.  There are other crops for which this is also likely to be
true.  The critical distortion differs markedly across commodities, and
their results are highly dependent on assumptions concerning demand
and supply elasticities, and therefore the results may differ markedly
across commodities.  In the case of sugar, it is trade restrictions which




Table 2.6. Change in World Trade Volume
This table shows the change in world trade resulting from a 40 per cent reduction in protection across
3 sectors: Agriculture, manufactured goods, services. AgrMkt40 excludes reductions in production
subsidies whereas Agr40 covers all forms of protection. Figures are percentage changes.
AgrMkt40 Agr40 Manufac40 Services40
foodgrains 1.9 -7.2 1.2 0.5
feedgrains 4.1 1 0.7 0.5
oilseeds 0.6 5.8 0.1 0.3
meatlstk 5.6 4.9 1.1 0.3
dairy -6.7 -6.9 0.1 0.7
othagr 8.3 8.1 0.5 0.4
othfood 12.1 11.8 0.5 -0.1
bevtobac 27.5 27.6 0 0.8
extract 0 -0.1 1.8 0.3
textiles 0.2 0.2 16.3 0.3
wearapp 0.7 0.4 22.3 0.6
woodpaper 0 0 3.6 0.4
pchemineral 0 -0.1 4.6 0.6
metals 0 0 5.5 0.4
autos 0.3 0.5 9.4 0.9
electronics 0.1 0.1 4.1 -0.1
othmnfcs 0.1 0.2 5.2 0.2
houseutils 0 0 0.1 1
tradetrans 0.5 0.5 1.5 59.8
construction 0.3 0.5 0.4 18.3
busfinance 0.1 0.1 0.5 10.8
govservice -0.1 -0.1 0.8 39.2
Source: Hertel et al. (2000) Table 6, page 26.
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Table 2.7 Welfare and Efficiency Gains due to 40% Liberalization in Agriculture: 2005
The first column  reports the efficiency changes as a share of food and agricultural value added. AgrMkt40 excludes
reductions in production subsidies whereas Agr40 covers all forms of protection.
Agr40 experiment ratios
(percentages)
Total EV by experiment ($mill.)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)






NAmerica 9 11 0.035 3401 1436 3310 4517 52532
WEurope 6 104 0.369 36959 27810 8180 8532 128593
AusNZL 6 -12 0.377 1786 1348 207 209 8421
Japan 6 120 0.253 12552 13461 6607 2564 33358
China 6 1067 0.012 172 753 22593 826 8710
Taiwan 4 143 0.060 265 295 3288 83 6072
OthNICs 3 115 0.333 2672 2996 5270 612 23228
Indonesia 2 1183 0.002 6 26 792 270 1474
OthSEA 2 101 0.465 1931 1247 2631 393 11092
India 1 137 0.200 1058 927 3084 19 3989
OthSoAsia 1 118 0.852 1176 1181 1645 9 2213
Brazil 1 64 0.245 1988 1683 4491 457 3625
OthLatAm 1 48 0.360 3055 2366 1449 652 8611
Turkey 1 123 0.142 338 332 619 70 3524
OthMENA 0 -15 -0.202 -1506 -718 1074 231 16667
EIT 0 142 0.033 301 282 1391 1865 10265
SoAfrCU 0 46 0.080 129 54 283 128 1897
OthSSA 0 31 0.194 436 529 249 30 4496
ROW -1 115 0.741 2601 2611 2399 137 3798
World 69320 58619 69564 21604 332565
Source: Hertel et al. (2000) Table 8, page 27
Table 2.8: Welfare Gains (Anderson et al. 2001)
Sectoral and regional contributions to the economic welfare gains from completely removing trade















High Income High Income 110.5 -0.0 -5.7 -8.1 96.6
Low Income 11.6 0.1 9.0 22.3 43.1
Total 122.1 0.0 3.3 14.2 139.7
Low Income High Income 11.2 0.2 10.5 27.7 49.6
Low Income 31.4 2.5 3.6 27.6 65.1
Total 42.6 2.7 14.1 55.3 114.7
All countries High Income 121.7 0.1 4.8 19.6 146.2
Low Income 43.0 2.7 12.6 49.9 108.1
Total 164.7 2.8 17.4 69.5 254.3
Source Anderson et al. (2001)
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Contribution by Tax/Subsidy to World Price
Change
Output Int.Input Land Capital
pdrice 0.26 0.12 0.34 0.05 -0.23
wheat 4.91 1.03 1.68 1.11 1.09
crsgrns 5.5 1.42 1.79 1.02 1.27
oilsds 3.53 0.92 1.21 0.79 0.6
rawsgr -0.58 0.09 0.14 -0.33 -0.48
othcrops -1.5 -0.01 -0.03 -0.69 -0.77
ruminants 4.3 0.48 0.95 -0.38 3.25
nonrumnts 0.54 0.26 0.45 -0.14 -0.02
rawmilk 0.21 0.14 0.81 -0.33 -0.4
pcrice 0.27 0.13 0.12 0.06 -0.03
vegoilfat 0.97 0.2 0.34 0.24 0.2
refsgr -0.06 0.05 0.06 -0.03 -0.15
rummeat 2.21 0.31 0.56 -0.11 1.44
nrummeat 0.43 0.17 0.28 -0.06 0.04
dairy -0.19 0.14 0.36 -0.27 -0.43
othprfood 0.22 0.06 0.11 0.07 -0.03
mnfc 0.12 0.01 0 0.1 0.01
srvc 0.11 0.01 0 0.1 -0.01
Source: Dimaranan et al. (2003) Table 10, page 30.
Table 2.10. Developing Region Welfare Changes: Domestic Support Reform in $ millions
Region Equivalent Variation Terms of Trade Components Region
Total Alloc Efficiency ISEffect T.O.T. WorldPrice ExportPrice ImportPrice
China -69.1 -69.6 -18.0 18.5 -51.8 137.1 -66.8
Indonesia -13.6 0.8 -1.9 -12.4 -54.5 35.5 6.6
Vietnam -8.2 -1.9 0.3 -6.6 -10.0 5.8 -2.4
ASEAN4 -15.2 4.9 -4.3 -15.9 -47.4 113.4 -81.9
India 35.9 15.2 -2.1 22.8 -22.9 38.6 7.1
RsoAsia -44.2 -3.3 -1.2 -39.7 -57.2 17.2 0.3
Argentina 157.3 26.2 10.6 120.5 183.1 -53.1 -9.5
Brazil 200.2 73.3 31.9 94.9 1.1 88.5 5.3
RlatAmer -214.3 -29.9 -1.0 -183.4 -244.7 101.8 -40.5
MENA -270.1 -50.6 -1.8 -217.7 -315.9 83.1 15.1
Tanzania -7.0 -1.2 -1.0 -4.9 -7.1 1.8 0.4
Zambia 0.0 0.2 0.0 -0.3 -1.4 0.4 0.7
R_SSA -126.1 -16.0 -2.1 -108.0 -149.7 31.1 10.6
ROW 17.1 27.7 -1.1 -9.4 -221.4 285.9 -73.9
LDCTotal -357.3 -24.2 8.4 -341.6 -999.7 887.0 -228.9





This section analyses the potential gains from the
liberalisation of services.
Services represent an increasingly large share of GDP in
both developed and developing countries—but a much
larger share in developed countries.  Indeed, the area of
focus of trade negotiations during the past fifty years,
manufacturing, is increasingly becoming the province of
developing countries.  It is natural, then, that the developed
countries like the United States would shift their focus
towards liberalization of services.
The bulk of the empirical studies surveyed below suggest
that the liberalisation of services could yield significant
welfare gains – much larger than the gains from agricultural
or manufactured goods. The estimates of global gains are as
a high as $400bn. The estimates are large because
protection levels are high in the service sector, and services
make up are a large (and growing) share of world trade.
Additionally services are key inputs into the production of
almost all goods.
The enthusiasm in the cross-country empirical literature is
tempered by negative experiences at the national level.
Opening up markets has been accompanied at times by a
reduction in competition, and an increase in prices6; in the
case of financial services, there are even allegations that the
supply of credit to medium and small domestic enterprises
has been reduced.  Financial and capital market
liberalization has been associated with greater instability,
not higher levels of economic growth. These adverse
                                                      
6 For example, privatisation of utilities – such as South Africa’s
experience of granting its newly privatised telecommunications utility
Telekom a 5 year monopoly – can lead to inefficient services (OECD
2002). Similarly the poor regulation of financial sectors across South East
Asia contributed to instability prior to the crises of the late 1990s. Poor
electricity deregulation has led to problems in many countries.
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consequences help, in turn, to explain the unhappiness that
many countries have about efforts to force further opening
up of the service sector.
It is easy to explain the discrepancy between the “models”
and the outcomes.  It is partly that, as deficient as the
models used to analyze the consequences of agricultural
liberalization are, those in the area of services are far worse.
They model trade in services in exactly the same manner
that they model trade in goods, and thus the models have
all the problems we noted earlier.  But in addition, there are
several further problems.  There are some formal barriers to
trade:  the United States does not allow coastal shipping by
ships of another nationality. There are restrictions on media
ownership. Foreigners may not buy spectrum, and if they
cannot buy spectrum, they cannot provide broadcasting
services except by selling services to Americans who own
stations.  But many of the barriers to trade are more subtle,
and are typically hard to quantify.  Because the estimates of
the government created trade barriers are unreliable, so are
the resulting estimates of the benefits that would accrue
from eliminating them.  Worse still, debates about
liberalization in services do not center around discussions of
lowering the effective barrier from say 40% to 20%; rather,
they center around particular measures, such as
privatization, elimination of particular regulations, etc.  In
each of these cases, the ramifications of the particular
measure extend well beyond the impacts on trade; in many
cases, these are incidental.  Inevitably, then, debates about
service sector liberalization devolve into fundamental
debates about national economic and social policy.  Should
the media, for instance, be controlled by a few rich, foreign
firms, who are able to use their wealth to control the flow
of information to the citizenry?  This is an issue which is
fundamental to the functioning of democracy, and should
not be relegated to trade negotiators to settle.  (At the same
time, we should recognize that there are certain service
sector liberalizations which are little different in their impact
than a standard trade liberalization; such is the case for
construction and maritime services—areas which were not
included in the Uruguay negotiations, and which are of
some concern to developing countries.)
Part of the reason that the standard models are unpersuasive
arises from the fact that they fail to take account of the
highly differentiated nature of services, and the large “local
information” content.  There are other ways in which trade
in services are obviously different from trade in goods.  For
the most part, services have to be consumed at the point of
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production.  In the case of haircuts, the point is obvious.
But the same is true for retail sales, hotels, electricity.  Thus,
the issue of the trade in services in inextricably linked (as
already noted) to the movement of capital and labor.
Without these, there can be little trade in services.
But movements of labor and capital introduce a host of
other considerations, quite different from those associated
with trade in goods.  The issues of labor—which are of vital
concern to developing countries—are dealt with in the next
section.  The central issue of concern for capital flows are
investor protections.  What the investors would like, of
course, is a world without regulation or taxation, but that
would compromise the general well being of the
developing world.  Indeed, most of the failures of
liberalization have been because of a failure to put into
place an adequate regulatory environment (including one
which ensures competition.)
Economic theory, of course, says that, under certain
idealized circumstances (e.g. constant returns to scale)  full
global efficiency can be gained either through the free
mobility of capital or the free mobility of labor.  But in the
general case, equating the marginal returns to capital will
not suffice to equate the marginal returns to labor.
What do international firms provide when they provide
services?  Why might an American company have a
competitive advantage in financial services over a domestic
company?  Presumably, this relates to knowledge and
information, e.g. about how to organize the provision of
the services.
There are, in fact, a variety of ways by which such services
are sold, besides direct investment.  Hotels and restaurants
issue franchises, which have been enormously popular.
Firms may contract out management services.
Of increasing concern in recent years in the United States is
the problem of “contracting out” services through the
internet.  This is one area in which production of a service
can occur at a place different from that where the service is
consumed.  Such services are, in many ways, very much
like traded goods.  It is of importance to developing
countries that this nascent industry not be impaired, by the
creation of new trade barriers by the developed countries.
Impact on poverty.  A further concern is that many service
sector liberalizations increase poverty, by increasing prices
of essential services  or reduce access for the poor. Private
Services
28
firms may be less willing to engage in cross-subsidisation of
market segments in poor and rural areas. Even if
liberalisation leads to lower average costs through increased
competitiveness and efficiency, prices for some end-users
may rise. Mosely (1999) estimates that the impact of
financial liberalisation on access to rural credit in four
African countries – Uganda, Kenya, Malawi and Lesotho.
The study found that liberalisation expanded credit where it
was accompanied by innovative reforms with regulation
focussed on rural access and poverty reduction. However
merely privatising government micro-credit agencies had a
negative effect on rural areas, as witnessed by the
consequences of reform in Malawi.
Impact on communities and cultural identity.  There is also
a concern that some service sector liberalizations, even if
they increase economic welfare, narrowly defined, have an
adverse effect on community life.  Each individual in the
community values having the local store; the local store
owner, like other local businessmen, provide essential
services for the community.  But these are services that are
not “priced.”  It pays each consumer to buy the goods for
the lowest price.  Walmart is thus able to drive out of
business the local store.  But there are fundamental
questions:  is the community better off, with the local
businessman replaced by a hired manager, that is rotated in
and out of the community in three years time?
3.2 Patterns of trade and protection
Services sectors account for half of GDP in developing
countries (60 per cent in developed countries) and are some
of the fastest growing industries in many economies. The
performance of the services sector is critical to growth. For
example, the strength of a countries financial sector is a
determinant of growth (Levine 1997, Carlin and Mayer
2003). Well-managed and well-regulated banks lead to an
efficient transformation of savings to investment, ensuring
an appropriate allocation of resources. Similarly, efficient
business services reduce transactions costs and
telecommunications capabilities are an important
prerequisite for development in many sectors.
(i) Modes of supply
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The GATS framework provides for 4 modes of service
delivery
• Mode one: cross-border supply, which is analogous
to trade in goods; arises when a service crosses a
national frontier, for example, the purchase of
software or insurance by a consumer from a supplier
located abroad.
• Mode two: consumption abroad; occurs when the
consumer travels to the territory of service supplier, for
example, to purchase tourism, education, or health
services.
• Mode three: commercial presence; involves foreign
direct investment, for example, when a foreign bank
or telecommunications firm establishes a branch or
subsidiary in the territory of a country. Figure 3.1
indicates that the stock of service sector FDI in
developing countries is small relative to OECD
countries. However as the right-hand panel indicates,
service sector FDI is growing more rapidly in
developing countries, with the exception of Sub
Saharan Africa.








• Mode four: movement of individuals; occurs when
independent service providers or employees of a
multinational firm temporarily move to another
country. This mode will be discussed separately in
another section.
These four elements of the General Agreement on Trade in
Services (GATS) encompass the movement of both capital
and labor for services provision. This broad approach
enables countries to bargain to exploit their comparative
advantage. For example developing countries might
exchange greater market access for capital for more fluid
movement of unskilled workers to developed countries.
Figure 3.2 shows that the existing commitments have been
lopsided, with the development of mode 4 proceeding most
slowly.
(ii) Protection





The upper part of each bar represents partial commitments, the lower part full commitments.
DC = Developed countries; LDC = Developing and transition economies; AC = Acceding countries
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International service transactions remain heavily protected
in many countries. Table 3.1 estimates the tariff equivalent
protection levels for the construction services, business and
finance, trade and transport, and government services
sectors across various countries and regions. These are
taken from estimates by Francois (1999). The estimates are
based on predictions of the level of bilateral services trade
with the US. Discrepancies between the actual level of
bilateral trade (from US trade data) and the predicted level
are assumed to result from protection. The estimates for the
trade and transport, and the government services sectors are
taken from Hoekman (1995).
Table 3.1 indicates that impediments to trade are quite high
in trade and transport, government services and
construction and that barriers to trade in services are much
larger than barriers to trade in manufactures and extraction
industries. Findlay and McGuire (2003) report that
impediments to international services tend to fall as income
rises, except in some professional service activities. This is
indicated in figure 3.3.
Table 3.1 Average Rates of Protection
This table reports estimated levels of average protection by region and sector in 2005. In services
these are tariff equivalent rates. For example in China, the figures below suggest that import prices
in the construction industry must be 41 per cent above their free trade level to explain the relatively
low share of imports in this market.








N America 5 3 10 8 69 34
W Europe 8 1 18 9 84 40
Aus NZL 4 7 24 7 91 31
Japan 58 2 30 20 71 32
China 18 20 41 19 96 42
Taiwan 41 4 5 3 93 36
Other NICs 21 2 10 2 82 37
Indonesia 5 8 10 7 85 43
Other SEA 25 12 18 5 88 40
India 40 35 62 13 96 41
Oth SoAsia 37 20 46 20 92 41
Brazil 4 16 57 36 71 44
OthLatAm 9 10 26 5 79 43
Turkey 31 6 46 20 92 40
Oth MENA 15 14 10 4 92 40
EIT 12 9 52 18 71 35
SoAfrCU 8 8 42 16 58 26
OthSSA 13 9 11 0 94 43
ROW 76 33 46 20 97 38




One has to be careful, however, about interpreting this data,
which refers primarily to mode 1 impediments.  There are
some service sectors—like haircuts—that are typically small
businesses.  Without mode 4 liberalization, there is likely to
be little cross border sales of these services, even though
standard economic theory would suggest that there would
be large gains to trade.  Services are highly individualized,
often requiring large amounts of localized information.
Thus, even with no artificially created barriers, individuals in
one country may prefer to deal with those from their own
community; and those from their own community may be
able to provide the services that individuals want.  Local
banks may have a competitive advantage in knowing who
are good borrowers (an advantage which may more than
offset the problem of correlated risk.)  Large multinationals,
geared to providing services to those in advanced industrial
countries, may find it difficult to provide the services
demanded in poor developing countries.  In short, there are
reasons to believe that even apart from artificially created
barriers to trade in services, such trade might be more
limited than trade in manufactured goods.  In that case,
even though the service sector is today larger than the
manufacturing sector in developed countries, potential gains
from trade, and the reductions of trade barriers, may be
more limited.
Moreover, one has to distinguish protection from the
legitimate role of government in imposing regulations that
promote a variety of concerns of general interests, even
when such regulations have the effect of discouraging
foreign firms.  For instance, affirmative action requirements
might have the effect of discouraging foreign firms, yet it is
a legitimate objective of government policy to advance the
economic well being of the disadvantaged.
Figure 3.3  Service sector openness by region:
financial services and telecommunications
The openness index for telecommunications captures the degree of competition, restrictions on
ownership and the existence of an independent regulator (ITU-World Bank database for 1998).
The index for financial services captures the restrictions on new entry, foreign ownership and




3.3 Potential gains and costs of
liberalisation for developing countries
Inefficient service industries operate like a tax on an
economy. Since services are essential production inputs for
most goods, the price and quality of services provided to
other producers have major impacts on the whole economy.
This is particularly true in key service industries such as
telecommunications, transport, energy and finance.
For this reason the majority of gains from effectively
managed reform accrue to the liberalizing region itself.
Domestic firms benefit from access to services at lower
prices; consumers gain; employees in most service
industries earn higher wages than in manufacturing (OECD
2002).
This poses two questions:  First, if the benefits of
liberalization are so great to the country liberalizing, why
does one need to include such liberalizations within a trade
agreement?  Won’t countries have an incentive to do that on
their own.  The answer traditionally put forward is that it is
part of the political economy of trade liberalization:  one
gives up something of value to the other side (refusing at
the same time to do something that would be of even
greater value to oneself) in order to extract a concession out
of the other side.  The problem with this argument, in the
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context of services, is that typically the advanced industrial
country as a whole has relatively little to gain, though
particular firms in the developed country may gain a large
amount.  Thus, in the area of services, one is pandering to
special interests.  Pandering to special interests in not only
bad economic policy, it is dangerous; because after the
foreign firm comes in, the company continues to put
pressure on its government to put pressure on the foreign
government to pass legislation or regulations that are to its
benefits, to renegotiate concessions, when they prove
unprofitable, not to abrogate a contract, even when there is
clear evidence that the contract was only entered into
because of corruption.
The reason that particular firms have much to gain, though
not necessarily countries as a whole, is associated with the
very reason that there are gains to trade in services:  these
arise not out of the standard differences associated with
differences in factor supplies (after all, most of the
production actually occurs in the purchasing country) but
out of differential information and knowledge, including
organizational capacity. If that information is widespread
within a society, it is more likely that that information can
easily flow abroad, especially so in our highly
interconnected global economy.  Walmart, Toys-R-Us, AIG
have certain strengths that may not (or, in some cases, may)
be easily imitated.  When hard bargaining by the U.S.
allowed Toys-R-Us to open up in Japan, Japanese children
benefited from the cheaper toys, as did Chinese workers, as
China’s sales of toys increased.  But America benefited only
to the extent that Toys-R-us profits increased.  American
jobs were essentially unaffected.
The second, related issue is why should these liberalizations
be part of an international trade agreement.  Such
agreements should focus on areas where there is a global
public good being provided, e.g. through the setting of
standards or where there are global externalities.




For agricultural and manufacturing, most models report
results dominated by two main effects – allocative efficiency
gains and changes in terms of trade.
For services liberalisation, movements of capital across
borders generate additional effects. Firstly, foreign direct
investment inflows and outflows can lead to an expansion
or contraction in the capital stock located within a region.
Changes in capital endowments affect national output, but
since the capital is still owned by foreigners, the effect on
GNP is less than on GDP.
A second effect on income works through the rents earned
on foreign direct investments. Rents are created by barriers
to services trade which fall during liberalisation. It is
conceivable that service sector liberalization could increase
GDP but lower GNP, as domestic providers of services lose
their rents, foreign firms capture rents associated with their
superior knowledge and information, and the gains to
others from the more efficient provision of services are less
than the losses in domestic rents.
(ii) Modelling results
Unlike in agriculture, the modelling, which focuses on the
benefits resulting from assumed gains in the efficiency of
the provision of services, suggests that the main
beneficiaries of reform in terms of both absolute and
relative (% GDP) welfare gains are the developing countries.
Dee and Hanslow (2000) use a CGE model called FTAP, to
report that the total global gain from liberalising all post-
Urguay trade restrictions on services is $130 bn.7 This
amounts to half the total gain ($260bn) from total post-
Uruguay liberalisation – with the other half being made up
of gains from agriculture ($50bn) and manufactures ($80bn).
These are the projected gains in real income about 10 years
after the liberalisation has occurred. They include the gains
from increased trade and more efficient resource allocation.
In a similar exercise by Hertel (1999), world welfare gains
were predicted to me smaller than those in Dee and
Hanslow (2000). Hertel predicts that the gains from
liberalisation in agriculture, manufactures, and services are
164bn, $ 130bn and $55bn respectively. This variation is
                                                      
7 Welfare gains are reported in standard CGE ‘real income’ terms. Real




largely accounted for by differences in modelling
assumptions. In agriculture, Hertel assumes no effective
Uruguay liberalisation post-1995, leaving much more to be
done and more gains to be realised. In manufactures, the
difference is largely accounted for by differences in the base
year (Dee and Hanslow use 1995; Hertel uses 2005).
Applying the 2005 base to the FTAP model makes up 90 per
cent of the difference. In the service sector, Hertel models
only liberalisation in the construction and business services
sector. He also does not include liberalisation of FDI.
Brown, Deardorff and Stern (2002) use a CGE model to
calculate the welfare effects of a 33 per cent reduction to
barriers in the service sector. Table 3.2 shows that they
expect global welfare to rise by $413bn. All of the countries
listed experience welfare gains as well as increases in real
wages and returns to capital. Developed countries
experience large welfare gains – $142bn for the EU,
$131.4bn for the US, and $57.9 for Japan. However
developing countries also large, and in many cases larger
relative shares of the benefits. Brown, Deardorff and Stern
(2002) note that their results  - which are dependent on the
accuracy of the size of barriers they estimated indirectly
from trade flow data – show that the liberalisation of
services is likely to yield significantly larger gains than other
reforms.
Hertel, Anderson, Francois and Martin (2000) also compare
the gains from services liberalisation to agriculture and
manufactures. They report that a 40 per cent cut in
protection in the business services and construction sectors
yield a $22bn gain. Their estimates of the potential gains in
the trade and transport sectors are$332bn. The trade and
transport sectors represent a large share of global trade in
services and have significant flow on benefits to other
sectors of the economy. Table 3.3 shows the wide
distribution of these gains across developed and developing
countries.
Verikos and Zhang (2001) analyse the sectoral impacts of
liberalisation in financial and communication services. They
estimate the gain from each sector is $24bn. In both sectors,
the majority of the gains come from removing restrictions
that discriminate against foreign firms.
(iii) Distribution of gains across countries
These gains are not of course divided equally across all
countries. In Dee and Hanslow’s analysis, their $133bn gain
accrues disproportionately to developing countries. The
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service sectors in many developing countries are projected
to expand as their relatively large barriers to entry are
removed. For example, the service sector in China (which
captures a large part of the welfare gains) is projected to
increase by a third when its large barriers to entry are
removed. This is predicated, of course, on the assumption
that China cannot obtain the requisite knowledge and
information to improve its service sector without opening
itself more fully, an assumption which is increasingly
looking dubious.
Dee and Hanslow report results for only a small number of
commonwealth developing countries. The gain to Malaysia
from global service sector liberalisation is $1bn – equivalent
to 0.7 per cent of GDP. The gains to the ‘rest of the world’
which includes smaller developing countries is $23bn or 0.8
per cent of GDP. Australia, China, Mexico, Chile and
Indonesia all gain more from tertiary liberalisation than from
primary and secondary combined.
3.5 Conclusions
Service sector liberalisation has the potential to deliver large
welfare gains to developed and developing countries. But
the results of attempts to estimate these benefits need to be
taken with even more caution than results in agriculture and
manufacturing.  The localized nature of the services and the
information that leads to success in its provisions means that
the elimination of government imposed barriers may not
necessarily lead to as much increase in trade as these
models predict, and the gains in efficiency may be partially
offset as rents are transferred from domestic to foreign
producers.  Some worry that financial service sector
liberalization may even lead to a reduction in national
output, as the supply of credit to domestic small and
medium size enterprises is reduced.  Empirical work
estimating these effects is limited, and most of the CGE
models simply proceeds by assuming that the production
and sales of services is little different than those of
agriculture and manufactured goods.  Thus to the litany of
qualifications to the use of CGE models noted earlier, the
additional ones noted here mean that the results need to be
taken with circumspection.
Since a large part of the gains from reform in the services
sector accrue to domestic policy reforms, it is not obvious
why international negotiations are necessary to achieve
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desirable outcomes. If the main gains could be achieved
unilaterally, then what is the utility of multilateral
negotiations? Matoo (2002) observes that many developing
countries are in a situation where their ability to implement
reform is hindered by opposition from domestic lobbies. In
this context, it may be useful for some countries to
undertake reforms in the context of the momentum of
broad international negotiations.
There are however other areas where co-ordinated
reciprocity could yield significant gains in the context of
multilateral negotiations. On one hand developing countries
have a number of developed country market access
interests, particularly in the area of access to labour markets
(GATS Mode 4), but also in construction and back-office
business services. This suggests the prospect for a deal
based on access to labour markets in exchange for a
developed country demand such as greater commercial
presence by foreign service providers in developing
countries (Matoo 2002).   But  the shape of earlier service
sector negotiations undermined this rationale; financial
sector liberalization, for instance, preceded liberalization in
construction and other service sectors that were of interest
to developing countries.
Moreover there are several cases in which international
cooperation may be valuable. One example is competition
policy: a permissible merger in one jurisdiction may have a
detrimental effect on competition in a smaller foreign
jurisdiction. Fink, Matoo and Rathindran (2001) suggest that
the GATS should require domestic competition law to
consider the effect of collusive agreements on foreign
markets. Second they suggest the foreign consumers should
have the right to take actions in foreign courts against




This table shows the effects of a 33% reduction in barriers to service trade on imports, exports, terms of trade, welfare, real wages and
the return to capital.
Country Imports Exports Terms of trade Welfare Welfare Real Wage Return to Capital
(Millions) (Millions) (Percent) (Percent) (Millions) (Percent) (Percent)
Australia&NewZealand 2354.4 1962.3 0.385 1.050 5379.6 0.694 0.657
Canada 2244.0 2136.3 0.083 0.811 5910.4 0.317 0.316
EuropeanUnionandEFTA 35478.1 35336.8 0.032 1.295 142003.2 0.553 0.546
Japan 14797.7 15501.6 -0.067 0.891 57875.1 0.247 0.277
United States 32467.7 32231.5 -0.033 1.448 131426.8 0.524 0.534
India 919.2 803.9 0.212 0.552 2321.6 0.170 0.204
SriLanka 121.7 99.1 0.335 1.202 200.4 0.881 0.507
RestofSouthAsia 374.3 286.7 0.286 0.689 804.9 0.293 0.453
China 5660.3 6210.9 -0.128 1.320 11959.1 0.840 0.603
HongKong 7587.2 8058.4 -0.611 4.382 5643.1 5.638 5.927
SouthKorea 4842.2 5002.5 -0.102 1.339 7619.5 0.913 0.956
Singapore 3325.1 3776.2 -0.297 3.322 2470.8 4.821 3.972
Indonesia 1401.3 1469.4 -0.072 1.256 3177.0 0.327 0.307
Malaysia 1487.6 1466.8 0.049 1.267 1514.5 1.026 0.928
Philippines 1986.7 2195.0 -0.462 2.342 2067.1 1.739 1.622
Thailand 3324.2 3625.3 -0.413 1.401 2886.4 1.088 0.904
Mexico 863.1 809.1 0.110 0.878 3099.3 0.204 0.195
Turkey 1733.3 1462.9 0.589 1.781 3745.9 0.695 0.884
CentralEurope 3841.7 3744.5 0.061 1.409 5227.2 1.067 0.996
Central&SouthAmerica 4199.9 4442.8 -0.179 1.050 18363.5 0.256 0.272
Total 129009.6 130621.8 413695.4
Source: Brown, Deardorff, Stern (2002), table 4
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Table 3.3 Welfare and Efficiency Gains
The first column  reports the efficiency changes due to a 40% liberalization in agriculture as a share of food and
agricultural value added. The second column reports the efficiency gain as a proportion of the total gain in terms of
equivalent variation (EV)– where this is larger than 100, the terms of trade effect is negative. Column 3 reports the EV as a
proportion of total expenditure. Columns 5-8 report the EV for 5 different sector liberalization experiments.
Agr40 experiment ratios
(percentages)
Total EV by experiment
($mill.)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Region Eff/$VA Eff/EV EV/Exp Agr40 AgrMkt40 Manuf40 BusFinSv
ces
T&Tsvces
NAmerica 9 11 0.035 3401 1436 3310 4517 52532
WEurope 6 104 0.369 36959 27810 8180 8532 128593
AusNZL 6 -12 0.377 1786 1348 207 209 8421
Japan 6 120 0.253 12552 13461 6607 2564 33358
China 6 1067 0.012 172 753 22593 826 8710
Taiwan 4 143 0.060 265 295 3288 83 6072
OthNICs 3 115 0.333 2672 2996 5270 612 23228
Indonesia 2 1183 0.002 6 26 792 270 1474
OthSEA 2 101 0.465 1931 1247 2631 393 11092
India 1 137 0.200 1058 927 3084 19 3989
OthSoAsia 1 118 0.852 1176 1181 1645 9 2213
Brazil 1 64 0.245 1988 1683 4491 457 3625
OthLatAm 1 48 0.360 3055 2366 1449 652 8611
Turkey 1 123 0.142 338 332 619 70 3524
OthMENA 0 -15 -0.202 -1506 -718 1074 231 16667
EIT 0 142 0.033 301 282 1391 1865 10265
SoAfrCU 0 46 0.080 129 54 283 128 1897
OthSSA 0 31 0.194 436 529 249 30 4496
ROW -1 115 0.741 2601 2611 2399 137 3798
World 69320 58619 69564 21604 332565





The GATS recognises four modes of service delivery. The
temporary movement of natural persons (TMNP) is known
as Mode 4. It is by far the smallest in terms of trade flows
and the volume of scheduled concessions recorded under
the GATS (figure 3.2).
The limited commitments that have been made refer to
high-skill personnel – business executives etc. – whose
mobility is closely linked to foreign direct investment and is
an issue of interest to business lobbies in developed
countries. Thus far Mode 4 has not progressed in a way that
allows developing countries to use their comparative
advantage in low and medium skill labor-intensive services.
The empirical studies surveyed below suggest that an
expanded Mode 4 could generate enormous welfare gains.
The temporary movement of less skilled workers from
developing countries (where they are in oversupply) to
developed countries (where they are relatively
undersupplied) is estimated to increase world welfare by
hundreds of billions of dollars, even if the scale of the labor
flow was modest.
4.2 Potential gains and costs from
liberalisation
The movement of natural persons is usefully divided into
three categories.
(i) Flows from Developed to Developing
This category represents highly skilled technical or
managerial workers who work in developing countries
either providing specialised services such as consulting and
legal advice or fulfilling senior management roles in foreign-
owned firms. This is a widespread practise which aids the
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management of multinational firms and supplies useful skills
to firms in developing countries.
(ii) Skilled flows from developing to developed
The emigration of skilled workers from developing
countries is actively encouraged by developed countries and
provides clear gains to them. Over 30 per cent of all doctors
and nurses in the British health care system were born
outside the UK. The same is true for more than 12 per cent
of academic staff in British Universities.
From the perspective of developing countries, this flow is
better known as the ‘brain drain’. The loss of skilled local
workers deprives the country of the various economic and
non-economic spillovers. The brain drain reduces total
output, diminishes the competence of domestic high skill
sectors, and erodes the tax base. To the extent that these
skilled workers are complementary with other factors of
production, such as unskilled labor, the emigration of these
skilled workers leads to lower incomes for these other
factors.  Desai et al. (2001) point out that the one million
Indians living in the United States account for just 0.1 per
cent of India’s population but earned the equivalent of 10
per cent of India’s national income.
On the other hand, the temporary emigration of skilled
persons can benefit developing countries in several
important ways. First, the possibility of temporary migration
for skilled workers may  increase the returns to education in
the source country, inducing more investment in human
capital. Commander Kangasniemi and Winters (2002) argue
that this leads to an increase in skilled workers in the
domestic economy (even taking account of those that
migrate out) which partly offsets the direct effects of the
brain drain.
Second, remittances from workers in developed countries
back to their families are an additional benefit of migration
(Massey et al. 1998). Remittances are an economically
significant transfer for LDCs. In 2002, the Inter-American
Development Bank reported $32bn in remittances sent to
the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean. This was
far greater than total ODI and only slightly less than foreign
direct investment (Ellerman 2003). (Though impressive in
size, it is worth being circumspect about the potential for
remittances to generate sustained development. Martin and
Straubhaar (2001) argue that income from remittances is
potentially less valuable than income from newly
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established local enterprises, or export earnings because the
domestic spillovers may be smaller.)
Additionally there is evidence that national diasporas are an
important source of growth. For example, the 50 million
Chinese living abroad have been remarkably beneficial to
the Chinese economy. They are a source of business
experience, network connections, and capital.
(iii) Unskilled flows from developing to developed
The movement of unskilled workers to developed countries
offers the greatest gain because it is associated with the
largest difference between factor prices and the largest
scope for movement, measured as number of willing
people. It is also however the subject of the greatest
concern in developed countries.
Developed countries experience benefits and costs from
unskilled migration. Foreign workers are an important
source of labor in developed countries. London’s catering
industry depends on migrants for 70 per cent of its labor
force and a large proportion of seasonal agricultural
workers are foreign (Home Office 2000).
Opposition to unskilled labor flows comes from the fear
that foreigners displace local workers and contribute to
unemployment.8 A study by the British Home Office (2000)
examines the widely held perception that immigration is
detrimental to native workers. It concludes that unskilled
workers often fill jobs in low paid and insecure industries.
In many cases these are jobs that native workers are
unwilling to accept. In these jobs, foreign workers are filling
labor market gaps rather than displacing native workers.
Where migrants move in to industries with unfilled
vacancies, their presence has little effect on either
employment or wages of domestic workers.
Even in industries where migrants are competing with
domestic workers, the effect is not much different than the
impact of labor-intensive imports of foreign goods on
domestic manufacturing.
                                                      
8 Such concerns are, of course, not consistent with the CGE models,




In an early study, Hamilton and Whalley (1984) suggest that
if labour were free to move between countries sufficiently
to equalise wages around the world, world output would
rise by more than 150 per cent.9
Even using the more conservative assumption that part of
the cross-country difference in wages reflects productivity
differences which persist irrespective of location – e.g.
health and education – the gains are large. Winters,
Walmsley, Wang and Grynberg (2002) assume that workers
from poor countries are naturally only one third as
productive as workers in developed countries. They
estimate the gain from full labor mobility to be 70 per cent
of world GDP.
Obviously full labor mobility is an extreme and impractical
assumption. Winters (2000) estimates that even relatively
modest increase in labor mobility would increase world
welfare by $300 bn. This study assumes that fifty million
additional workers from developing countries be permitted
to work in developed countries. Winters assumes that when
workers move from a low to a high wage country, they
make up one quarter of the wage gap, i.e. three quarters of
observed wage gaps are due to persistent differences in
productivity.
These rough estimates have been subsequently
corroborated by Winters et al. (2002) using a general
equilibrium model. They find that if developed countries
allowed temporary workers from developing countries to
increase their workforces by 3 per cent (8 million skilled
and 8.4 million unskilled), world welfare would increase by
over $150 bn.  Winters et al (2002) use the GTAP model and
database developed by Hertel (1997). They assume that
temporary workers make up half the productivity
differences between their home country and their host
country when they move.
The initial residents of developing countries (which are
labor exporting) gain most from the increase in migration.
Their share of the total gain is approximately $80bn, more
than developed countries and a significantly larger fraction
of their income. The largest part of this increase accrues to
                                                      
9 Assumes an elasticity of substitution between factors of 1.
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accrues to temporary migrants themselves. In several
developing countries Winters et al. (2002) find that the
remaining residents of developing countries generally
experience a loss in welfare. Despite increases in
remittances and an improvement in their terms of trade (as
the fall in GDP reduces the supply of their goods), the
decrease in labor supply leads to a fall in the return to other
factors which outweighs these gains.10 However for many
commonwealth countries including India, South Asia and
South Africa, the welfare of permanent residents increases.
For these underdeveloped countries, the increase in
remittances outweighs the decline in labour and capital
income. Remittance income increases the demand for
domestic goods and allows the real wages of both skilled
and unskilled workers to rise. The welfare of permanent
residents in India and the rest of South Asia increases by
$16 billion and $350 million respectively. In South Africa,
the welfare of permanent residents increases by $82 million,
while the welfare of temporary migrants increases by $4.4
billion.
4.4 Conclusion
The substantial benefits estimated to be available to
developing countries from the liberalisation of temporary
migration for the unskilled—related to the huge differences
in wages in developed and less developed
countries—suggest that this is a promising area of reform.
The global efficiency gains too are probably an order of
magnitude greater than those associated with capital market
liberalization, which has been the subject of so much
attention. Unskilled workers in developed countries have,
not surprisingly, been worried about the effect of the
migration of unskilled labor on their wages, and have so far
been effective in limiting the extent of migration.  (On the
other hand, business interests in developed countries have
been successful in allowing migration of skilled workers;
this may be partially because unskilled workers have
thought that such workers are complements, and thus they
too will benefit.  But such skilled labor migration is of
                                                      
10 This result obviously is based on the assumption that the migrants are




ambiguous benefit to the developing world.)  Winters et al.
(2002) suggest that one possible way forward is to include
existing foreign worker schemes under the GATS by
scheduling them and subsequently extending them. Many
countries already have short-term foreign worker schemes
for low skilled jobs in agriculture, tourism and construction.
A second approach is to focus on subcontracting schemes in
future Mode 4 negotiations. Restricting the movement of
people to  existing employees of incorporated firms avoids
many of the problems of mobility for individual workers
(but also limits the scope of benefits). The pre-employment
guarantee ensures that the workers will arrive with a job
and increases the likelihood of their return after completion
of the project. Where firms are responsible for their staff,
they can provide housing, health and insurance, etc. These
services may reduce the costs of mobility for some workers.
However there are also many disadvantages associated with
sub-contracting. First, many service transactions are not
appropriate for sub contracting. Limiting mobility to
transactions that are suitable for provision by sub
contractors obviously diminishes the potential gains from
liberalisation of migration.
In spite of the huge barriers that developed countries have
imposed to the movement of unskilled labor, the economic
forces leading to such migration is so large that large
amounts still occurs, in spite of the barriers, and the
developing countries have received large benefits, e.g. as a
result of remittances. The developing countries have an
interest in facilitating the flow of these remittances and in
improving the rights and living conditions of the migrants
(many of whom are illegal.)  These issues would be high on
an agenda for a development round of trade negotiations





The Doha Ministerial Conference agreed to launch tariff-
cutting negotiations on all non-agricultural products. The
aim is to “reduce, or as appropriate eliminate tariffs,
including the reduction or elimination of tariff peaks, high
tariffs, and tariff escalation, as well as non-tariff barriers, in
particular on products of export interest to developing
countries.”
Significant progress on tariff reduction has been made in
several sectors. The empirical evidence below suggests that
this reform has been accompanied by an increase in the
share of manufactured goods in world trade and in the
share of manufactured goods in developing country exports.
However, several studies suggest that the potential gains
from the Doha Round might be larger than those realised as
a consequence of Uruguay Round reform. This may be
because the Uruguay Round was tilted against developing
countries.
The reduction in tariffs peaks on goods of interest to
developing countries and the reduction in protection on
south-south trade are promising areas for reform.
5.2 Patterns of trade and protection
While the average rate of agricultural protection in OECD
countries has risen in the last 3 decades, manufacturing
protection levels have fallen. Average tariffs on industrial
goods imported into the OECD countries fell from around
40 per cent in 1950 to 1.5 per cent in 1998 (Hertel 2000).
Figure 5.1 shows that there has been over the same period a
shift in the composition of global export towards




This trend is particularly strong in developing countries.
Figure 5.2 shows that in the last 40 years, the share of
agriculture in total developing country exports has fallen
from 45 per cent to less than 10 per cent, while the share of
manufactures has risen from 23 per cent to 79 per cent.
Source: Hertel (2000)
Figure 5.1 Manufacturing and agriculture shares
of world exports (%)
Source: Hertel (2000)
Figure 5.1  Manufacturing and agriculture shares




Despite their export shift from agriculture to manufactures
(figure 5.2 above) and their increasing share of the world
trade in manufactures (figure 5.3 below), developing
countries as a group are still net importers of manufactured
goods and net exporters of agricultural goods.
Figure 5.4 shows that developing countries have succeeded
in increasing the quantity of manufactured goods they
provide to major developed economies. However even in
the last period reported (1995) the shares were low, ranging
from just over 3 per cent in Japan to under 7 per cent in
North America.
Source: UNCTAD (1996)
Figure 5.4  Selected developed country imports








Aggregate data hides the existence of tariff peaks, which
may restrict access to developing countries products. For
example, in the processed food sector, Canadian, Japanese
and EU tariffs on fully processed food are 42, 65 and 24 per
cent respectively. By contrast, the least processed products
face tariffs of 3, 35, and 15 per cent in the same countries.
Partly because of these trade restrictions, the penetration of
developing country processed food has been limited (World
Bank 2002).
(ii) South-South Trade
Notwithstanding tariff peaks, developing countries goods
are subject to much higher barriers in other developing
countries than in OECD countries. Table 5.1 shows that
developing countries face average manufacturing tariffs of
12.8 per cent in other developing countries but just 3.4 per
cent in developed countries.
Table 5.1 Average manufacturing tariff rates
This table reports the average tariff rates faced by high
and low income countries on their own and each other’s
goods.








Source: Hertel and Martin, 2000
Figure 5.5  Average MFN tariff on






Figure 5.5 shows the average MFN tariff on manufacturing
by importer in 1995 and 2005 (Hertel 2000). The highest
tariffs are in developing countries, particularly India, China
and Other South East Asia.
5.3 Empirical review
Brown, Deardorff and Stern (2002) use a CGE simulation
model model to test the effects of trade liberalisation in
manufactures. In their model domestic consumers respond
to reductions in protection by purchasing more imported
goods. Industrial sectors in each country expand or contract
depending on whether their protection is reduced by more
or less than in other countries. Countries with larger than
average tariff reductions experience a real depreciation of
their currency to maintain a constant trade balance.11
Welfare in their model is determined by the effect of these
changes on allocative efficiency and each country’s terms of
trade. The authors also incorporate non-tariff barriers. These
generate rents to the preferred exporters, which are lost
upon elimination. Thus the effect of liberalisation may not
be positive for all exporters.
Brown, Deardorff and Stern (2002) initially apply their
model to the Uruguay Agreement on manufactures. They
estimate the welfare gains resulting from a scenario in
which all countries reduce their tariffs as per the Agreement.
Table 5.2 shows that global welfare increases by $56.5 bn
and the gains are shared across all countries. The largest
welfare increases in absolute terms accrue to the European
Union ($17.4 bn), however large relative gains – expressed
as a share of GDP – accrue to the Rest of South Asia, the
Philippines, and Malaysia.
Brown, Deardorff and Stern (2002) follow this simulation
with an estimation of the welfare gains available in the
Doha Round (table 5.3). They present the results of a 33 per
cent reduction in post Uruguay Round tariffs. They estimate
that the potential gains from the Doha Round ($163.4bn
from a 33 per cent reduction) are significantly larger than
those realised in the Uruguay Round (table 5.2). In
particular, most developing countries gain significantly more
                                                      
11 This is the kind of effect which is often ignored in popular
discussions of trade liberalization, but is absolutely essential when
attempting to appraise the true (general equilibrium) effects.
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as a share of GDP than they did in the Uruguay round. The
authors suggest that this may be because the Uruguay round
was tilted against developing countries.
Hertel et al. (2000) use the GTAP model of global trade to
make similar estimates about the welfare gains from a 40
per cent liberalisation of post Uruguay tariffs on
manufactures. They find that the global gain is in the region
of $70bn, roughly the same size as the gains they predict
from agriculture. Table 5.4 shows that developing countries
get a much larger proportion of the gains from liberalisation
of manufacturing trade than they do from agriculture. With
the exception of Sub Saharan Africa, all developing
countries gain more from the reduction of manufacturing
tariffs.
A third study, Hertel (2000) using the same GTAP model,
estimates that the benefits of full (100 per cent) reduction in
post Uruguay manufacturing tariffs is a global gain of
$130bn. Again, the author predicts that a large share of this
will accrue to developing countries. Figure 5.6 shows the
developing country share of the gains from reform in three
different sectors (and combined reform). Manufacturing is
the sector most benefited within developing countries (who
gain over 70 per cent of the welfare and efficiency
dividend). This persistent result in the literature is derived
from the fact that developing countries have the highest
tariffs on manufacturing goods and thus receive the largest
gains from removing the distortions. The studies do not
separately analyse “consumer benefits” (access to goods at
lower prices) and “producer benefits” (the creation of new
jobs as a result of access to markets abroad). Another
implication of the analysis is that the realisation of these
allocative efficiency gains will entail significant adjustment
costs – a theme we revisit in appendix 2.
Manufactures Full ServicesAgriculture
Source: Hertel (2000)
Figure 5.6 The share of liberalisation gains accruing to


















(Millions) (Millions) (Percent) (Percent) (Millions) (Percent) (Percent)
Australia&NewZealand 2848.0 2527.6 0.347 0.327 1674.8 0.345 0.300
Canada 1071.9 1354.5 -0.086 0.127 926.3 0.137 0.114
EuropeanUnionandEFTA 16826.6 15358.5 0.145 0.159 17405.6 0.157 0.163
Japan 8680.6 8331.3 0.062 0.102 6608.4 0.092 0.115
UnitedStates 12426.0 13459.3 -0.133 0.123 11187.1 0.124 0.122
India 2585.3 3628.9 -2.099 0.446 1875.4 0.316 0.577
SriLanka 98.8 106.3 -0.193 0.558 93.0 0.507 0.608
RestofSouthAsia 3454.8 4820.1 -7.541 2.025 2366.5 2.224 1.828
China 3112.6 1917.7 0.456 0.305 2762.2 0.347 0.271
HongKong 763.5 480.1 0.254 0.360 464.1 0.346 0.373
SouthKorea 2858.6 2733.2 0.068 0.422 2403.3 0.409 0.435
Singapore 3539.8 3647.5 -0.078 2.111 1570.3 1.943 2.258
Indonesia 936.5 894.5 0.068 0.247 626.0 0.291 0.215
Malaysia 2790.9 3411.4 -0.563 1.919 2293.9 1.816 1.974
Philippines 2452.6 3102.1 -1.989 1.917 1691.7 1.853 1.964
Thailand 1264.7 1002.3 0.291 0.366 753.9 0.597 0.283
Mexico -64.9 1.4 -0.026 0.019 66.3 0.038 0.010
Turkey 319.3 253.9 0.143 0.123 259.1 0.122 0.124
CentralEurope 1871.7 1846.1 0.020 0.294 1091.2 0.311 0.270
Central&SouthAmerica 3778.8 2999.5 0.423 0.022 377.1 0.043 0.004
Total 71616.2 71876.4 56496.0
Source: Brown, Deardorff and Stern (2002)
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Table 5.3 Doha Welfare gains












(Millions) (Millions) (Percent) (Percent) (Millions) (Percent) (Percent)
Australia&NewZealand 3720.7 3457.2 0.267 0.545 2790.6 0.508 0.515
Canada 1996.0 2097.3 -0.013 0.347 2526.2 0.216 0.251
EuropeanUnionandEFTA 23184.8 22840.3 0.050 0.358 39273.0 0.190 0.199
Japan 19071.4 15817.0 0.548 0.696 45190.9 0.234 0.304
UnitedStates 20454.2 18337.3 0.167 0.260 23634.2 0.198 0.224
India 3280.4 4054.2 -1.384 0.733 3084.4 0.439 0.592
SriLanka 536.8 592.1 -1.025 3.207 534.5 1.565 2.010
RestofSouthAsia 1892.0 2018.4 -0.604 1.895 2214.7 0.889 1.025
China 16080.3 19416.3 -1.221 1.199 10859.3 1.470 1.323
HongKong 3182.8 1840.3 1.246 1.444 1859.1 0.947 0.647
SouthKorea 8023.4 8440.7 -0.233 1.515 8622.9 1.158 1.003
Singapore 4382.9 4161.8 0.131 2.276 1692.5 2.481 2.611
Indonesia 2362.7 2336.0 0.053 0.835 2113.3 0.645 0.447
Malaysia 4242.8 4805.2 -0.488 2.555 3055.1 2.896 2.812
Philippines 3984.0 4535.1 -1.192 5.478 4834.4 3.310 2.461
Thailand 3406.1 3970.1 -0.675 0.873 1798.6 1.664 0.972
Mexico 916.3 1132.6 -0.166 0.364 1283.1 0.195 0.204
Turkey 1421.0 1558.6 -0.335 0.827 1740.3 0.349 0.272
CentralEurope 3866.3 4366.4 -0.428 0.734 2724.2 0.816 0.722
Central&SouthAmerica 5038.9 6103.2 -0.612 0.206 3610.0 0.159 0.108
Total 131043.7 131880.0 163441.4
Source: Brown, Deardorff and Stern (2002)
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Table 5.4. Welfare and Efficiency Gains due to 40% Liberalization in
Agriculture and manufacturing: 2005
Both columns  reports the benefits of reform in terms of equivalent
variation.






















Source: Hertel et al. (2000) Table 8, page 27
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6  Preliminary conclusions
The purpose of the empirical survey above is to suggest a
prioritisation of trade issues that will benefit developing
countries.
When negotiating parties lobby at the WTO, it is assumed
that they do so in their own self-interest. In the case of
developing countries and their advocates, it is not always
clear what evidence they are using to determine how
different reforms will affect them.
The CGE results presented in this note are certainly not
perfectly reliable estimates of the welfare effects of various
WTO proposals – indeed the estimates vary quite widely
between different studies. However they draw attention to
the wide range of global effects of WTO proposals.
The results of the empirical survey presented in this note
suggest a  different prioritisation to the current hierarchy of
market access issues receiving attention in the WTO.
The evidence presented above suggests that an alternative
market access liberalisation agenda might focus on labor
market access for unskilled workers, unskilled labor
services, market access for agricultural goods exported by
developing countries, and tariff peaks for manufactured
goods. The empirical work has paid less attention to the
non-market access issues, like competition policy, but, as
we noted in the text, here too the agenda that was being
pursued, e.g. in the Singapore issues, is markedly different
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APPENDIX 2:
Regulatory Harmonisation: The Singapore Issues
21 Introduction
The inclusion of a domestic regulatory agenda in WTO
negotiations represents a departure from the traditional
‘market access’ focus of the GATT rounds. The national
regulations embodied in the ‘Singapore issues’ have become
more prominent as the liberalisation of traditional trade
protection instruments has highlighted the trade impact of
remaining differences in national regulatory regimes.
Efforts to harmonise national regulation have commenced in
competition law, FDI policy, transparency in government
procurement, and trade facilitation. It has been argued that
these issues are not priorities for low-income countries and
should not form part of a so-called ‘development round’. In
particular, there is significant opposition from developing
countries. In the space of a month from early June 2003, 77
developing countries, including over half the WTO
membership, made public statements urging that new
negotiations should not be launched as part of the Doha
Round.1
Several developing countries see the Singapore issues as
incursions into their national sovereignty that are not
justified by the benefits they bring. Multilateral regulatory
disciplines hold the spectre of preventing individual
governments from pursuing development policies based on
their own national priorities and problems.
In addition there are concerns that the initiatives based on
the Singapore issues may impose a large burden on the
administrative capacity of developing countries. There are
significant costs associated with both the creation and
enforcement of new regimes in competition policy,
investment regulations, and trade and customs procedures.
Moreover the required institutional capacity and human
expertise may not be available in developing countries. In
OECD countries these critical inputs developed gradually
over a long period of time. These considerations suggest
that the payoff to requiring WTO members to implement
                                                      
1 CAFOD (2003) ‘Singapore Issues in the WTO: What do developing
countries say?’
3rapidly the Singapore proposals may not be large relative to
its costs. Moreover it suggests that any reform will require
significant technical assistance from developed countries.
Finally there is broad concern that the Doha agenda may be
overloaded. The Doha Round has an ambitious work
program involving multilateral negotiations on many issues.
The inclusion of complex and controversial issues may slow
progress on more fruitful initiatives.
As the debate on the Singapore issues evolved, two other
issues became more apparent.  The first is that many of the
Singapore issues involved a detailed knowledge of complex
public policy issues that went well beyond the competence
of trade ministers to negotiate.  The outcomes, accordingly,
might not be good even for the developed countries.  There
was a resonance with what had happened in the intellectual
property negotiations (TRIPS) in the Uruguay Round, where
both the Council of Economic Advisers and the Office of
Science and Technology Policy raised serious concerns, to
which the U.S. Trade Representatives paid little attention in
the negotiations.  The issues that were being debated under
“Competition” did not attempt to unify treatment of
predatory pricing between domestic and foreign firms, a
natural part of any attempt at developing a uniform
competition code.  The United States put on the agenda in
the discussion of Investment highly controversial issues
involving capital market liberalization, which almost
contemporaneously, the IMF had revisited, raising questions
about the potential economic benefits and costs.
This brings us to the second concern:  some of the
proposals would have actually been adverse to the
development of the developing countries. They went
against the entire spirit of the Development Round.  Such
was the case, for instance, with proposals for full capital
market liberalization.
In the context of these concerns, we consider four criteria
for prioritizing an issue in the current round of negotiations.
 Is WTO justified by returns to international collective
action that are higher than returns to unilateral
action, i.e., are there spill-overs or externalities which
justify multilateralism?
 Are the benefits of the initiative large relative to other
proposals? Are the benefits shared between
developing and developed countries?
4 Are the costs of implementation small relative to the
benefits of the initiative?
 To what extent do multilateral commitments impede
national development strategies?
Using these criteria, this appendix analyses the merits of
including the Singapore issues in the Doha Development
Round. The merits are certainly not uniform across the four
issues or even across the different initiatives within each
issue.
Significantly more work needs to be done to quantify the
potential benefits and costs flowing from the Singapore
issues. Indeed the paucity of authoritative studies in this
area is in itself a reason to advocate caution. Therefore the
conclusions of this appendix are preliminary.
Nonetheless the empirical survey below suggests that the
current focus of the WTO’s regulatory harmonisation agenda
is misdirected in some areas.
 In the competition and investment arenas, the WTO
should move away from imposing uniformity on
manifestly different countries and focus its attention
on areas where externalities generate returns to
multilateralism.
In investment policy, reducing the ‘race to the
bottom’ incentive war would be a useful initiative.
Similarly, competition policy initiatives should
include anti-trust action against cartels which raise
prices for developing countries, and a mechanism for
analysing the global effects of merger decisions in
developed countries.
 In government procurement and trade facilitation,
progress should be made through national efforts
aided by technical assistance, rather than through
imposing additional obligations in the WTO.
52 Investment
At the Singapore WTO Ministerial meeting in 1996, members
agreed to form a working group to study the relationship
between trade and investment.  Since then, some developed
countries have attempted to move towards a negotiated
investment agreement within the WTO.
The proponents of such an agreement seek internationally
binding rules that would minimise the conditions and
regulations on foreign investors entering or operating in
host countries and to grant them national treatment.  This
would involve the removal of performance requirements
and the adoption of a range of investor rights. 
However most developing countries were reluctant to agree
to this because several believed that an investment regime
was inappropriate within a trade organisation. Others had
concerns about the loss of autonomy over investment policy
and the consequent limitations on industrial policy options.
Also there were broadly expressed concerns that an
investment agreement would divert time and human
resources from other vital work in the WTO. 
2.1 Potential benefits and costs from an investment
agreement
The fundamental premise of the argument in favor of a
multilateral investment agreement is that it will increase
investment flows to developing countries. An agreement
which improves investor protections may stimulate domestic
investment and alleviate the concerns of foreign investors.
However there are several reasons to be cautious about the
responsiveness of investment to new multilateral
protections. First, the current absence of multilateral
investment disciplines and the failure of previous attempts
to establish them (such as the OECD’s ill-fated Multilateral
Agreement on Investment, MAI) has not deterred foreign
investment. Foreign direct investment has grown rapidly
over the last decade, outpacing both trade and output
growth.
Additionally, the absence of a multilateral agreement has
not prevented substantial unilateral liberalisation of
6investment regimes. UNCTAD reports that between 1991
and 2001, a total of 1,393 changes were made to national
investment  regulations. More than 90 per cent of these
were liberalising changes. Figure 1 shows that in 2001, over
200 regulatory changes were made in 71 countries, only 6
per cent of which were restrictive changes. In this
environment there does not seem to be a compelling
rationale to force national governments to adopt a uniform
multilateral agreement. Idiosyncratic national regimes are
sensitive to national development proprieties and can be
tailored to existing institutional arrangements to minimise
implementation costs.
A third reason for caution comes from the historical
experience of investment treaties in generating increased
investment flows. Bilateral investment treaties (BITs) surged
in the 1990s to more than 2,000 in 2001. There has been
significant activity between developing countries, which
accounted for 42 per cent of new BITs in 2001 (UNCTAD
2002). BITs proscribe a range of investment protections that
often go further than many of the realistic proposals before
the WTO. Yet there is not much evidence that the signing of
bilateral investment treaties increases the flow of
investment. UNCTAD’s (1998) study found no relationship
between the level of FDI and the number of BITs signed by
host countries. A more comprehensive study by Hallward-
Driemeier (2002) looked at the bilateral flows of OECD
countries to 31 developing countries over 20 years. After
accounting for trends, they found little evidence that BITs
Figure 1. Liberalisation of investment regimes
Number of countries changing their
investment regulations
Number of liberalising and restrictive
changes to investment regulations
Source: UNCTAD 2001.
7increased investment to developing countries. More research
need to be done on the effects of investment treaties on
investment volume, but the existing evidence suggests that
the benefits of additional treaties may be small.
Fourthly, the most serious concern, nationalization of
foreign investments, has already been addressed at both the
national and international level, though national and
multilateral agencies (MIGA, the Multilateral Investment
Guarantee Association, is part of the World Bank Group)
providing guarantees against such confiscations of property.
Going beyond this entails difficult to make judgments about
what are “legitimate” and illegitimate restrictions.  Most
fundamentally, each country has an incentive to develop an
investment regime balancing provisions which might serve
to attract more foreign investment with those protecting
against potential adverse effects on the citizenry.
International agreements might help developing countries
provide assurances that they will abide by their
commitments, which is what MIGA in effect does.  But they
should not dictate how each country should make that
balance.
A further difficulty is that in providing further protections,
even bilateral agreements negotiated by trade ministers
often go too far, intruding on national sovereignty in
unacceptable ways. The problem is that it often takes years
The effect of BITs on FDI
(Share of annual FDI flow)
Figure 2. Bilateral investment treaties
Growth of BITs in developing countries
(number of treaties indecade)
Source: GEP 2003.
8before the full import is discovered, by which time the
possibility of revising the treaty has become difficult and
tendentious.  The infamous Chapter 11 of NAFTA provides a
compelling case in point, where foreign investors were
given more rights than domestics (e.g. for compensation for
changes in costs or profitability  as a result of even fully
justified regulations, in what are called regulatory takings).
This is arguably having an adverse effect in the
development of important regulations in areas like the
environment and consumer protection.  (The Clinton
Administration was opposing attempts to provide such
compensation in domestic legislation, even as its trade
negotiators were putting such a provision into NAFTA,
without seeking prior approval either of the Cabinet, the
National Economic Council, or Congress.  Once such
provisions are put into an agreement, it is hard to take them
out.)  Even judicial protections, such as punitive damages,
have come under question.
The attempt to impose restrictions on capital market
liberalization illustrates the dangers of these non-trade
related investment agreements.  (Trade related capital flows
are already covered within current IMF agreements.)  There
is compelling evidence that full liberalization has little effect
on economic growth, but exposes countries to increased
instability, a fact recognized even by the IMF in its recent
Board paper.2
For these reasons, the current direction of WTO negotiations
on investment disciplines seems to offer few advantages to
developing countries. An international agreement on
investment rules of the type currently being proposed is
ultimately designed to maximise foreign investors rights
whilst minimising the authority of governments in
developing countries.   Instead the WTO should focus on
improving the investment environment in ways which
strengthens the bargaining position of governments vis-a-vis
foreign investors rather than weakening it.
2.2 Priorities
One area in which there is clear cause for multilateral action
is the reduction of ‘beggar-thy-neighbor’ investment
                                                      
2 See also the forthcoming IPD volume on Capital Market Liberalization
and Macroeconomic Stability (Oxford University Press)
9incentive competition for foreign investment.  Since the
mid-1980s, the efforts of national and sub-national levels of
government to attract direct investment to their jurisdictions
have increased considerably (Charlton 2003).    
Political pressure on governments to be seen as ‘job
winners’ push policy makers to play a race-to-the-bottom
game. Oxfam (2000) estimates that developing countries
lose $35 billion per year due to a competitive pressure to
reduce corporate tax rates combined with the transfer of
profits out of developing countries to low-tax environments.
The potential negative consequences of investment
competition are particularly acute in developing nations.
The risk of “overbidding” is exacerbated by institutional
weaknesses, poor cost-benefit analysis and in some cases,
corruption. Moreover, the potential consequences of
excessively generous incentives might be increased in those
developing nations whose fiscal positions are already weak.   
Agreements to limit the size of incentives seems to be the
most obvious approach to pursue within a multilateral
framework. The European Union provides a good example
of the kind of approach to policy co-ordination that might
benefit developing countries. The EU has been operating
state aid guidelines now for several decades. Although
grants to foreign direct investment are not explicitly targeted
by Commission policy, in practice they are one of the main
forms of state aid regulated by it. The EU takes the general
view that state aid is incompatible with the common market.
The definition of state aid clearly encompasses traditional
instruments of investment attraction. Indeed the European
Commission classifies state aid as including i) grants to
firms; ii) loans and guarantees; iii) tax exemptions; and iv)
infrastructure projects benefiting identifiable end-users. The
European Commission claims some success in reducing
subsidies in the EU. There is evidence that the Commission
has used its guidelines to effectively restrict incentives in
some areas. For example, before the introduction of
guidelines for the support of SMEs, it was not rare to find
state-aid grants of as much as 20 per cent of an investment
project. Under the new framework, the fixed maximums are
7.5 per cent (medium-sized enterprises) and 15 per cent
(small enterprises).3
                                                      
3 An example from the Czech Republic provides an illustration of how
the Commission uses its power in practice. The Czech Republic planned
to offer subsidies to the Volkswagen unit Skoda for an engine plant at
Mlada Boleslav. After a year of negotiations with the EU, the
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3 Competition policy
Strong competition policy backed by clearly enforced laws
is beneficial to developing countries and should be
encouraged in international forums.  There is a clear worry
that the benefits of a liberal trade regime would be
undermined by domestic or international monopolies and
cartels.  Liberalization might largely simply transfer rents
that had been accruing to the government to private sector
monopolies, and not lead to lower consumer prices.
However competition policy disciplines as envisaged by the
proponents of a WTO agreement may impinge on the
ability of each country to choose a competition policy
model which is suitable for its own development priorities,
and the proposals under discussion do not address the most
important concerns of developing countries.  What is
required is a paradigm to view competition from a
development perspective.  What is needed is to ensure that
developing country producers receive even handed
treatment with domestic producers (which they currently do
not), and to ensure that developing country consumers can
be protected from non-competitive actions by global anti-
trust action, including anti-trust actions centered in the
developed countries. National competition law and policy
should complement other national development objectives
(such as industrial development). Moreover it should not
hinder government efforts to minimise adjustment costs
resulting from structural change generated by WTO driven
liberalisation in other areas.  Some sensitive industrial
sectors may require protection from advanced foreign firms
for the time it takes to create local capacity.  Moreover, it
needs to be recognized that the legal frameworks that have
been developed in the advanced industrial countries to
promote competition are costly to administer.  Early on,
there was an awareness of the risk of politicization of
competition policy, providing one of the rationale for
private enforcement actions. There is some reason to
believe that those fears have been justified, and when
incorporated within a trade regime, there is often more a
concern for the promotion of the interests of the country’s
                                                                                                                                         
government agreed to slash tax breaks and grants that if was offering to
Skoda from $120 million to $22 million.
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corporations, than on the well-being of consumers.  Thus, a
failure of a country’s firms to do well in a market will be
blamed on anti-competitive actions; but the attempt by a
foreign government to protect its citizens from anti-
competitive practices of one’s own company will be viewed
with suspicions.  But because of their costs, private
enforcement actions are often not feasible for those harmed
in developing countries.
For these reasons, some of the conventional models of
competition which operate in developed countries may not
be appropriate for a developing country.   In the discussion
below, we identify some policies that might redress the
imbalance.
3.1 Potential gains and costs
The theoretical benefits from the maintenance of
competition are clear.  Indeed, the benefits that are
associated with free markets are only enjoyed if those
markets are competitive.  As we suggested before, trade
liberalization and privatization will only deliver on their
promised benefits in a competitive environment.  But
imperfections in competition are pervasive, especially in
developing countries whether markets are often small.
There is an abiding concern that a large multinational can
use its economic power to become dominant in certain
markets in developing countries—these companies often
have sales that exceed the GDP of the economy.
While the case for strong competition policy is clear, there
is regrettably only a small amount of evidence on the
welfare effects of competition policy agreements. Kee and
Hoekman (2002) investigate the impact of competition law
on estimated industry mark-ups over cost. They use time
series panel data from 28 industries in 42 countries. They
conclude that antitrust legislation has no individual impact
on the size of mark-ups. By contrast they conclude that
imports and lower entry barriers (which anti-trust policies
can lead to) are associated with a larger payoff, a result
supported by several studies (Djankov et. al, 2002;
Hoekman, Kee and Olarreaga, 2001; Vandenbussche, 2000).
By contrast, Clarke and Evenett (2003) show that in Latin
America, Asia and Western Europe, jurisdictions that did not
enforce their cartel laws suffered greater overcharges than
those nations that actively enforced their cartel laws.
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New competition regimes are associated with significant
implementation costs. Competition law is technical and
requires institutional skills and resources that are in short
supply in many developing countries. In addition
competition law enforcement is expensive. OECD and
national sources indicate that the annual budget of the
antitrust office in OECD countries is in the $15-50 million
plus range. For developing countries with enforcement
agencies the budgets are lower but still significant
(Hoekman and Mavroidis 2002).4
3.2 Priorities
Discussions under “competition” center around two issues:
preventing monopolization and anti-competitive practices;
and preventing governments from acting in ways which
give an “unfair” competitive advantage to their firms, either
by imposing requirements on foreign firms or by subsidizing
their own firms.
Under the first rubric, preventing monopolization and anti-
competitive practices, there are two important reforms.  The
first is the adoption of a single standard for predatory anti-
competitive behaviour between domestic and foreign firms.
There is a large literature5 on the cost of dumping laws, and
on their inequities (including those associated with the
manner in which they are implemented).
Another priority should be to protect purchasers in
developing countries from paying excessively high prices as
a result of  monopolies and especially international cartels.
National competition policy may ignore collusion by
domestic firms to raise prices in export markets since there
is no harm to those within the country. Moreover,
developing countries without the resources to effectively
enforce competition policy on international firms may suffer
from international cartels. There is a small amount of
(mainly informal) evidence on the effects of international
cartels on developing countries. Levenstein, Oswald and
Suslow (2002) analyse 16 goods whose supply was found to
                                                      
4 For example, the costs of antitrust offices are large in Mexico ($14m),
Poland ($4.1m), Argentina (1.4m), Hungary ($2m).
5 See for example, Xavier Martinez-Giralt and Pedro Barros, (1997), On
the Effects of Anti-dumping Legislation, No 1590 in CEPR Discussion
Papers.
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be internationally cartelised by American or European firms.
They found that in 1997 developing countries’ purchased
$36.4bn of goods from a set of 10 industries that had seen a
price fixing conspiracy in the 1990s. This amounts to 2.9 per
cent of developing countries total imports which may have
been subject to collusive price fixing by firms from
developed countries. It has been estimated that cartels in
developed countries have cost consumers in developing
countries up to $7bn in the 1990s. Some of the worst
offending cartels have been found in the international
maritime transport industry. Such cartels are often approved
by national competition authorities but have been found to
lead to higher prices for consumers. Fink et al.  (2001)
estimates that collusive practices in the maritime transport
industry have cost consumers in the US alone up to $2.1bn.
If developing countries were to save the same proportion of
their shipping costs the savings would be $2.3bn.
Figure 3.  Imports affected by cartels




In the mid-1990s, as Russia moved from communism to a
market economy, one of the few goods that it could easily
sell internationally was aluminium, but its attempts to enter
Western markets were hampered as American aluminium
companies put pressure on the United States to create an
international aluminium cartel that would strictly limit the
extent to which they could enter Western markets and
which would thereby maintain international prices at high
levels.  This is a case in which both Russia and consumers
around the world were injured.  But those affected had no
recourse to anti-trust laws, especially since governments
were involved in the very creation of the cartel.
Almost undoubtedly, the most important international cartel
is OPEC, which attempts to control the price of oil.  Though
several OPEC members are developing countries, most of
those in the developing world live in countries which are
net importers of oil, and therefore are worse off as a result
of the oil cartel.
This suggests there might be potential gains from
multilateral action to ban export cartels, including those in
which governments are a party.
A key issue is how developing countries can respond to
anti-competitive actions, including export cartels.  No small
developing country could force the break up of a cartel;
each would find it expensive to bring a court case, and
even if it could bring such a case in its own jurisdiction,
enforcement of a judgment would be difficult. One option
would be to allow governments of detrimentally affected
countries to use the court system of OECD countries to
prosecute offending firms.  Further, adversely affected
parties (including governments acting on behalf of citizens)
should be allowed to be a plaintiff in civil actions in the
courts of the advanced industrial countries, and there
should be a provision for class action suits, with flexible
standards for class certification, which would in particular
encourage purchasers of products in foreign countries to be
able to join in with each other and with other purchasers in
the advanced industrial countries. Given the limited
resources of developing countries and the high costs of
suits, assistance from OECD countries would be desirable.
Hoekman and Mavroidis (2002) suggest the creation of a
‘special prosecutor’ within the WTO with authority to bring
cases in the relevant jurisdiction on behalf of developing
country consumers.
Merger policy is another area in which national competition
policies may have international spillover effects. The
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concern is that nationalistic approval criteria may allow
mergers between domestic firms even when the global
welfare effect is negative, so long as the welfare benefits
within the country are positive. If these firms have a larger
combined market share in some smaller foreign markets
than they do in the domestic market, a merger may be
domestically acceptable but globally undesirable.
Both from the perspective of developed and less developed
countries, we worry about attempts to harmonize national
competition policies, for in doing so, there is a real risk that
the “least common denominator” will be accepted, that is,
one which will provide the least protection for consumers.
Even a movement towards a common framework, a
common framework which inevitably would be close to a
“least common denominator,” would risk not recognizing
the differential circumstances of the developing countries
and encouraging governments to move towards this low
standard.  This is especially the case because corporate
interests tend to be far better represented in trade
negotiations than consumer interests.
It would be better to use the discussion of Competition
issues within the WTO to encourage countries to develop
high competition standards, and to recognize some of the
ways that countries may legitimately do so.  For instance,
the United States has, on several occasions, recognized that
concerns about competition “trump” intellectual property;
standard intellectual property protections, which give
temporary monopoly power, have been circumscribed,
when they lead to excessive monopolization of particular
markets.  This is a principle which should more universally
be recognized; it should be made explicitly clear that such
actions are not a violation of TRIPs.  As a second example,
per se rules may be easier and less costly to enforce than
“rule of reason” judgments, requiring the careful balancing
of costs and benefits of certain potentially anti-competitive
practices.  Strong “per se” rules (such as limiting the share
of the country’s market that any firm may have) should be
allowed, even if they have the effect of limiting entry by
international firms (for whom, say, entry into a market
would only be worthwhile if they had a dominant position.)
On the second rubric, actions taken to give a competitive
advantage to one’s own firms (or competitive disadvantage
to foreign firms), the development concerns should be
given priority, and actions which have arguably a
development objective should be allowed, at least on a
medium term basis, even if they put foreign firms at a
disadvantage.  Inevitably, firms from developing and
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developed countries are in different circumstances; each has
some advantages over the others.  Firms from advanced
industrial countries often have access to lower cost of
capital and to government financed research, especially by-
products of the huge expenditures on defence.  Local firms
may have more local knowledge, and that may give them a
competitive advantage.  Inevitably, there will be some
ambiguity in what is meant by “levelling the playing field.”
But approaching the issue from the development
perspective provides some guidance into what kinds of
policies should be allowed by developing countries.
Developing countries should be allowed to provide capital
to domestic firms at “reasonable terms,” which may be
significantly below the very high interest rates that are
imposed on them as a condition of IMF loans, or which
they feel they have to have to prevent a currency crisis.
Imposing “community reinvestment act” lending
requirements on banks, to lend a certain fraction of their
money to particular groups, e.g. underserved minorities, or
small or medium size domestic enterprises, is a legitimate
restriction.  Giving preferences to small and medium sized
enterprises for government contracts  (see below) should
also be legitimate, even if in doing so, multinational firms
are in effect discriminated against.  At the same time, the
standards for judging whether the provision of infrastructure
which, in the first instance, may be directed at a particular
enterprise, is a subsidy or not should be looked at from
different perspectives for a developing country than for a
developed country.  While advanced industrial countries
have long been critical of local content requirements, such
requirements may in fact facilitate developmental objectives.
4 Government Procurement
Government purchases of goods and services are a
significant fraction of world GDP. Recent analysis by the
OECD indicates that total central government expenditures
of OECD countries was almost $2 trillion in 1998.6 In
developing countries this figure was $0.3 trillion – equal to
six times the total annual multilateral and bilateral aid
currently given to developing countries (Evenett 2003).
                                                      
6 This figure excludes military expenditure and the payment of state
employees.
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In an attempt to harness this part of the international
economy, several WTO members signed the ‘plurilateral’
(only binding to those members that choose to sign)
Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA) at the
Uruguay Round in 1994. One of the GPA’s primary long
term objectives is to ensure that government decisions to
purchase goods and services do not depend on the location
of production or the affiliation of the supplier.
Many developed countries, principally the US and the EU
would like to see the GPA develop into a multilateral
agreement which in the fist stage draws all members into an
agreement on transparency; and in the second stage extends
the scope to due process and national treatment for foreign
firms.
4.1 Potential benefits and costs
Estimates of the value of a broad multilateral procurement
agreement (encompassing both transparency and non-
discrimination) depend on the size of the government
procurement market, the size of preference margins
extended to domestic suppliers, and the general equilibrium
gains and losses derived from the elimination of these
preferences.
As described above, government procurement accounts for
an average of about 10-15 per cent of GDP for developed
countries and as much as 20 per cent of GDP for
developing countries. National domestic preference margins
are estimated by analysing either national policies or the
price wedges that explain government purchasing choices.
Francois, Palmeter and Nelson (1997) estimate the margin of
preference for OECD countries to be in the 13-50 per cent
range.
However the proportion of government purchases whose
price is inflated by preferential treatment may not be large.
In a procurement auction, preferences only raise prices
when domestic bidders are not the lowest but are within the
preference margin, or when the domestic bidders are the
lowest but there is only one of them (in which case the
domestic bidder raises its sell price to the lowest foreign
price plus the preference margin). However in other
circumstances a preferential procurement policy may
actually reduce procurement costs. McAfee and McMillan
(1989) show that preferential polices can cause foreign
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suppliers to reduce their sell price so as to bid under the
domestic firms receiving preferences.
Government procurement policies have important economic
and social roles in developing countries which would be
curtailed if governments were mandated to observe national
treatment principles. The level of expenditure, and the
attempt to direct the expenditure to locally produced
materials, is a major macroeconomic instrument, especially
during recessionary periods, to counter economic downturn
(Kohr 2003). If the foreign share increases, there would be a
leakage in government attempts to boost the economy
through increased spending during a downturn.
Additionally procurement policies might be used to boost
domestic industries or encourage development in specific
sectors of national interest. Social objectives could also be
advanced by preferences for specific groups or
communities, especially those that are under-represented in
economic standing.
Finally, while developed countries (and especially,
particular firms within developed countries) have much to
gain from gaining access to government procurement in
developing countries, it is not likely that the gains are fully
reciprocal.  Even the EU has had difficulty making inroads
into U.S. government defence procurement.  Furthermore,
the consequences of procurement liberalization will
inevitably depend on liberalization of services and labor
flows.  If the U.S. government decides to subcontract meal
services in the army, will it allow a foreign firm to provide
the service?  Almost surely, security concerns will demand
that the firm be an American firm.  But since defence is a
larger fraction of expenditures for America, it means that a
larger fraction of government procurement will be exempt.
Some communities in the United States have moved towards
contracting out a range of public services, including schools
and prisons.  It is unlikely that foreign firms have equal
access.
In the context of the important government objectives
achieved by procurement policy and the lack of any
externalities to justify international action, it seems
important that developing countries retain their autonomy
over this area of policy.7
                                                      
7 Moreover, it will be difficult to implement any procurement policy in a
way which would widely be acceptable.  A large fraction of American
expenditures are for defense, and it will almost surely claim a defense
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5 Trade facilitation
Trade facilitation initiatives8 hold out the promise of
increasing trade and efficiency by reducing onerous trade-
related costs. Such costs include: regulatory compliance
costs; charges for trade-related services; procedural delays;
lack of predictability; and lost business opportunities
(Lucenti 2003).
The benefits of improving trade facilitation include:
increasing trade in goods and services; promoting
competition which can spur productivity gains as well as
lower prices; enhancing efficiency in both the state sector
and the private sector; improving the business environment
and so encouraging foreign direct investment (“FDI”); and
increasing participation of small- and medium-sized
enterprises (“SMEs”) in international trade.
The empirical evidence below suggests that many of these
benefits may be economically significant but are associated
with large implementation costs. Rather than imposing new
obligations within the WTO, progress on trade facilitation
should be achieved through national efforts aided by
technical assistance.
5.1 Potential benefits and costs
Few studies have been done that explicitly examine the
potential gains from trade facilitation.  There are dramatic
anecdotal stories:  Costa Rica’s commitment to trade
facilitation was arguably critical in its getting the large Intel
plant.  Modern manufacturing has increasingly relied on
                                                                                                                                         
exception.  Much of government procurement is for services, but the
provision of such services requires the temporary movement of natural
persons.  Contract specification can often be used to give local firms a
preference; ascertaining whether the contract specification was
“reasonable” will be extremely tendentious.
8 The Doha Declaration (para 27) states that until the Fifth Ministerial
the WTO Council for Trade in Goods shall review and as appropriate
clarify and improve relevant aspects of Articles V, VIII and X of GATT
1994 and identify the trade facilitation needs and priorities of Members,
particularly developing and least developed countries. [Article V is on
freedom of transit, Article VIII is on fees and formalities connected with
import and export, and Article X is on  publication and administration of
trade regulations.]
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just-in-time inventory methods, and these cannot operate if
there are costly delays at borders.
 Moreover the studies presented below differ in terms of the
scope of trade facilitation considered and the breadth of
countries and commodities analysed. This makes their
results difficult to compare meaningfully. However the
results below do highlight the magnitude of potential gains
from trade facilitation.
Ernst and Whinney (1987) surveyed EC business costs for
the European Commission. The customs compliance costs
associated with intra EC trade were estimated to be 1.5 per
cent of the total value of trade between member countries.
The US National Committee on International Documentation
(US NCITD) analysed the benefits of trade facilitation in a
1971 study, subsequently updated in the 1990s by Raven
(1996). These studies found that the costs of documentation
and compliance with export and import regulations (at both
ends of the transaction) represented more than 7.5 per cent
of the total value of US shipments.
A study by the Swedish Trade Procedures Council
(SWEPRO) in 1995 used data from companies and
government sources to estimate the cost of compliance with
Swedish trade procedures. It concluded that these costs
could be as much as 4 per cent of the value of imports and
exports.
More recently, a study by Wilson et al. (2003) used a
computable general equilibrium framework to estimate
gains from trade facilitation. They estimated the effect of
bringing the below average APEC members halfway to the
APEC average in four key areas of trade facilitation
(administrative transparency, e-commerce, logistics,
standards harmonisation). They estimate this type of
facilitation  would increase APEC trade by $280bn.
A similar study by Wilson, Mann and Otsuki (2003)
compares the relative benefits from trade facilitation with
those from traditional market access initiatives. They
estimate that a reduction of all tariffs to zero from an APEC
average of 6.5 per cent would create a gain of $27.8bn. By
comparison they find that the improvement in trade
facilitation necessary to achieve the same gains is small.
Relatively minor improvements in port efficiency, customs
procedures and e-business usage deliver similar sized gains.
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The brief survey above suggests that there is a wide span of
estimations regarding the costs of trade procedures, ranging
from 1.5-7.5 per cent of the value of trade flows.
The implementation costs associated with realizing gains
from trade facilitation are also significant. Administrative
changes are associated with obvious costs to both
governments (the creation of new systems and enforcement
of new regulations) and business (compliance). For
developing countries, a large part of the costs to
government should be borne by technical assistance from
developing countries.
The costs of trade facilitation depends on the type of reform
proposed. For example, the World Bank assisted Tunisia in
its program of streamlining and modernising its customs
procedures. The total value of World Bank loans to Tunisia
for this purpose was $35m in 1999. Similarly the World
Bank lent $38m to Poland for upgrading physical and
managerial infrastructure of its port facilities.9 In some cases,
streamlining procedures will both facilitate trade and save
the government money.
Developing countries should put forward the view that
improvements in trade facilitation should be made through
national efforts aided by technical assistance, rather than
through imposing additional obligations in the WTO. If the
consideration of the problems in these areas results in some
solutions, these should, at best, be adopted only as guiding
principles or as flexible best-endeavour provisions, not
enforceable through the dispute settlement process (Das
2002). 
The discussion here, as elsewhere, focuses more on the
concerns of developed countries in gaining access to
developing countries, than on what should have been the
concern of the Development Round,, i.e., developing
countries gaining access to developed countries’ markets.
Of intense concern in the last few years are America’s visa
restrictions.  Such restrictions may or may not be justified by
legitimate concerns for security, however it is certainly true
that the existence of  these security concerns illustrates that
the developed countries often put non-trade concerns over
trade concerns—but often criticize developing countries
when they attempt to do the same.  But the inability to send
businessmen to America to market their goods and the long
delays and high costs (especially in time) in obtaining a visa
                                                      
9 Wilson (2001) and WTO (2000)
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is clearly an important impediment to trade.  This is an issue
that would be high on a development oriented agenda for
trade facilitation.  The fact that it has not been on the
agenda at all is just another illustration of the gap between
what has been attempted to be sold as a development
round agenda and an agenda that would truly promote the
interests of the developing world.
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